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This thesis examines UK doctors’ labour supply from the intensive margin. 
Initially, it explores trends in average weekly hours of work using data from the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). Next, it compares how average weekly hours of 
work vary over the lifecycle for doctors and compare to with other professionals’ 
hours (lawyers and accountants). Finally, as doctors continuously report being 
stressed and unhappy, this thesis explores data from the Annual Population 
Survey (APS) to assess whether hours of work could alter self-reported well-
being levels for doctors and other workers.  
This thesis is made up of five chapters with three main essays on the topic of 
interest. Chapter 1 conveys an extensive background on what we know about 
doctors’ labour supply in the UK and other countries.  
Chapter 2 exploits the LFS to examine main trends in doctors’ weekly hours of 
work (GPs and hospital doctors) over 21 years (1994-2014). It proposes a 
definition of total hours worked that encompasses total usual hours in main job 
(basic hours and overtime hours, paid or unpaid) plus total hours in second job. 
The chapter is mostly descriptive and focuses on changes in average weekly 
hours of work of the headcount of doctors over the period and on variation 
across different characteristics. It also portrays irregular working patterns, 
second job hours and desired hours of work (both more and fewer hours). The 
main finding conveys that despite training more doctors every year and the 
increasing female participation in the medical profession, hours of work have 
fallen over time and the sharpest fall occurs between 1994 and 2004. From 
2004, this trend attenuates but continues falling though at a reduced rate.  
Chapter 3 estimates labour supply models over the lifecycle for a representative 
agent using a pooled cross-section dataset from the LFS for ‘partner’ GPs (Self-
employed), ‘salaried’ GPs, hospital doctors, lawyers and accountants. The 
main finding posits that the reduction in female doctors’ average weekly hours 
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of work – especially ‘salaried’ GPs – has been larger than those of lawyers and 
accountants. This is attributed to lifecycle effects and, particularly, children.  
Chapter 4 examines self-reported well-being outcomes (anxiety, happiness, life 
satisfaction and worthwhile levels) and variables relating health problems 
(depression, hypertension or whether having a health problem limits activity to 
work). We examine the relationship between hours of work and well-being 
levels. Although there is considerable literature on doctors’ job satisfaction, 
especially GPs, and, also, there are numerous studies on the issue of burnout, 
this is not the case for well-being of physicians which is underexplored. The few 
existing studies come from small snapshots and unrepresentative samples. 
This chapter explores a large well-established dataset using conventional 
screens to examine the distribution of well-being and their proximate 
determinants. The information is available in the Annual Population Survey 
(APS) from 2011 quarter 2 to 2015 quarter 1, covering four fiscal years (2011/12 
to 2014/15). Our main finding conveys that, contrary to popular belief, and the 
assertions of the professional bodies for physicians, doctors appear to be more 
satisfied, happier, feel that their life is more worthwhile, and they are less 
anxious than other professionals. The chapter also makes an economic 
contribution on labour supply: hours of work, at the margin, have virtually no 
significant effect on the measures of well-being. This means that individuals are 
on their labour supply curve but those reporting to work more hours may have 
lower values of the well-being measures. This is true for lawyers and 
accountants but not for doctors, which is viewed as evidence of intrinsic 
motivation driven by mission orientation among doctors. So, there is scope for 
expanding supply along the intensive margin, which may be both an 
inexpensive and quick solution to the alleged supply shortfall, relative to the 
current policy of expanding supply along the extensive margin. 
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INTRODUCTION    
 
Labour inputs are used intensively in healthcare services, averaging 70% of 
total costs in the UK (HoC, 2007). This intense use of this input demands better 
understanding of the main labour force issues amongst different occupations. 
Those highly trained and skilled health workers will positively impact on the 
effectiveness and productivity in the health sector (WHO, 2000; Campbell et al, 
2013) to deliver better services more effectively.  
In England, Health Education England (HEE), which seeks to supply the NHS 
workforce with the required skills to provide high-quality services, has only 
estimated a labour supply model for non-clinical staff. Hence, labour supply 
models for clinical workers are still demanded (NAO, 2016). Nurses’ labour 
supply has been analysed extensively (Antonazzo et al, 2013; Rice, 2003; 
Skåtun et al, 2005), but the evidence on doctors is more limited. Moreover, 
current forecasts on the headcount of doctors needed in the UK are based only 
on projections from existing trends. But they are unlikely to be accurate and do 
not delve into on the main issues underlying doctors’ labour supply, at least 
from the intensive margin (NAO, 2016).  
This thesis contributes to narrowing the existing gap in the literature in the UK 
doctors’ labour force (Elliot, 2003; Fox, 2007; Nicholson and Proper, 2011) 
looking at the intensive margin of their labour supply. In fact, this thesis provides 
a comprehensive and detailed analysis on total average weekly hours of work 
over time using secondary data such that contained in the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) expanding on this underexplored topic in the UK from the intensive 
margin. 
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Since 2000, there is a growing perception that there is a shortage of doctors in 
the UK but the expansion of the headcount of doctors has been notable since 
then. On the supply side, this has been accentuated by restrictions to the 
supply, trends in the nature of the supply due to changes in the gender 
composition of doctors, retirement decisions and growing intentions to take 
early retirement. On the demand side, factors that have been associated with 
this perception refer to changes in the nature of care requirements associated 
with the ageing population.  
Legal changes such as the implementation of the European Working Time 
Directive (EWTD) might have adversely affected overall supply of hours of work 
curbing the average weekly hours of work to protect patients and minimise 
potential medical mistakes. Others such the share growth of immigrants and 
the increase in the training capacity of Medical Schools might have had a 
positive impact. The effect of austerity is unclear but the freeze on public sector 
pay might have had some supply side consequences even if overall health 
spending has been ring-fenced. Finally, Brexit is unlikely to increase supply and 
may have an adverse effect (few UK trained doctors work in the EU-28, while 
many EU-28 trained doctors work in the UK). 
 
1.1. THE SUPPLY OF DOCTORS IN THE UK 
1.1.1. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
In the UK, there are few data sources that mostly provide information from the 
extensive margin (headcount and full-time equivalent figures). These are the 
List of Registered Medical Practitioners (LRMP), which is released by the 
General Medical Council (GMC), and the Doctors and Dentists Review Body 
(DDRB) reports from the Office of Manpower Economics (OME). There are 
other sources for each country within the UK such as the Statistics Offices or 
Departments of Health for the devolved governments for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. In England, there is the Health and Social Care Information 
Centre (HSCIC), now called NHS Digital. This thesis is concerned with UK 
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doctors’ labour supply and expands on the awareness of other reliable sources 
to explore this from the intensive margin, covering the whole country rather than 
looking at single national data. 
Data from the LRMP comes from registrations made by doctors themselves 
while data from DDRB reports come from different sources available in each 
country, such as those from the NHS Employers, Departments of Health or 
Statistics Offices. For the specific case of the LRMP, records come from 
individuals and colleges. A medical student enrols in the medical register1 
provisionally after completion of the Foundation Year 1 (FY1), the first year of 
postgraduate training after graduated from a medical degree. The full 
registration comes after FY1. This may end on fully licensed doctors after a few 
more year of training and only licensed doctors can treat patients, at least in 
the NHS. Figure 1.1 shows trends of registered doctors in the GMC medical 
register (data refers to 31st of December 2016) and Figures 1.2 and 1.3 the 
number of doctors in the GP and the Specialist register respectively. 
In 2014, the medical register in the UK included 267,1682 doctors of whom 
236,908 were licensed doctors (GMC, 2015). The difference between figures 
in the medical register and those licensed is attributed to the exclusion of 
doctors in training who are not fully licensed or doctors who stop practising, 
gave up their license for retiring or emigration reasons. Of the 236,908 licensed 
doctors, 188,248 were from England (79.46%), 20,108 from Scotland (8.49%), 
9,812 from Wales (4.14%), 6,293 from Northern Ireland (2.66%) and 12,447 
from other areas (5.25%). Licensed doctors included in the “Other” region refer 
to those licensed doctors who are located overseas and those who were 
impossible to locate from the date they registered.  
 
 
                                               
1 See Appendix 1 for careers path. Definitions of different categories are available in DDRB reports.  
2 Figures in the GMC 2015 report The State of Medical and Practice in the UK report a total number of 
registered doctors 267,168. However, Figure 1.1 showed 267,177 doctors in the same year. There may 
be some corrections done after the publication of the report. 
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Figure 1.1 Registered Doctors on the LRMP 
 
Figure 1.2 Registered Doctors on the GMC GP Register 
 




There is not strong consensus on absolute figures. Data from the GMC medical 
register in 2014 (GMC, 2015) shows that, amongst licensed doctors (236,908) 
65.64% were UK trained (155,508), 10.12% (23,967) from the European 
Economic Area (EEA) and 24.24% (57,433) were International Medical 
Graduates (IMG), and the majority is from Asia. The same source conveys that 
on the GP register (60,279 licensed GPs), 5.86% (3,531) were EEA trained 
doctors, 16.6% (10,008) IMG, and 77.54% (46,740) UK-trained. The same 
figures from the Specialist register (73,342 licensed Specialists in 2014) show 
60.46% (44,368) UK-trained doctors, 15.43% (11,321) EEA and 24.11% 
(17,693) IMG trained. However, the number of EEA-trained doctors has fallen 
over time (NAO, 2016) 
In relative terms to population, the OECD reports 2.6 doctors per 1,000 
population (OECD, 2010) in the UK rising to 2.8 in 2013 (OECD, 2015) and 
2014 (OECD, 2016). Figure 1.4 depicts the number of physicians among OECD 
countries in 2013 and compares with figures in 2000.  
Figure 1.4 Number of Licensed Physicians per 1,000 Population 
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933280876   
 
The UK underperforms compared to the average number of physicians in the 
OECD. Knowing that the population in the UK in 2013 was 64,105,654 people3 





and there were 2.8 licensed physicians per 1,000 population then we can work 
out that there were 179,495 licensed doctors in the country, which is very close 
to data reported in DDRB reports (the 44th DDRB report recorded 177,388 
licensed doctors in the NHS in 2014 and 183,522 in the 45th DDRB report in 
2014). 
 
COMPOSITION OF DOCTORS 
In the UK, doctors usually split into specialists (hospitals), and generalists 
(primary care) where the former usually account for a larger proportion than the 
latter. Hospital doctors encompass consultants and specialists (associate 
specialists, SAS and other specialists) and doctors in primary care include 
General Medical Practitioners (GMP), both salaried and contractors, under the 
national General Medical Services contract (GMS) or the more local Personal 
Medical Services contract (PMS), which focuses on the special characteristics 
of populations in certain areas. During recent years, there have been new 
policies to tackle the unbalanced headcount between specialists and 
generalists. For example, under the Health Education England (HEE) mandate 
the goal is to achieve a 50:50 ratio between generalists and hospital doctors.  
Figure 1.5 shows the composition of doctors for OECD countries in 2013 
(OECD, 2015) and Figure 1.6 over time, by specialty, using data from DDRB 
reports. In 2013, 71% of UK doctors worked in hospital premises whilst 29% 
did in primary care premises. In Figure 1.6 the time trend composition conveys 
that the number of hospital specialists has grown over time whilst proportions 
in primary care doctors lessened. Figure 1.7 adds the ratio of hospital doctors 
for each generalist doctor in 2004, 2009 and 2014 and confirms that the number 
of physicians slightly grew over the number of generalists in the UK but is stable 




Figure 1.5 Composition of Doctors (OECD Countries) 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Composition of Doctors by Specialty (DDRB data) 
 







Source: OECD, Health Statistics 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933280883 
Notes:  
1. Generalists include general practitioners/family doctors and other generalist (non-specialist) medical practitioners. 
2. Specialists include paediatricians, obstetricians/gynaecologists, psychiatrists, medical, surgical and other specialists.  
3. In Ireland and Portugal, most generalists are not GPs ("family doctors"), but rather non-specialist doctors working in 
hospitals or other settings. In Portugal, there is some double-counting of doctors with more than one specialty. 
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The GMC medical register reported 148,572 males (55.61%) and 118,596 
females (44.39%) of 267,168 registered doctors in 2014. Among the 236,908 
licensed doctors, 54.74% were males (129,668) and 45.26% females 
(107,220). Breaking down gender figures on the GP and Specialist registers 
and, next, doctors in training proportions were 49.61% (29,903), 67.16% 
(49,293) and 42.87% (25,269) males respectively.  
Overall, males are more numerous than females for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the number of specialists is larger than generalists and the proportion of males 
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working as hospital specialists is greater than females. Secondly, before the 
expansion of UK universities in the 1990s, male medical students were more 
numerous than females. Since the 1990s this changed the gender composition 
and female participation rose. For example, the proportion of female 
consultants rose from 21% in 1999 to 31% in 2010 (CfWI, 2012). Data from the 
GMC in 2016 conveys that there were 59,564 males (66%) and 30,746 females 
(34%) of 90,310 specialists in the Specialists register, which has been stable 
compared to 2011 (see BMA, 2012). The GP register from the GMC reported 
32,350 males (47.8%) and 35,307 females (52.2%) of 67,657 generalists. 
Figures 1.8 and Figures 1.9 show the change in the gender composition of 
doctors and Figure 1.10 the increasing female participation in Medical schools.  
Figure 1.8 Share of Female Doctors 
 












Figure 1.9 Registered Doctors by Gender Breakdown (2007-2016) 
 
Source: http://www.gmc-uk.org/doctors/register/search_stats.asp  
 
 
Figure 1.10 Medical School Intakes (England) 
 
       Source: CfWI (2012) 
 
 
 1.1.2. MORE FEMALES WANT TO BECOME DOCTORS 
 
The number of female doctors has grown substantially over the last years. This 
has been a common trend in many countries (Riska, 2012; Boulis and Jacobs, 
2008; More, 2009; Kilminster et al, 2007). Table 1.1. summarises the change 
in the proportion of females over time. 
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Table 1.1 Proportion of female doctors 
 
Source: OECD Stat (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx) 
 
The expansion in the number of female physicians has increased the proportion 
of females to about 50% of total doctors in some countries and around 35% in 
others (US) based on data from the OECD. Overall, in post-soviet countries 
female doctors were a majority showing proportions above 50% in all years 
                  
REGION 
PROPORTION FEMALE DOCTORS (%) 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
 
        
Post-soviet countries         
     Czech Republic 51.55 51.84 52.15 52.44 53.02 53.73 54.39 - 
     Hungary 50.1 51.41 51.05 51.2 52.31 54.23 54.41 54.54 
     Poland 54.18 54.02 53.79 55.38 55.73 56.65 55.69 56.5 
     Lithuania (non-OECD) - 69.68 69.54 69.27 69.84 70.07 69.53 69.69 
         
Scandinavian countries         
     Denmark 36.26 38.23 39.97 42.16 43.95 45.51 47.32 48.96 
     Finland 49.94 51.16 52.51 53.93 55.48 55.5 56.88 58.28 
     Norway - 33.45 34.84 38.37 40.46 42.28 43.94 45.95 
     Sweden 39.58 40.57 41.54 43.13 44.54 45.59 46.67 47.58 
         
Central Europe         
     Austria 36.77 38.27 39.95 41.13 42.85 44.47 45.49 46.18 
     Belgium 27.65 29.44 30.97 32.4 34.03 35.63 37.32 39.5 
     France 36.5 37.21 38.08 38.81 39.73 40.82 42.07 43.59 
     Germany 36.01 36.92 37.75 39.11 40.76 42.46 43.87 45.21 
     Greece 33.93 35.16 35.94 37.32 38.51 39.37 40.24 41.2 
     Ireland 36.53 37.03 36.59 35.63 37.01 38.86 40.07 42.57 
     Italy 30.19 31.63 33.09 34.7 36.08 37.24 39.37 40.29 
     Netherlands 35.3 37.23 39.13 40.84 43.9 46.05 49.45 51.66 
     Portugal 45.58 46.45 47.41 48.2 49.54 50.69 52.07 53.4 
     Spain 36.82 41.67 44.78 45.28 48.17 50.18 50.29 51.55 
     Switzerland 29.12 30.65 32.2 33.58 34.72 35.96 37.74 39.72 
     United Kingdom 35.37 36.48 37.64 39.44 41.82 43.99 45.67 47.19 
         
Non-European 
Countries 
        
     Australia 29.96 31.52 32.35 33.81 35.14 - 37.68 39.34 
     Canada 31.32 32.78 34.14 35.77 37.29 38.83 39.91 41.24 
     Israel 39.19 39.89 40.32 40.61 40.82 41.06 41.24 41.4 
     Japan 14.33 15.54 16.36 17.12 18.02 18.84 19.55 20.3 
     New Zealand 32.86 34.66 36.31 37.71 39.55 40.84 41.93 43.21 
     United States 25 26.35 28.11 29.54 30.78 31.76 33.42 34.56 
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while in Scandinavian and European Countries there has been a rising 
participation of females in the medical profession since 2000, reaching 
proportions close or above 50% in Scandinavian countries and less or near to 
50% in European countries. This proportion is lower in other non-European 
countries which sets between 35-40%.  
This growth in the proportion of female doctors differs amongst countries. The 
increase in US female physicians is a result of the 1970s reform on US 
universities which expanded medical schools, a drop in the number of male 
doctors during the 1980s, and an increasing interest in medical careers for 
males and females during the 1990s as doctors was seen as a prestigious 
career in the US (Boulis and Jacobs, 2008). In other countries, such as post-
soviet countries the introduction of social insurance mechanisms and private 
healthcare practices lessened participation in a formerly prestigious job during 
the soviet era, reducing doctors’ income more than other professionals after the 
introduction of relevant structural reforms to gain competitiveness in a post-
soviet era (Riska, 2012). In Scandinavian countries, the expansion of the public 
sector, the welfare state, and the expansion of gendered equality policies, 
attracted more females for medical careers. This was complemented with an 
education policy that expanded medical schools in the country and improved 
access to primary care publicly funded systems (Riska, 2001). 
The interest in understanding the feminisation in doctors’ careers has expanded 
during the last decade (McKinstry et al, 2006; Hedden et al, 2014; Jefferson et 
al, 2015). Similar patterns have been observed in most countries. However, 
there are some determinants that may explain whether there is gender 
segregation that leads female doctors to concentrate on a few specialties. For 
example, Riska (2012) compared doctors’ specialties amongst the US, the UK, 
Finland, Lithuania and Sweden between 2007 and 2009 and confirm there is 
gender segregation and females usually prefer working in a few specialties 
such as general practice, paediatrics, psychiatry, obstetrics and gynaecology. 
In England, Jefferson also confirms that the proportion of females working in 
primary care grew hugely compared with the number of females working in 
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specialist care. Amongst the main reasons that may help explain this gender 
segregation are individual preferences on careers choices, working patterns 
such as the females’ preference for part-time work or regular working hours 
(Riska, 2012). Other authors posit preferences, institutional or social changes 
(Boulis and Jacobs, 2008).  
In a systematic review, Hedden et al summarise the gender differences 
amongst primary care physicians: females work fewer hours, are more likely to 
work part-time – especially if they have children aged under 18, do less intense 
work encountering fewer patients or reducing the number of visits, they 
prescribe and refer more to specialists do less out-of-hours, retire or leave 
earlier than males and are less likely to work in solo or rural practices. Heiligers 
and Hingstman got similar determinants for Dutch doctors but they did not get 
a clear part-time work preference for females (Heiligers and Hingstman, 2000). 
The scope of work matters for females and female primary care doctors prefer 
specialties where they can see younger patients and fewer elder patients, 
reducing the chronicity and complexity of treatments. In Australia, females 
primary care physicians prescribed 4% more than males, requested nearly 20% 
more clinical treatments, 18% more referrals or 10% more pathology tests 
(Harrison et al, 2011). In Netherlands, female primary care doctors prescribed 
less and recorded fewer technical interventions but referrals to specialists 
remains similar between males and females (Bensing et al, 1993). Others are 
out-of-office hours, years of practice or specific practice characteristics.  
Hedden et al find literature in Canada that confirms that fewer female primary 
care doctors tend to work out-of-hours (7% vs 9.6% of males) and doing home 
visits (1.5% vs 3.7% of males). Moreover, female GPs tend to take early 
retirement in greater proportion than males (in Australia, Brett et al confirm 
those proportions are 75% females wanting to retire earlier than the retirement 
age of 65 versus 59% of males). Other studies confirm that childbearing is one 
source for leaving the profession or reducing hours (Leese et al, 2002).  
In England, the most relevant study estimates that female GPs work on average 
almost 12 hours less than male GPs (Gravelle and Hole, 2007). About 5.4 hours 
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of this gap (40%) is explained by the reduction in female hours of work. 
McKinstry et al are concerned about the impact of the feminisation in the 
Scottish primary care service, demanding more research on the effect of hours 
of work of female GPs. However, although most acknowledge gender 
differences in preferences to work, career preferences or hours of work over 
the life cycle there are no studies considering this analysis and the main policy 
implications. For example, Jones and Fisher tracked 544 medical graduates for 
over a decade to better understand what determined their career choices and 
to examine whether medical students were consistent with their decisions taken 
at the medical school (Jones and Fisher, 2006). They found that females are 
more likely to switch to primary care after a few years of experience since 
graduation seeking for a better work-life balance. Nonetheless, there are some 
questions that remain unanswered: Does the UK really need more GPs? What 
are the implications of having more GP doctors working part-time? Why is being 
a GP still unattractive to medical students relative to a hospital doctor? 
1.2. WHY DOES LABOUR SUPPLY MATTER?  
There has been a growing interest in the literature to understand the main 
issues on labour supply in general. Specifically, most articles since the 1970s 
have explored the differences in individuals’ participation and hours of work 
(Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Between 1960s and 1980s, also, empirical 
literature tested how individuals made their choices to maximise their utility of 
work - for example labour supply decisions of lone parents (Bingley and Walker, 
1997), both theoretical and empirical theories, at the extensive margin (labour 
force participation or work arrangement) or the intensive margin (hours of 
work). Other works have distinguished between static, dynamic and structural 
functions, producing a considerable number of analyses on intertemporal 
substitution between consumption and leisure (Card, 1991) or the analysis of 
the labour supply using life-cycle models that help explain the choices at 
different ages or the effect of business cycles on the supply of hours. 
Furthermore, the labour supply topic has encouraged researchers to find 
solution to selection bias, measurement error or other endogeneity problems 
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(Heckman, 1993). Other studies measured the elasticities at both margins 
(Reichling and Whalen, 2012; Chetty et al, 2011) of wages or unearned income 
on the decision to supply more or fewer hours. Besides, there have been some 
analyses at the extensive margin to understand why hours of work vary 
amongst countries (Prescott, 2004; Bozio, 2011; Blundell et al, 2011) or gender 
determinants of labour supply (Pencavel, 1986; Killingsworth and Heckman, 
1986). This all shows that fostering awareness on what underlies labour supply 
choices helps to address specific problems arising in different markets and 
formulate the right incentives to increase individuals’ work effort, productivity, 
efficiency and effectiveness on different policies, from fiscal policy to welfare or 
public policies to tackle potential inequalities.  
The labour supply of doctors is important in many ways: better understanding 
of doctors’ career preferences may help to improve workforce planning in 
specialties; how workers decide to supply more or fewer hours; whether there 
are gender differences in allocating work time or balancing work-family 
decisions; it helps identify specialties where workers are more likely to work 
part-time or full-time.  
Training is costs and time is important as doctors’ training is mostly borne by 
taxpayers, either financing universities or providing student loans, and it takes 
a long time to get a licensed doctor (on average 10 years for a GP and 12-14 
for a hospital doctor). It is expensive, and much of the cost is born by the 
taxpayer4. It is important to better understand the main determinants of the 
labour supply of doctors over their lifecycle. This topic is underexplored in the 
literature, especially in the UK, and is very important in all health systems for 
many reasons. Although there is some literature on hospital consultants or 
general practitioners, better understanding of doctors’ labour supply is 
important because it will help policymakers to better understand what motivates 
doctors to change their supplied hours of work; secondly, they would be able to 
                                               
4 Recently it was announced that it cost £230,000 to train a doctor over fees paid by medical students. This means the 
total cost after tuition fees. On average, the investment for the Medical degree would mean £245,000 of which tuition 
fees meant £44,458 for 2016/17. A GP would cost £400,000 and Consultants above £500,000 according to the Unit 
Costs and Social Care 2016 report. Data from the National Audit Office suggest those figures go to £485,000 for a GP 
and £720,000 for a hospital consultant (NAO, 2016). 
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design better policies and incentives to increase their performance or reduce 
dropouts from the labour force; finally, they could focus on increasing 
motivation, satisfaction, or better manage their geographical distribution.  
The composition of doctors by sector (primary or secondary care) and by 
gender is not static. Expanding the number of analyses on doctors’ labour 
supply will help to understand the main determinants, what main changes in 
the composition imply for the supply of healthcare services to the population 
and increase efficiency in delivering better health services. For example, the 
enhancement of community-based services improves the efficiency in the 
delivery of health services (RCGP, 2013) and increasing the proportion of 
female doctors is a gender equality policy. However, is we fail to understand 
what consequences those changes have or why females work different hours 
than males, then the effect on the health system will be limited. As seen in 
previous figures, the proportion of doctors who are female has been rising 
strongly. But males and females have different work patterns over their lifecycle 
(Blundell et al, 2011; Pencavel, 1986; Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986) which, 
as we will see, has important implications for the overall supply of care. There 
is more evidence on doctors’ earnings in the UK (Morris et al, 2008; Morris et 
al, 2011; Gravelle et al, 2011) but very few studies on hours of work and this is 
reflected in our focus here on labour supply. The little evidence that does exist 
relies on data from specific questionnaires which make comparability 
problematic and forbids entirely any comparisons with trends in other workers. 
This is reflected here in our choice of LFS data. 
1.3. STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT 
This thesis is built upon three main empirical chapters and finishes with a final 
chapter where I draw my conclusions from the analysis. 
1.3.1. OVERVIEW CHAPTER 2 
The main contribution made in Chapter 2 is twofold. Firstly, it is the first analysis 
that extensively exploits data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the 
analyses of the main issues on doctors’ labour supply (GPs and hospital 
doctors). The research study spans over 21 years (1994-2014) and is mostly 
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descriptive, but nonetheless comprehensive and very informative. We explore 
average weekly hours of work using a new single variable of the self-reported 
hours of work, that encompasses hours in main – basic and overtime – and 
second job. The chapter offers information on hours of work for GPs and 
hospital doctors by gender breakdown and other demographics such as 
ethnicity (white versus non-white), country of birth (UK natives versus 
immigrants) or regional distribution (residence region). It also presents 
information on more or fewer hours wanted to work in main job. The analysis 
conveys that hours of work have fallen over time and that the sharp fall happens 
between 1994 and 2004. Since 2004, average hours of work continue falling 
but at a reduced rate. The second contribution of this chapter explores the 
trends in both the extensive and the intensive margin. Since 2000 the 
headcount of doctors has expanded almost every year and the number of 
female workers has grown very rapidly too, changing the gender composition 
of certain types of doctors, especially in primary care. However, as stated in the 
main contribution, total average weekly hours of work have fallen.  
This detailed analysis can increase awareness of incorporating both margins 
when addressing workforce planning policies. Also, it will help policymakers to 
unravel whether there is a real shortage of doctors in the UK or they can tackle 
this perceived shortage from the intensive margin, incentivising doctors better.  
1.3.2. OVERVIEW CHAPTER 3 
Chapter 3 extends the previous analysis estimating labour supply models over 
the lifecycle for doctors (‘partner’ GPs, ‘salaried’ GPs and hospital doctors) and 
compares with other professionals (lawyers and accountants). The analysis 
confirms differences by gender and a gender gap in hours in all occupations, 
but the gap is wider amongst doctors, especially in primary care. This behaviour 
is mostly explained by motherhood in the literature on the labour supply and it 
is also the case for GPs. Moreover, since the new contract (2004) the policy 
has consisted on expanding the headcount of GPs increasing the recruitment 
of salaried GPs. Also, female GPs seem to participate more in this work 
arrangement, where they outnumber males. While the labour supply shows the 
 18 
usual U-inverted shape for males that is not the case for females where it shows 
a more U-form curve between 26 and 46 years old. Beyond that age, the hours 
of work start to fall as one should expect. The chapter makes use of 
counterfactuals to explain the gap in hours by gender and occupation.  
1.3.3. OVERVIEW CHAPTER 4 
The last chapter covers the analysis of the well-being of doctors and the 
implications on the labour supply. Although there is considerable literature on 
job satisfaction, especially for GPs, and on the issue of burnout amongst 
physicians, that is not the case on well-being of doctors where the very little 
existing research relies on small snapshots and unrepresentative samples. The 
main contribution of this chapter lies in exploring the self-reported well-being 
measures (anxiety, happiness, life satisfaction and worthwhile) as well as other 
metrics (such as depression, hypertension and whether having health problems 
limit work activity) using the Annual Population Survey (APS). Contrary to 
popular belief, and the assertions of the professional bodies for physicians, 
doctors appear to be more satisfied, happier, feel that their life is more 
worthwhile and are less anxious than other professionals (like lawyers and 
accountants).  
The chapter includes economic content relating to labour supply including 
hours of work in main and second job and desired hours (more or fewer than 
currently worked). It finds that hours of work, at the margin, has virtually no 
significant effect on the various measures of well-being included in the analysis. 
The could mean that these individuals are, on average, on their labour supply 
curve. Among the small proportion of respondents who state wishing to work 
more hours, we find that, controlling for the wage rate, those individuals have 
lower values of the well-being measures used. This is true for lawyers and 
accountants, but not for doctors. So, this can be viewed as evidence of intrinsic 
motivation. The main policy implication of this finding is that, hence, expanding 
supply along the intensive margin is likely to be both an inexpensive and quick 
solution to the alleged supply shortfall of doctors, relative to the current policy 





DOCTORS’ HOURS OF WORK IN 
THE UK: LABOUR SUPPLY 




The unprecedented expansion of the headcount of doctors in the UK since 2001 
has been justified by the increasing demand for medical services from a rapidly 
ageing population; growing expectations of better quality health services; and 
the overall rise in the UK population. On the supply side, despite the rising 
female participation in labour markets since the 1980s (Goldacre, 1998) and a 
rise in the number of immigrant doctors, there still is a belief that there is a 
shortage of doctors. The existing doctors have been reporting growing levels of 
stress and heavy workloads which have reflected growing intentions to leave 
the profession early5. Nevertheless, recent reports predict an increase of 60% 
in trained hospital doctors by 2020 (CfWI, 2012, RCP, 2013), potentially leading 
to an oversupply of 2,800 consultants, and 5,000 extra GPs for understaffed 
Primary Care services (NHS, 2016; RCGP, 2013).  
These trends have supported a long-standing perception that the UK needs to 
recruit more doctors, especially in primary care services and professional 
bodies are suggesting significant shortfalls in supply. The Centre for Workforce 
Intelligence (CfWI) reported that England needs 3,250 more GPs (CfWI, 2012); 
the General Practice Forward Review foresees 5,000 extra GPs (NHS, 2016); 
                                               
5 See BMA, 2014q1; BMA, 2014q2; BMA, 2014q3; BMA, 2014q4; BMA 2015q1; BMA, 2015q2; BMA, 
2015q3; BMA, 2015q4. 
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and other sources have suggested6 to recruit 8,000 new full-time GPs by 20207 
(RCGP, 2013; NHS, 2014; NHS, 2016). All of the existing work has focussed 
exclusively on the extensive margin and the policy suggestions have largely, 
but not entirely, been confined to expanding the number of doctors8. In our 
work, we focus on average hours of work (intensive margin) to investigate 
whether there might be some possibility of expansion along this margin, rather 
than only through increasing the headcount (extensive margin).  
It is in primary care where there is very little information on hours since most 
such physicians (General Practitioners, GPs9) work as either self-employed 
(‘partner’ GPs) or employed (‘salaried’ GPs) at these independent partnerships 
(few are employed directly by the NHS). Thus, for GPs, there is limited data 
available on their supply of hours of work. Moreover, even the little we know 
about the FTE headcount of hospital doctors (DDRB, 1992-2017) is limited to 
their contractual arrangements and does not take account of overtime or activity 
in any second job. 
THE 2004 CONTRACT  
The 2004 contract introduced new incentives, mostly financial, for GPs and 
hospital doctors. Besides, it regulated the number of hours for full-time doctors: 
hospital doctors would make up to 40 hours per week, the equivalent to 10 
Programme Activities where each Programme activity averages 4 hours; and 
GPs up to 37.5 hours per week, in 9 sessions of 4 hours and 10 minutes. 
Alternatively, the European Working Time Directive (EWTD) capped the 







8 For example, Bloor et al (2006) have suggested that the gap could be filled with highly qualified trained 
nurses. 
9 In the UK, most GPs are independent contractors (self-employed, partner GPs) and are bound to either 
a national contract (General Medical Services, GMS) or a local contract (Personal Medical Services, 
PMS). 
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maximum number of weekly average hours of work to 48 in a 17-week period 
to minimise medical errors.  
For GPs, it covered primary care physicians contracted under the General 
Medical Services (GMS), both partner GPs and salaried GPs, and replaced the 
former 1998-2003 contract for GPs but those under the Personal Medical 
Services (PMS) were excluded. The PMS was introduced in 1997 under the 
1990 GP contract and allowed GPs under this contract to work as ‘salaried’ 
GPs, getting paid by session and temporary work as locums. The contract aims 
to provide more flexibility for contractors, providing better order and clear 
structure to Primary Care Organizations. 
Doctors benefited from the new financial incentives the 2004 contract offered. 
GPs get a ‘global sum’ which is a weighted income of all practices GPs covered, 
where each weight is allocated on the basis of each practice list size which is 
adjusted by patients’ characteristics such as age or sex. Patients’ weights are 
based on the workload they generate. So, locations where most patients are 
children, women and the elderly, will get higher weights and, thus, higher global 
sum. There is also an additional weight based on the location of the practice 
(rural versus urban practices where rural are more expensive, for example), the 
cost of hiring and employing staff (the so-called Market Forces Factor, MFF), 
the rate of changing or cancelling appointments in the patient list (known as the 
rate of “churn”) and morbidity in the area based on the measure provided by 
the Health Survey for England. This ‘global sum’ formula may have change 
GPs’ income and the income loss for some GPs (for example, in rural areas) 
and through their representative organisations the GPs were able to extract a 
concession. GPs receive a “Minimum Practice Income Guarantee, MPIG”, 
which temporarily protected the previous income levels of those otherwise have 
lost out – that guarantee being withdrawn over time by a combination of inflation 
and the clawback of pay rises. 
Payments are calculated using Carr-Hill formula (attributed to Professor Roy 
from The University of York). The calculation includes practice characteristics, 
individual patients' age, gender and health conditions and calculates a 
 22 
"weighted" count of patients according to need. Hence, what matters is patients’ 
characteristics and health conditions and not the burden of patients list. So, 
should two practices have the same number of patients, they could have 
different weighted patient numbers due to heterogenous patient characteristics 
and health conditions. This would result in higher levels of funding for the 
practice with worst patients’ characteristics. 
Additionally, the Government introduced a voluntary scheme to foster quality of 
the service delivered in primary care. This is called the Quality of Outcomes 
Framework (QoF). This mechanism incentivises GPs to increase their activity 
incorporating more services in their practices than the basic services. The 
requirement to benefit from this mechanism was to take more services and fulfil 
certain conditions based upon 146 indicators. The result is that GPs get points 
and, hence, more money. The money coming from QoF is taken out the global 
sum that rewards GPs’ activity. So, essentially, this extra money is distributed 
income rather than representing extra money. However, GPs can opt out the 
QoF. The fact that the QoF payments are considered extra money for GPs’ 
activity relies on this decision to opt in or out. However, most GPs opted in. The 
results derived from QoF has led to substantial improvements in the screening 
for risk factors in the community by primary care, particularly for older patients 
with cardiovascular disease. 
With regards to hours of work the new contract does not establish a minimum 
number of hours per week, apart of setting the maximum for a full-time worker. 
However, almost all GPs were forced to opt out of weekend and night out-of-
hours (OOH) services. The reason was financial as the cost of providing a good 
quality service was twofold the funding allocated to it by the patient. Also, the 
government set standards that were difficult to meet by workers (all calls to be 
answered within 60 seconds etc.).  
Additionally, apart the 2004 contract reduced the basic pay GPs got but doctors 
still could get higher earnings thanks to the QoF bonus scheme. The old 
contract paid General Practitioners (GPs) on the basis of fees and allowances. 
In contrast, the new contract allocated resources to GPs through three main 
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funding streams: the global sum; the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF); 
and enhanced services payments. Separate funding streams were available 
for practices to modernise their premises and improve their IT infrastructure. 
This chapter looks at doctors’ labour supply from the intensive margin exploring 
average weekly hours of work in great detail over a twenty-one-year period 
(1994-2014) using information from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). We 
analyse doctors’ self-reported hours of work over time, and while our main focus 
is on GPs, we also consider hospital doctors. Our ultimate objective is to 
examine the extent to which the supply of doctors’ hours has changed - to 
complement what we already think we know about the headcount (extensive 
margin). We find evidence that hours of work have fallen over the last two 
decades, most of the drop occurring before the time the new 2004 contract was 
passed in February 2004 and implemented two months later. Although the GP 
headcount rose by 44.5% between 1994 and 2014, their average hours of work 
fell by 30% and their overall supply of hours remained almost exactly as it was 
in 1994 (only a 1% change between 1994 and 2014). In contrast, the increase 
in the supply of hospital doctors of approximately 136% is only translated into 
an overall increase in the supply of hours of 91% because of the 19% reduction 
in their average hours of work per week. 
 
2.2. LITERATURE 
Over the last years, there have been important changes in labour supply both 
at the extensive and intensive margin. By education level, participation 
(extensive margin) has risen markedly, especially for those with more years of 
education (16+). By gender, females have benefited from higher participation 
in the US and the UK, but males slightly have dropped theirs since 1970s 
(Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). In other countries, like Germany, participation 
has been more stable over time though females’ participation slightly rose and 
fell for low-educated workers. By cohorts, older cohorts of males have 
experienced lower declines in participation than young cohorts in the US, the 
UK and Germany but for females there has been the opposite.  
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Average annual/weekly hours of work (intensive margin) have shown different 
patterns by country and education level. In the US, for example, average weekly 
hours grew between 1983 and 1994 and highly educated workers increased 
their hours more than other workers (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). By gender, 
the more educated male workers, then, continue working more hours in the US 
than the low educated. Nevertheless, hours of work remained around 42 hours 
per week on average between 1970s and 1990s. In Europe, for example in the 
UK and Germany, average weekly hours fell in Germany between 1984 and 
1994 and the highly educated workers experienced the sharpest fall. 
Meanwhile, in the UK, average weekly hours of work grew over the same period 
and the highest surge was for high educated workers whose average weekly 
hours grew by 5% between 1984 and 1994. On the other hand, female workers’ 
average weekly hours increased for all workers in the US and the growth was 
greater for females having more than 16 years of education. In the UK, the 
change in average weekly hours was steadier for most female workers and 
grew for the more educated 14% (from nearly 30 hours per week in 1982 to 
slightly above 34 hours per week in 1994). Meanwhile, average weekly hours 
fell in Germany and the sharpest fall was for the more educated female workers. 
 
The determinants of work behaviour of males and females is well documented. 
More years of schooling, increasing proportion of males taking early retirement, 
a fall in weekly hours worked, increase in holiday entitlement or exerting lower 
effort have been signalled as main causes to explain why males do work less 
over time (Pencavel, 1986). On the other hand, females’ average weekly hours 
of work have shown a secular decline too but their participation in the labour 
market has grown dramatically. Killingsworth and Heckman posit that what 
matters when looking at females’ labour supply is number of weeks worked per 
year rather than average weekly hours of work (Killingsworth and Heckman, 
1986).  
 
Most analysis from a family perspective or on married female workers usually 
control for unearned income. Ilmakunnas and Pudney estimated a discrete 
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choice model of labour supply for Finnish females to identify if Finnish females 
were constrained to work their desire hours using data from the Labour Force 
Survey and Census in Finland (Ilmakunnas and Pudney, 1990). There is an 
arbitrary assumption on participation (positive hours) and the definitions of part-
time (19h) and full-time (39h). They control for unearned income and conclude 
that females are constrained because there are few chances to get part-time 
work as wages increase, setting the elasticity of Finnish females around 0.7. 
Other authors also included this control. Unearned income is important to 
evaluate labour supply as it plays an exogenous role on decisions on hours. 
Empirical evidence has tested that unearned income reduces labour supply 
and, thus, labour earnings while it increases the consumption of leisure about 
11% (Imbens et al, 2001). This is more evident on workers aged above 50. 
 
Specifically, for doctors, there is a long-lasting perception that there is a 
shortage of physicians which has been attributed to changes in modern 
societies such as ageing populations, growing needs of health services and 
rising female participation in labour markets since the 1980s have contributed 
to the expansion of the headcount of doctors (Goldacre, 1998). The literature 
looking at the feminisation of the medical profession is thin but has expanded 
quickly (McKinstry et al, 2006; Hedden et al, 2014; Jefferson et al, 2015). 
Although there are gender differences in the labour supply, this topic only has 
produced more studies recently and many are required. Most analyses usually 
are static and stress the positive role of females as a factor that is increasing 
the supply of doctor services to the market.  
The growing female participation held the expansion of the headcount 
(extensive margin) of doctors in the UK since the late 1990s. Empirical studies 
focussed on understanding medical students’ career preferences to ascertain 
potential shortages. Jones and Fisher tracked medical graduates from 1995 to 
200410 (Jones and Fisher, 2006) and found that female GPs outnumbered 
males in 2004 (107/159 versus 52/159) and that they are more likely to work 
                                               
10 Sample size is 544 in 1995 and 484 responded to the questionnaire in 2004 (89%). 
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less than full-time (76% of females versus 21% of males). Moreover, they 
identified career changes to primary care11 after a few years of experience 
being the proportion females switching to primary care greater than males. 
Among the main reasons that respondents gave for this switch were hours of 
work and working conditions (81%) followed by domestic circumstances or 
career prospects among others.  
In the UK, the perceived shortage of doctors has been on the research agenda 
for some time (Elliot, 2003) but more studies are needed. Rather than training 
more doctors, Bloor et al discussed whether highly qualified nurses with 
advanced knowledge at doctors’ level could be a more cost-efficient alternative 
(Bloor et al, 2006). However, this could exacerbate the shortage of nurses, 
which also has been widely explored in the literature (Antonazzo et al, 2013; 
Rice, 2005). Also, their study does not estimate the number of nurses in the 
NHS with that level of training, whether they will be willing to undertake further 
training, and how much time and cost it would take to train to become doctor 
equivalents. 
In England, Gravelle and Hole estimate the total hours worked by English GPs 
using linear regression models (Gravelle and Hole, 2007) running probit models 
to ascertain the probability that GPs work part-time or full-time using data from 
a GP database from the Department of Health, through the National Primary 
Care Research and Development Centre. Including a part-time/full-time 
variable may lead to problematic interpretations because hours of work then 
appear on both sides of the equation. Overall, part-time GPs worked, on 
average, 13.5 hours less than full-time doctors; hours of work increased with 
experience (maximum level at 17 years of experience) and they report a 6.5 
hours gender difference in full-time workers (49.55 for males and 43.16 
females) and 5 hours for part-time workers (34.09 for males and 29.17 for 
females). Therefore, the overall effect they get is that female GPs work 11.3 
hours less than males. This is explained by the big effect dependent children 
                                               
11 Only 18% (96/544) of those who graduated in 1995 chose to follow medical careers in general 
practice but in 2004 that proportion rose to 33% (160/483). 
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under 18 have on the supply of hours of work and that males are less influenced 
than females when there are dependent children at home. 
The interest in the analysis of hours of work of doctors has also been studied 
in other countries and most confirm a fall over time in the average hours of work 
of physicians. For example, Staiger et al analysed the trends in the hours of 
work of doctors in the US using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data 
between 1976 and 2008 and acknowledge a fall of almost 4 hours per week in 
10 years (54.9 hours per week in 1996-1998 and 51.0 hours in 2006-2008) 
whereas hours of other professionals remain steadier (Staiger et al, 2010). 
They also report that financial incentives have a strong effect on hours and 
concluded that the fall in hours occurred during the period where physician fees 
dropped, positing a close link between physician fees and hours of work. 
In Norway, Baltagi et al find that hospital doctors work 9.4 hours less per month 
in 1996 than in 1994 which is attributed to the specialty they work in, family 
specifications (child dependent under 3 years), hospital location and size 
(Baltagi et al, 2005). Johannessen and Hagen report a 4-hour gender gap 
compared to the 10-hour gap found in the UK or Germany (Johannessen and 
Hagen, 2012) which is mainly attributed to having children aged under three.  
In Canada, main data sources rely on data from the Canadian Medical 
Association (CMA), which access is not public. The fact that most GPs in 
Canada are self-employed and are paid on a common fee schedule permits 
them to allocate their hours of work at their discretion, like in the UK. This is 
important as GPs hours of work have fallen over time. Amongst the main 
explanations provided, spending too much time doing administrative work and 
less clinical work (NHS, 2014; NHS, 2016), a continuous drop in direct patient 
care (Crossley et al, 2009), resulting in a fall in the average hours of work of 
female GPs12, or having dependent children under 5 are the most widely 
reported (Sarma et al, 2011). Marital status (being married) has not been 
sufficient to explain the reduction in hours of work if children are excluded 
                                               
12 Between 1982 and 2003 GP average hours of work plumped down from 45.4 hours to 38.3 hours, showing a fall of 
5.6 hours for males, from 47 hours, and around 34 hours for females. 
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(Wang et al, 2013). So, children potentially could be a determinant of the female 
doctors’ labour supply, at least Primary Care doctors.  
In Australia, there is a growing interest on the analysis of hours of work, 
especially GP hours. Most studies use data from the dataset Medicine in 
Australia: Balancing Employment and Life (MABEL). Joyce et al examined the 
hours of work in main job for GPs, excluding potential hours of work devoted in 
a second job either in the private or the public sector. They find a 4.9 decrease 
of hours over a fifteen-year period (Joyce et al, 2015). Using wave 1 MABEL 
(year 2008) Kalb et al also confirm that GPs work fewer hours compared to 
hospital doctors, regardless of their gender, and that male doctors are older 
than females, which could be explained by retirement patterns and regulation 
(Kalb et al, 2017).  
2.2.1. UK HEADCOUNT OF DOCTORS: MAIN DATA SOURCES 
In the UK, there are a few sources that provide information of the headcount of 
doctors, but most do not include hours of work. The General Medical Council 
(GMC) contains information on the number of doctors in the UK, both registered 
and licensed doctors in its medical register. Also, it compiles information about 
the number of doctors by specialty through the GP and the Specialist register.  
The Doctors and Dentists´ Review Body (DDRB) released yearly by the Office 
of Manpower Economics (OME) since 1991 has been collecting staff figures on 
headcount and full-time equivalent13 (FTE) for the whole UK. However, unlike 
the GMC, they only provide overall figures with no gender breakdown and, from 
our understanding, they do not include information of hours of work either. In 
England, the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC), now call 
NHS Digital, is the main source for doctors’ headcount, in primary care and at 
                                               
13 Full-time equivalents (FTE) is an arbitrary definition in the NHS. The relationship between full-time/part-
time and FTE is as follows: a person working full-time equalises 1.0 FTE while for those working part-time 
there will be a pro-rata equivalence with 1 decimal. For example, 1 doctors working full-time will account 
for 1.0FTE. For GPs, full-time workers are those who work 37.5 hours per week (this is around 9 sessions 
considering that each GP session length is 4 hours and 10 minutes. Full-time hospital doctors work 40 
hours per week (this requires making 10 Programme Activities (PAs) per week where each activity is 
estimated to require 4 hours). Part-time GPs, for example, working 20 hours each make 0.6FTE (20 
hours/37.5) and part-time hospital doctors working the same number of hours make 0.5FTE. Hence, 
getting 1.0FTE will demand fewer hours for GPs than for hospital doctors. 
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hospital level, and includes the main demographics. The headcount of GPs 
grew by 19.9% (40,236 in 2013 including all GPs) and by 43% for hospital 
doctors, Consultants (41,220 in 2014), over the period 2003-2013 (HSCIC, 
2014). Figure 2.1 conveys that the expansion of the headcount of doctors 
(DDRB, HSCIC) has grown faster than the growth in UK population (ONS). 
 
Figure 2.1 DDRB, HSCIC and Population Change (Index) 
 
The other sources that refer to hours of work are the British Medical Association 
(BMA) surveys, the UK Workload Surveys and the National GP Worklife Survey 
(NGPWS). The GP UK Workload Surveys are about GP practices. Two surveys 
have been carried out: the 1992/93 GP Workload Survey and the 2006/07 UK 
Workload Survey. It was not possible to access to the 1992/93 survey. The 
2006/07 survey, which is accessible online14, contains information under the 
2004 contract and includes all workers in GP practices, not just GPs (HSCIC, 
2007). Data for the 2006/07 survey comes from the Technical Steering 
Committee (TSC). This database includes 10,310 GP practices in the UK (data 
is from the four countries) and was the most comprehensive data by that time, 
including information about headcount, list size, contract types and GP 
                                               
14 http://content.digital.nhs.uk/pubs/gpworkload 
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practices in rural areas. In 2006/07, sample size was 6,387 including GPs 
(1,213), other clinical staff (1,306), non-clinical staff (3,267), attached workers 
to practise (497) and GP locums (104). From an initial random sample of 4,000 
practices, 834 practices accepted to participate and received a questionnaire. 
Response rate is below 40% (329 practices of 834). Data included in the survey 
refers to the proportion of GPs by contract arrangement, average number of 
GPs by practice size, practice composition, hours of work by practice type, staff 
group (salaried, partner, non-clinical, other clinical staff, GP locums or GP 
registrar) or geographical location. It also includes average number of sessions 
worked by type of GP and the distribution of hours of work, for example.  
There were 1,213 GPs who participated in the 2006/07 Survey of whom 67% 
were partner GPs, 19% salaried GPs, 7% GP Registrars and 8% GP locums. 
Overall, 70.8% of partner GPs, salaried GPs and GP Registrars are self-
employed (amongst partner GPS 94.6% are contractors but this is only 2.8% 
for salaried GPs15). Full-time workers are defined as those working 8 or more 
sessions16, which corresponded to 35 hours per week or more. Partner GPs 
working full-time are more numerous (62%) than salaried GPs (22%). On 
average, a full-time (FT) partner GPs17 worked 44.4 hours per week (standard 
error 0.5) in this period, while all partner (full and part-time) GPs averaged 38.2 
hours per week. Full-time salaried GPs worked 39.6 hours per week on average 
(standard error 1.2) and 23.8 hours per week overall (including full and part-
time workers).  
The series of the National GP Worklife Survey (NGPWS) have been running 
biennially since 1998 by the National Primary Care Research and Development 
Centre at the University of Manchester. To date, eight surveys (Sibbald et al, 
2000, 2003; Whalley et al, 2005, 2006; Hann et al, 2009, 2011, 2013; Gibson 
et al, 2015) have been carried out with their resulting reports (see Appendix 2 
for more detail). Between 1998 and the latest report released in 2015 hours of 
                                               
15 See Table 8, pp. X, Annex A in the 2006/07 Survey. 
16 For a GP, a session lasts 4 hours and 10 minutes (GPC, 2014). 
17 A GP working full-time is that one working 8 or more sessions per week, where a session is defined as 
half day (approximately 4 hours and 10 minutes). GPs not in the retainer scheme. 
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work of GPs decreased by 5 hours overall (from 46.4 average weekly hours in 
1998 to 41.4). These series not only focus on hours of work but also provides 




This chapter draws from the comprehensive and detailed data contained in the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), the main source for tracking changes in the UK 
labour market (Werner, 2006). We exploit this survey in great detail to conclude 
that potentially it can be used for prospective studies on doctors’ labour supply. 
The LFS is large, representing 0.16% of the population in Great Britain with 
more than 41,000 households, over 100,000 observations and approximately 
600 variables each quarter with a homogeneous structure and few changes 
from period to period. A sample of 0.23% population of Northern Ireland is also 
included, adding approximately 1,600 additional households.  
The LFS was launched in the 1970s, so it spans a reasonable number of 
years18 and contains extensive information on demographics, at individual and 
household level, education, employment status (employed, inactive or 
unemployed), employment arrangement (full-time or part-time, employee or 
self-employed), industry and occupation, number of days worked, hours and 
earnings (Ma et al, 2006).  
Since 1993, the data is collected in five consecutive waves, which is equivalent 
to quarters, in the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) series19. In every 
wave, 20% of the sample is replaced and variables are asked for all 
respondents, except the income questions, which are asked only in wave 1 and 
5. The total QLFS response rate has fallen from nearly 80% in 1993 to 50% in 
                                               
18 The LFS was launched in 1973, moved to a yearly basis in 1984-1991 and the Quarterly LFS (QLFS) 
was introduced in Spring 1992. 
19 Each wave corresponds to 13 weeks, to align with winter, spring, summer and autumn seasons. 
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201320. This decrease has also been remarkable across waves21 (ONS, 2015) 
where wave 1 has the highest response rate (80% in 1993 and around 60% in 
2013). For the same period, refusals have increased 18 percentage points 
(approximately from 14% in 1993 to 32% in 2013) and non-responses have 
increased by 7 percentage points (approximately from 3% to 10%). 
There are other surveys containing information about occupation, hours and 
earnings such as the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the 
Family Resources Survey (FRS). ASHE is a sample of National Insurance 
Numbers (NINs). It is larger than the LFS and is based on a 1% sample of 
employee jobs taken from the tax office (Her Majesty Revenue and Customs, 
HMRC) Pay As You Earn (PAYE) records (Ma et al, 2006). Unlike the LFS, 
ASHE provides only individual responses rather than household number. 
Information on hours and earnings is supplied by the employer and is not self-
reported as it is in the LFS which may reduce the biases in responses. ASHE, 
however, excludes data from self-employed workers but they are included in 
the LFS. This is a potential limitation for using ASHE as it only contains 
information of employees. For GPs, this would mean missing 70-80% of the GP 
headcount in the UK. Alternatively, the FRS is a continuous cross-section 
survey launched in 1992 by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) to 
track poverty and evaluate the role of the welfare system. The sample is large 
and random, covering 25,000 households yearly, but it is lower than LFS. FRS 
has considerable detail on income, earnings and hours of work and it is possible 
to identify doctors and dentists. Also, FRS contains data on income for self-
employed, something the LFS fails to do. However, in the FRS respondents are 
not asked the Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) questions so we 
cannot identify medical practitioners using the 4-digit SOC groups, which we 
need for this group. Also, it neither asks questions about size of place of work 
                                               
20 Although it is unclear whether non-response is random so that when a household does not provide a 
response in a specific wave, information is obtained on a roll-forward basis with data from the previous 
wave. 
21 Over the past 20 years, response rate has dropped from 79% in April-June in 1993 to 49% in January-
March in 2013. Usually, wave 1 reports the highest response rates and wave 5 the lowest, suggesting 
there is attrition bias in the survey. 
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nor provide information using the Standard Industry Classifications (SIC), which 
is required to split medical practitioners into GPs and hospital doctors. 
Bearing in mind all the above, the LFS is the most complete available survey, 
conducted by ONS, and provides the best compromise for the analysis of the 
main issues on the labour supply of doctors. It is not as large as ASHE but 
contains detailed information about self-employed workers, allowing us to look 
at the hours of GP ‘partners’. While the FRS contains income data for the self-
employed and employee groups, it does not permit the identification of doctors 
using Standard Occupation Classifications nor break down doctors in hospital 
doctors and GPs combining occupation and industry classification groups with 
the detail this analysis requires.  
 
2.3.2. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
This chapter gets the information from a pooled cross-section dataset built from 
the QLFS data available from 1994 to 2014. We used all 5 waves from the 
person data set (End User License, EUL) to examine hours of work (intensive 
margin). Earnings variables are only reported in waves 1 and 5 for employees 
but this information is missed for self-employed workers. The sample includes 
respondents trained as medical practitioners who are reported as workers who 
gained a university degree in medicine. It includes only doctors that have 
completed their postgraduate training. Undergraduate medical students are 
excluded. Hence, the sample is formed by doctors in training (junior) and 
licensed doctors.  
The initial identification encompasses 26,283 observations reported working as 
medical practitioners. It is possible to break into GPs and Hospital doctors and 
other roles using the Standard Industry Classification (SIC). We only consider 
GPs and Hospital Doctors and rule out other observations (mainly working in 
Academia, the pharmaceutical Industry and other professions, amounting to 
3,499 respondents). Therefore, our final sample size is 22,784 doctors in the 
UK, of whom 36.57% are GPs (8,333) and 63.43% hospital doctors (14,451). 
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Unfortunately, the data does not permit break down of hospital specialties in 
more detail, which would have been very useful at least into Consultants or 
Specialists (SAS) but we do not need for the purposes of this thesis. Data from 
HSCIC for the UK reports the following proportions: 31.36% GPs (excluding 
Retainers and Registrars) from 1994-2014 and 68.64% hospital doctors 
(Consultants, Registrars and Other doctors in training). Therefore, and 
considering all types of GPs, the proportions given in the QLFS are very stable, 
33.34% GPs (including all) and 66.66% hospital doctors. Hence, the LFS 
approximates well to official figures. Table 2.1 shows the main descriptive 
statistics for GPs and hospital doctors in absolute and percentage terms. 
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note: For partner GPs, the average age is 47.33 where 64.69% are males and 35.31% 
females. By contract arrangement, 73.89% work full-time and 26.11% part-time. For 
salaried GPs, average age is 39.91 with 39.22% males and 60.78% females and 62.05% 
in full-time and 37.95% in part-time jobs. 
By gender, the QLFS sample used in this chapter breaks down into 60.59% 
male doctors (13,805/22,784) and 39.41% females (8,979/22,784) and by type 
of occupation the breakdown shows a dominance of male workers, 59.14% 
male GPs (4,928/8,333) and 40.86% females (3,405/8,333) whilst for hospital 





 (N = 8,333) (N=14,451) 
Variables Mean N  Mean N  
Age 45.72 8,333 39.58 14,451 
Males 0.59 4,928 0.61 8,877 
Females 0.41 3,405 0.39 5,574 
Full-time 0.71 5,942 0.90 12,972 
Part-time 0.29 2,391 0.10 1,476 
Public 0.62 5,142 0.97 14,069 
Private 0.38 3,187 0.03 376 
Native 0.80 6,691 0.66 9,497 
Immigrant 0.20 1,642 0.34 4,954 
White 0.83 6,877 0.67 9,753 
Non-white 0.17 1,456 0.33 4,698 
Employed  0.22 1,818 0.98 14,104 
Self-employed        0.78 6,514 0.02 329 
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England, data from HSCIC comprises 61.49% male GPs and 38.51% females; 
64.97% male GP partners (62.84% in LFS data in England) and 35.03% 
females (37.16% LFS data). 
 
2.3.3. COMPARING THE QLFS WITH OTHER SOURCES 
Our database is built upon 84 QLFS individual EUL datasets pooled over 21 
years, from 1994 to 2014. Medical practitioners are reported as workers who 
gained a university degree from a recognised medical school by the General 
Medical Council (GMC). The LFS includes questions about qualifications 
gained outside the UK (variable FORTYP) but they are only available from 2011 
onwards.  
Initially, our identification strategy shows only workers who hold a degree in 
Medicine, either as a first degree or second degree. Subsequently, it refines 
the sample only keeping those who reported working as medical practitioners22 
in their main job using the most recent standard occupation code classification 
(SOC2010) and, next, it filters by industry code23 using the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC92 and SIC07) to break down doctors in General Practice or 
Hospitals activities. Among GPs, partner GPs are self-employed GPs and 
salaried GPs are employees. The LFS does not enable us to go further to 
identify specialty, as it does not incorporate such detailed data. Figure 2.2 
compares LFS and DDRB headcount growth (1994=100), which includes data 
for the whole UK24, but the LFS tracks the growth in the DDRB index quite well, 
at least up to 2010, showing a rise in staff numbers. 
 
                                               
22 According to the GMC, medical practitioners are workers who are able "to diagnose mental and physical 
injuries, disorders and diseases, prescribe and give treatment, recommend preventive action, and conduct 
medical education and research activities. They may specialize in particular areas of modern medicine or 
work in general practice and, where necessary, refer the patient to the specialist”. The entry requirements 
for this occupation are holding a university degree from a medical school recognised by the General 
Medical Council (GMC), followed by a year of pre-registration training as a house officer. 
23 Occupation codes are reported using the Standard Occupation Classifications (SOC1990, SOC2000, 
SOC2010). Industry codes are built upon Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC1992, SIC2007). 
24 Base year for headcount is 1994 and we compute the growth in figures. 
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Figure 2.2 LFS and DDRB Indices of Doctors Headcount 
 
Note: the bumps and dips in 1997 and 1999 are explained by a fall in the number of 
male doctors by 20% (653 in 1997 and 823 in 1996) whilst females kept steady. In 
1999, female doctors rose more rapidly than males (1.12 %) and quarter 1 is missed 
in 2001 due to Census 2001 work carried out by ONS at the expense of LFS work. 
We offset this by rolling-forward doctors’ figures from previous quarter 
With the Health Education England (HEE) Mandate (2015), the Department of 
Health (DoH) intends to increase the number of medical students becoming 
GPs, setting 50% target (known as 50:50 ratio). However, the assessment 
carried out in 2015 proved it was far from the 3,500-initial target. Figure 2.3 
tests how well LFS tracks headcount from HSCIC plotting proportions by 
doctors’ breakdown for England using the QLFS and compares data against 
the HSCIC numbers. We observe that the QLFS can also replicates quite well 
trends from HSCIC. The failure in achieving the 50:50 ratio (NHS, 2014) could 
reflect potential shortages of GPs, suggesting that the flows of trainees into 
General Practice are not enough to overcome this problem.  
While the QLFS tracks the DDRB headcount reasonably well, only the 
NGPWS25 is an alternative to compare whether average weekly hours of work 
in both surveys are alike.  
                                               
25 The series of the National GP Worklife Survey is a Commissioned survey started in 1998 at The 
University of York in alliance with PRUComm (Policy and Research Unit in Commissioning and the Health 
Care System). It covers GPs in England and Wales. Since the 3rd National GP Worklife Survey, the 
findings are reported from The University of Manchester. The PRUComm is funded by the Department of 
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Figure 2.3 Proportions of GPs and Hospital Doctors 
 
Note: These figures record the headcount of GPs and hospital doctors. GP 
figures include Registrars and Retainers. Hospital doctors’ figures include 
Consultants, Registrars and doctors in training. 
 
NGPWS data only refers to GPs in England and Wales, but the QLFS can 
approximate and compute that data as it covers the whole UK. Also, whereas 
NGPWS requires granted access, the LFS data is publicly available and data 
can be downloaded from the UK Data Service website. The anonymised 
version of the QLFS (End User License, EUL) is a better alternative to explore 
trends in hours of work and main issues of the labour supply of doctors in the 
UK (average hours worked). Figure 2.4 compares hours of work reported in the 
cross-sectional data of the National GP Worklife Surveys, which includes the 
                                               
Health as a main reference centre for leading commissioning research. Data is collected between 
September and November 2012. This is a random sample of GPs which contact details are obtained from 
the GMS Statistics database from HSCIC and NHS Prescription Services. The random sample is based 
on 3,000 GPs in England (approx. 1/12 of population of GPs) excluding GP Registrars for the cross-
sectional part. The longitudinal part was launched in 2010 (6th National GP Worklife Survey) and sample 
is 3,280 for the 7th National GP Worklife Survey (2,350 GPs in 2010, 855 GPs in 2008 but were not in 
2010 plus 75 more from previous surveys). Response rate is 40% in cross-sectional part and 62% in the 
longitudinal in the 7th National GP Worklife Survey (for example in the 3rd Survey in 2004, response rate 
was 53% in the cross-sectional part (1,035/1,950) and 54% in the longitudinal survey (1,226/2,258). In 
the 7th National GP Worklife Survey they introduced a new question format to ask for hours of work which 
increased hours by 2 more (for example, in the 2008 report). 
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new question, and the total hours of work (main and second job) in the LFS for 
GPs working positive hours in England. 
Hours of work in the NGPWS refer to average hours of work spent every week 
doing NHS GP-related work. Although they include all clinical and non-clinical 
NHS work, they do exclude out-of-hours work. Before 2008, the 5th NGPWS, 
the question about hours was more general: “How many hours per week do you 
typically work as a GP? (Please exclude any hours on call)”. From 2008 they 
asked respondents: “How many hours do you spend, on average, per week, 
doing NHS GP-related work? (Please include ALL clinical and non-clinical NHS 
work but EXCLUDE OUT-OF-HOURS WORK)”. This methodological change 
increased average hours by 2 compared to results from the original question. 
So, all average hours obtained in former surveys were updated to this change.  
Figure 2.4 National GP Worklife Survey vs QLFS (England) 
 
Note: LFS shows total hours in main and 2nd job. In 2008, the NGPWS introduced 
a new hours of work question and increased previous results on by 2 more hours.  
2.3.4. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  
This chapter focusses on the analysis of the total hours of work of doctors over 
time using a new variable that encompasses total hours worked per week which 
includes total hours in main job (basic and overtime usual hours) and actual 
hours in second job. The fact that two different indicators for hours are included 
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in the definition (usual versus actual) is because usual hours in second job are 
not available in the LFS. Usual hours of work measure the number of hours that 
respondents usually work every week and are not affected by holidays, bank 
holidays, illnesses or any other absence. Therefore, they provide a better 
measure of usual working patterns rather than actual. Actual hours measure 
the number of hours that respondents work during the week and are seasonally 
adjusted to reflect absences from work (Walling et al, 2007; Clegg, 2012). Usual 
hours, then, provides a better indicator on hours worked on a regular basis and 
convey a better measure of the average weekly hours worked. Also, it depicts 
a broad and accurate insight on the usual available labour supply, in terms of 
total average hours worked by doctors. All the variables used to construct the 
variable total hours in main and second job are continuous (basic usual hours 
in main job, overtime usual hours in main job and actual hours in second job). 
GPs are broken down into ‘partner’ and ‘salaried’ GPs using the ILO definition 
variable included in the LFS. This ILO definition classifies workers in terms of 
their employment type which classifies workers into active (employed, self-
employed), unemployed or inactive (students, retired, looking for family, and 
other statuses). The GP breakdown by type of GP, thus, makes use of this 
classification where salaried GP is obtained by combining GP variable and 
employed working arrangement. These are dummy variables. 
The analysis also includes covariates such as age, sex, married/cohabiting, 
single, widowed, divorced, separated, native, immigrant, white, non-white, want 
more hours, number of more hours wanted, want to work fewer hours, number 
of fewer hours wanted, public and private. All these variables are dichotomous 
except age. 
Finally, we smooth trends of average weekly hours of work using a local 
polynomial (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Fan and Gijbels, 1996) of degree 3 
and bandwidth 3. This smooths the trends in the graphs with non-parametric 
density functions and relies on a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression. 
Compared to other smoothing techniques, it is preferred to moving-averages 
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methods in pooled cross-section datasets because the Epanechnikov 
polynomial is the most efficient function to minimize the mean integrated 
squared error. This differs from Staiger et al (2010) who use moving averages.  
2.4. RESULTS 
2.4.1. DOCTORS BY GENDER BREAKDOWN 
Figure 2.5 portrays sample size trends of female doctors over time to track the 
50:50 ratio and conveys that female GPs now outnumber the proportion of male 
GPs and the increased participation of female GPs in relative terms has 
transformed this occupation into a female-dominated occupation (males’ 
absolute figures fell from 415 in 1994 to 357 in 2014 in the LFS sample).  
Figure 2.5 Feminisation of the Medical Profession 
 
Note: QLFS data. From 1994 to 2014, women have increased their participation in the health 
sector. Female GPs almost doubled, from 28.67 % in 1994 to 52.38 % in 2014. However, the 
QLFS figures do not show that growth in absolute figures (119 in 1994 and 187 in 2014). 
Hospital doctors followed a similar trend (29.05% in 1994 and 46.60% in 2014) but absolute 
figures confirm a growing participation, from 157 female hospital doctors in 1994 to 384 in the 
2014 sample. 
The composition of GP numbers has changed over time. In the past, the 
medical profession was a male dominated occupation, but the growing female 
numbers has changed this composition. Figure 2.6 shows the composition of 
doctors by gender and GP role (partner or salaried GPs). The proportion of 
male GPs has fallen to 50% of GPs. This can be attributed to the decrease 
proportion of male GP partners. Female GPs have increased their proportion 
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among all GPs, which is mostly attributed to the larger growth in female salaried 
GPs since 2006. 





Hence, the growth in female GPs is explained by the increasing participation in 
salaried GPs. However, as partner GPs still mean almost 80% of all GPs, 
despite the rising numbers of female salaried GPs, primary care physicians 
continue to be a male dominated profession but less than it was in the past. 
The fast growth of female salaried GPs has not been enough to outnumber 
male GPs overall yet. Compared to HSCIC data, trends are similar, although 
the growth in female salaried GPs has been faster in England. 
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2.4.2. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
2.4.2.1. TOTAL HOURS OF WORK 
Table 2.2 conveys the average weekly hours of work of hospital doctors, partner 
and salaried GPs by gender. The table includes a detailed decomposition of 
hours in basic usual hours in main job, overtime and total usual hours in main 
job. Then, it adds actual hours in second job. Missing data was recoded to zero-
hours category for the sake of simplicity though the literature suggests that this 
is incorrect and lead to selection bias. We could have dealt with this potential 
endogeneity with a selection model but that is not the purpose of this chapter 
and we did not find a good instrumental variable to pull out this endogeneity. 
Table 2.2 Decomposition Hours of Work: Gender and Specialist Breakdown 
 
Figures 2.7-2.9 depict the non-parametric Kernel densities of total weekly hours 
in five-year intervals (time-effect) by gender breakdown and plot the estimate 
of the probability density function (pdf). In Figure 2.7, the changes in the kernel 
densities convey that doctors’ average hours of work have fallen as well as the 
variance for both GPs and hospital doctors. The distribution has very few 
extreme observations as the right flat tails indicate. All portray a shift to the left 
in the distribution of hours, with higher decreased in standard deviation and 
flatted distribution for female GPs but more leptokurtic for hospital doctors. 
These features have been more obvious under the new contract (since 
February 2004).  This has entailed fewer average weekly hours, a reduction in 








Partner             
GPs 
Salaried             
GPs 




Partner             
GPs 
Salaried             
GPs 
 
        
Basic hours 44.71 44.46 45.37 39.08 40.00 32.44 33.13 31.02 
Overtime hours 5.93 2.29 2.16 3.08 4.69 2.02 2.05 1.96 
Hours main job 50.62 46.74 47.52 42.16 44.68 34.47 35.18 32.98 
Hours 2nd job 1.27 1.45 1.48 1.29 0.48 1.03 1.04 1.00 
Total hours 
(main & 2nd) 51.89 48.19 49.00 43.44 45.16 35.50 36.22 33.98 
N 8,877 4,928 4,214 713 5,574 3,405 2,300 1,105 
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distributions overall and for males, while more flattened for females, especially 
GPs. In Figures 2.8 and 2.9, female workers behaved differently: female 
hospital doctors working 48 hours or more have increased since 2009, but their 
GP counterparts have reduced their workload with maximum probability set 
around 28-30 hours26.  
Figure 2.7 Kernel Densities of Total Hours (GPs and Hospital Doctors) 
(A) General Practitioners     (B) Hospital doctors 
  
 
Figure 2.8 Kernel Densities of GPs Total Hours by Gender Breakdown 






                                               
26 Appendix 3 
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Figure 2.9 Kernel Densities of Hospital Doctors' Total Hours by Gender 
(A) Males     (B) Females 
 
Appendix 3.1. complements Figures 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 summarising the main 
descriptive statistics (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th moments) in a table which confirms 
that standard deviation has fallen but still remains high (15 hours standard 
deviation). Appendix 3.2. shows the analysis by quartiles (Piketty and Saez, 
2003) and Appendix 3.3. the cohort perspective. The analysis by quartiles 
conveys that the share of quartile 1 and 2 converge over time for GPs and 
account for 20% each in 2014, while quartile 3 sets higher than quartile 4 
(around 35%). Overall, the distribution for GPs is volatile which could reflect the 
entries and exit in the labour market and, thus, the higher female participation 
over time. For hospital doctors, the shares show a similar pattern where quartile 
1 barely changed (17% in 1994), quartile 2 increased from 20% to 25%, quartile 
3 decreased from 30% to 26-27% in 2014 and quartile 4 slightly reduced to 
30% in 2014. The right-hand side graphs plot average weekly hours for each 
quartile and year and includes the yearly average as a benchmark. Either GPs 
or hospital doctors’ average hours are close to quartile 2 which may be pointing 
out a strong concentration of workers in those quartiles and fewer workers in 
the upper quartiles. 
The cohort analysis in Appendix 3.3 is built upon cohorts born in 1941-1950, 
1951-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990. We mostly concentrate on 
post-war cohorts because they account for 91% of observations. The kernel 
distributions show that younger cohorts work more intensively because they are 
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in their early careers. The standard deviation widened for GPs aged 45 or older 
(Cohort 5) but shrank for younger cohorts. The same happens for hospital 
doctors. For female GPs, cohorts 7 and 8 report the lowest number of hours, 
averaging 34 hours per week. The 2nd quartile averaged 24-33 hours and male 
GP cohorts are more leptokurtic than females. Also, the table included after the 
kernel densities in in Appendix 3.3. on page 177 shows that there has been a 
shift in sample size by cohort. Male sample was larger in early cohorts than 
females but female sample outnumbered males’ in 1961-1970, 1971-1980 and 
1981-1990 cohorts. 
 
2.4.2.2. OVERTIME AND SECOND JOB HOURS 
Figure 2.10 shows the overall average total weekly usual hours in main and 
second job of hospital doctors, salaried and partner GPs by year. 
Approximately 32.47% of GPs work overtime (2,706/8,333) compared to 
61.21% of hospital doctors (8,845/14,451). Also, 16.12% of GPs reported 
having a second job (1,343/8,329) and 14.08% of hospital doctors 
(2,034/14,451) did so with the inclusion of the European Working Time 
Directive (EWTD) in the English Working Time Regulation.  
The EWTD was passed in 1993 by the European Commission and enacted in 
the UK in 1998. Junior doctors, doctors in training (and transport workers) were 
included in the directive from August 2000 but GPs were not until the full 
compliance in August 2009. The main aim the EWTD was to limit the total 
number of working weekly hours for health and safety reasons. It sets an upper 
bound of weekly average hours of work in a 17-week period (48 hours). It also 
clearly details other requirements such as the length and frequency of breaks 
workers are entitled to take (20-minutes every 6 hours of work), rest after work 
(11 hours continuous rest in 24 hours and 25 hours continuous rest in 7 days 
or 48 hours in 14 days), holiday entitlements (4 weeks of annual leave and 5.6 
weeks for doctors) and average hours of work in night shifts (8 hours in 24). 
These all requirements intended to prevent employees to work large number of 
hours for health and safety reasons.  
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Dolton et al state the main effects the EWTD had on medical practitioners: 
firstly, doctors anticipated the reduction in hours of work between 1994 and 
1998; secondly, workforce management changed in hospitals; and, thirdly, this 
change in hospital managements influenced on doctors’ individual behaviour. 
The main results led to an expansion of headcount in hospitals between 1997 
and 2004 where consultants increased 43% and senior hospital doctors 38%. 
Furthermore, immigrant doctors grew too.  
For GPs, the EWTD applies to salaried GPs and Registrars as they are 
employees. But they may not apply for partner GPs. The directive regulates 
out-of-hours mainly under the requirements explained above. For example, 
should overnight out-of-hours be between 00.00am and 8.00am, the worker 
would need to rest 11 hours and should not start working again until 19.00 
hours. 
The QLFS also contains information about whether overtime hours are paid or 
unpaid and who reports having a second job27 (Table 2.3). The LFS question 
for overtime is: “Do you ever do any work which you could regards as paid or 
unpaid overtime?” The second job asks: “In the week ending Sunday the [Ref 
Date] did you do any other paid work or have any other paid job or business in 
addition to the one you have just told me about?” (QLFS volume 2, 2013).  
Figures 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13 depict similar trends over time than in Figure 2.10 
but by gender breakdown. Overall, female GPs work fewer hours than males, 
even basic usual hours are far away from those worked by males, for example 
between 2004 and 2014 (Figures 2.11 and 2.12). On average, females GPs, 
salaried or partner, work fewer hours than male peers. Hospital doctors work 
longer hours than GPs. The reduction in hours for hospital doctors may be 
explained by the EWTD. 
 
 
                                               
27 We only consider workers who reported having a second job and discarded those transitioning from 
one job to another in reference week. 
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Figure 2.10 Decomposition Total Hours (Basic, Overtime and Second job) 
(A) HOSPITAL DOCTORS 
 
(B) PARTNER GPs 
 




Figure 2.11 Decomposition of Hours of Work Salaried GPs 
          Males     Females
 
 
Figure 2.12 Decomposition of Hours of Work Partner GPs 
          Males     Females 
 
 
Figure 2.13 Decomposition of Hours of Work Hospital Doctors 




Next, we explore whether the second job28 is carried out in the public or private 
sector and provide the proportion of those workers over total sample size. Our 
data reflects that almost all hospital doctors do their second job in the public 
sector as well as GPs, although the proportion doing private practice is greater. 
Table 2.3 shows that both hospital doctors and GPs tend to work more in the 
public sector in their second job, although the proportion of GPs is lower. It is 
difficult to track Partner GPs in their second job as they are self-employed but 
the QLFS considers employees those reporting a second job. Doctors working 
overtime were 61.21% of hospital doctors (8,845/14,451) and 32.47% of GPs 
(2,706/8,333). Those having a second job were 14.05% for hospital doctors 
(2,031/14,451) and 16.08% for GPs (1,340/8,333). By sector, 13.75% 
(1,987/14,451) of hospital doctors were in the public sector (92% for those 
reporting working in a second job, 1,984/2,031) and 0.33% in the private sector 
(2.31% for those with a second job, 47/2,031) while 9.72% of GPs reported in 
the public sector (807/8,333) and 6.40% in the private sector (533/8,333). 
It is possible to convey the relationship between the average overtime hours 
done in main job and the average hours worked in second job by basic usual 
hours for hospital doctors and general practitioners (Figure 2.14). Figure 
2.14(A) shows that the amount of overtime goes up to around 8 hours when 
basic usual hours in main job are equivalent to 31-40 hours (a full-time hospital 
doctors works 40 basic hours per week). After this, it declines. Before the 
implementation of the new contract in 2004, consultants in the NHS working 
full-time could take on private activity in a second job but this was capped to a 
maximum billing of 10% of their earnings in the NHS. However, the new 
contract removed this restriction and allows hospital doctors to undertake as 
much private practice as they wish. Nevertheless, the NHS is given priority to 
allocate hours in a second job. The only condition that is included in the 2004 
                                               
28 With the new contract, which came into effect in February 2004, doctors can have a second job without 
the restrictions they had in the past. Before 2004, NHS full-time Consultants could undertake practice in 
a second job in the private sector up to 10% of their NHS income but there was no restriction for part-time 
doctors who could undertake unlimited private practice (this included Consultants up to ten-elevenths of 
the full-time salary). Even though the 2004 contract includes no restriction on private income, the NHS 
has priority should any hospital doctor want to work more hours. 
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contract is that they need to report to their NHS managers their desire to work 
more hours and the manager could explore whether the hospital would be able 
to fulfil that desire, suggesting the NHS has a priority in the allocation of those 
hours. If the NHS cannot satisfy this desire, then NHS Consultants can choose 
between public or private. 









 Hospital doctors 
  Males % Females % Total % 
No overtime 3,592 40.46% 2,014 36.13% 5,606 38.79% 
Ever work overtime 5,285 59.54% 3,560 63.87% 8,845 61.21% 
Total 8,877 100% 5,574 100% 14,451 100% 
No 2nd job (incl. those            
change in ref week) 7,241 81.57% 5,176 92.86% 12,417 85.92% 
Have a 2nd job in ref week 1,636 18.43% 398 7.14% 2,034 14.08% 
in public sector 1,601 18.04% 386 6.93% 1,987 13.75% 
in private sector 35 0.39% 12 0.22% 47 0.33% 
              
  General Practitioners 
  Males % Females % Total % 
No overtime 3,506 71.14% 2,121 62.29% 5,628 67.54% 
Ever work overtime 1,422 28.86% 1,284 37.71% 2,706 32.48% 
Total 4,928 100% 3,405 100% 8,333 100% 
No 2nd job (incl. those           
change in ref week) 4,069 82.57% 2,921 85.79% 6,990 83.88% 
Have a 2nd job in ref week 859 17.43% 484 14.21% 1,343 16.12% 
in public sector 487 9.88% 323 9.49% 810 9.72% 
in private sector 372 7.55% 161 4.73% 533 6.40% 
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Figure 2.14 Average Overtime and 2nd job hours (by basic usual hours in main 
job) 
(A)     Hospital Doctors   (B) General Practitioners 
 
 
Figure 2.15 portrays overtime and second job hours of senior hospital doctors 
before and after 2004. The definition of senior and junior doctors is based on 
an age criterion. Bearing in mind that it takes 5-8 years to train a consultant 
after their postgraduate studies (Foundation Years 1 and 2), junior doctors 
become senior doctors at the age of 31-33 the earliest. In the data, we took a 
more conservative assumption and consider junior doctors aged under 35 and 
senior doctors aged 35 or older. Senior doctors have reduced their hours of 
work for every basic usual hour in main job. For example, full time doctors 
(those at 31-40 basic usual hours), overtime is around 11 hours and hours 
worked in a second job around 2 hours per week. With the new contract, senior 
doctors working 31-40 basic usual hours now work approximately 5 overtime 
hours in main job and second job hours are like those they worked before 2004. 
Hence, the new contract does not seem to incentivise senior doctors 









2.4.2.3. EXPLORING CONTRACTUAL CHANGES 
We include a difference-in-difference (DiD) model to explore how contractual 
changes may have influence in the labour supply decisions of doctors 
(treatment group) compared to workers in other occupations (control group). 
Nevertheless, this chapter aims to be mostly descriptive, so we only include the 
DiD model to complement what we get from the LFS. We do not attribute any 
causal effect with the inclusion of this DiD. Our model is as follows: 
𝐻"# = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋" + 𝛾𝑇" + 𝜃𝐷" + 𝛿𝐷"𝑥𝑇" + 𝜖"#  (1) 
Where 𝑋" is the usual vector of demographic controls which includes age, 
gender, marital status, native, white race, tenure (whether they have 6 or more 
years of experience) and contract arrangement (whether the individual works 
as an employee of self-employed); 𝐷"# is a dummy variable to ascertain whether 
the individual works as a doctor or not;	𝑇" takes value 1 if year is 2004 or later 
and 0 otherwise; 𝐷"𝑥𝑇" takes value 1 for doctors since 2004 and 0 otherwise. 
We expand on this model including the interaction with all controls.  
𝐻"# = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋" + 𝛾𝑇" + 𝜃𝐷" + 𝛿𝐷"𝑥𝑇" + 𝜑𝐷"𝑥𝑇"𝑥𝑋" + 𝜖"# (2) 
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Table 2.4 reports estimates from the simplified version of the DiD model for the 
treated group (GPs and hospital doctors) with the control group (workers in 
other occupations). The table depicts that females work 6.5 fewer hours per 
week than males and the average weekly hours of work has fallen 1.5 hours 
per week. Doctors reduce their labour supply over the life cycle more 
dramatically than other workers and GPs’ reduction is larger than hospital 
doctors. The difference-in-difference estimator portrays how much time doctors 
have dropped their hours of work since the implementation of the new contract 
in April 2004. This DiD estimate conveys that on average, GPs have reduced 
their labour supply by 2.571 hours per week and hospital doctors work 4.022 
hours less.  
Table 2.5 includes an additional interaction of the DiD estimator with females 
and working as an employee. Including more interactions within the controls 
reports that females in our sample work even fewer hours (14 hours less than 
males) but GPs and hospital doctors work even fewer hours than control 
groups. Now, the contractual changes in 2004 reduce hours of work of doctors 
by 3.5 hours. The DiD estimator now reflects that GPs work 2 hours less per 
week on average under the new contract and result is significant at all levels. 
However, that is not the case for hospital doctors where we do not get 
significant results.  
Expanding the analysis with the interaction between treatment group and policy 
implementation with gender and employee variable reports that female salaried 
GPs, under the new contract, work 4.5 hours less and this result is significant 
at 5 and 10% level of significance. The analysis for hospital doctors is not 
significant at any level. 
In summary, we get that, under the new contract, doctors have reduced their 
hours of work from 2.5 to 4 hours if we do not expand on the analysis 
disaggregating by gender and working as employees. When we include those 
additional interactions, the same we get that female salaried GPs have reduced 
their labour supply by 4.5 hours, but results are not significant for hospital 
doctors.  
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Table 2.4 Difference-in-difference (model 1) 
 
 
Total hours (main & 2nd) GPs Hospital doctors 
   
Treatment group 39.029*** 14.360*** 
 (1.258) (1.556) 
Age -0.180*** -0.180*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Female -6.566*** -6.566*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) 
Native -0.684*** -0.684*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) 
White 1.917*** 1.917*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) 
Tenure (years of experience) 3.821*** 3.821*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) 
Employee 3.684*** 3.684*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) 
Contract change (April 2004) -1.572*** -1.572*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) 
Treated x Age -0.603*** -0.264*** 
 (0.024) (0.020) 
Treated x female -6.881*** -1.282*** 
 (0.419) (0.302) 
Treated x native -1.022 1.067** 
 (0.697) (0.418) 
Treated x white -6.144*** -1.728*** 
 (0.826) (0.428) 
Treated x Tenure 9.396*** -0.233 
 (0.561) (0.427) 
Treated x employee -6.432*** 8.663*** 
 (0.556) (1.216) 
DiD (Treated x Contract change since April 2004) -2.571*** -4.022*** 
 (0.423) (0.304) 
Constant 44.941*** 44.941*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) 
Observations 705,642 710,346 
R-squared 0.092 0.097 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Total hours (main & 2nd) GPs Hospital doctors 
   
Treatment group 36.404*** 8.017** 
 (1.265) (3.291) 
Age -0.182*** -0.182*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Female -13.894*** -13.894*** 
 (0.206) (0.206) 
Native -0.737*** -0.737*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) 
White 1.982*** 1.982*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) 
Tenure (years of experience) 3.783*** 3.783*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) 
Employee 0.286** 0.286** 
 (0.118) (0.118) 
Contract change (April 2004) -3.568*** -3.568*** 
 (0.153) (0.153) 
Female x employed 7.866*** 7.866*** 
 (0.212) (0.212) 
Treated x Age -0.594*** -0.260*** 
 (0.025) (0.020) 
Treated x female -1.482* 7.849 
 (0.786) (6.170) 
Treated x native -0.962 1.174*** 
 (0.698) (0.419) 
Treated x white -6.133*** -1.820*** 
 (0.830) (0.428) 
Treated x Tenure 9.360*** -0.223 
 (0.562) (0.427) 
Treated x employee -7.439*** 15.507*** 
 (1.256) (3.116) 
DiD (Treated x Contract change since April 2004) -2.011*** 0.785 






2.4.2.4. DESIRED HOURS OF WORK 
Finally, this chapter reports the available information on preferences to more or 
fewer hours which makes the LFS unique for our purposes. The LFS contains 
questions reporting the desire to work fewer hours29 in current job or more hours 
at current basic pay and how many hours (few or more) they want. The 
information is only available from 2001, at least for the variable reporting the 
desired fewer hours. The LFS also includes questions for those wanting to work 
more hours30. We plot data from 2001 quarter 2 to be consistent with previous 
graphs on desired hours, despite data being available from 1996. The 
distribution of the desired hours is as follows and it is plotted in Figure 2.16.  
                                               
29 Questions include "Whether prefer to work shorter hours than at present in current job" or "Whether 
would work shorter hours for less pay" and "How many fewer hours would like to work". 
30 "Whether would like to work longer hours, at current basic rate of pay, given the opportunity" and 
"Number of extra hours would like to work", which area available from 1996. 
Treated x Female x Employee -1.484 -10.360* 
 (1.835) (6.192) 
Contract change x female 2.974*** 2.974*** 
 (0.263) (0.263) 
Contract change x employee 1.997*** 1.997*** 
 (0.158) (0.158) 
Contract change x female x employee -2.620*** -2.620*** 
 (0.270) (0.270) 
Treated x female x contract change -0.045 1.936 
 (0.992) (6.779) 
Treated x employee x contract change 3.543** -5.292 
 (1.545) (3.375) 
Treated x contract change x female x employee -4.661** -1.218 
 (2.167) (6.809) 
Constant 48.025*** 48.025*** 
 (0.146) (0.146) 
Observations 705,642 710,346 
R-squared 0.098 0.103 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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𝐻2 = 𝐻#3 +max(𝐻28, 0) − 	max	(0,𝐻2=)   (3) 
Where, H? stands for the distribution of desired hours, H@A is the total usual 
hours worked in main job (includes basic usual hours and overtime hours in 
main job), max	(H?B, 0) compiles the more hours wanted and max	(0, H?C ) the 
fewer hours wanted for less pay.  
Figure 2.16 Distribution Desired Hours 
(A) By Specialty 
 
(B) By Gender 
GPs     Hospital doctors 
 
 
Figure 2.17 shows the average weekly hours worked by occupation for GPs 
and hospital doctors by gender. We plot data from 2001 (left axis) and the 
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percentage of doctors wanting to work fewer hours than at present in current 
job (right axis). Variable computing hours of work includes total usual hours in 
main job (basic and overtime) and hours in second job. The average is 
computed including zero-hours observations, near 2% for all doctors.  
Figures 2.17(A) and (B) show that male GPs work on average near 45 hours 
per week while female GPs are working almost 10 fewer hours (34-35 hours 
per week). The proportion of male GPs wanting to work fewer hours drops 
overtime (from nearly 70% in 2001 to 42% in 2014) much faster than females 
(from 50% in 2001 to 36% in 2014). However, around 40% of GPs in the sample 
still want to work fewer hours.  
Figure 2.17 Average Hours Work (left axis) and Desired Fewer Hours (right 
axis) than at Present in Current Job 
(A) Male GPs    (B) Female GPs 
 




Figure 2.17(C) and (D) plots the same analysis for hospital doctors. The 
difference in hours of work is shorter than for GPs. Male hospital doctors 
worked on average nearly 50 hours over the period and female hospital doctors 
did close to 44 hours. The proportion of doctors wanting to work fewer hours 
follows a similar trend to that for GPs. The main finding is that the proportion of 
hospital doctors wanting to work fewer hours has been increasing since 2011 
to the current share (43-45%), while that from GPs has been decreasing since 
2012 (males) or steady (females). 
To provide the most comprehensive analysis, we include information reported 
for those wanting to work fewer hours for less pay (right axis) and compare with 
the average weekly fewer hours desired than at current (left axis). This 
information is conveyed in Figure 2.18. The proportion of those wanting to work 
fewer hours falls over time. For GPs, is 51.41% (1,272/2,474) where 62.19% 
were males (791/1,272) and 37.8% females (481/1,272). For hospital doctors 
those figures are 50.50% (2,180/4,317) and 52.16% were males (1,137/2,180) 
and 47.84% females (1,043/2,180).  
Since 2009, among those wanting fewer hours, female GPs are more likely to 
work less than males (53.33% female GPs, 481/902, and 58.86% female 
hospital doctors, 1,043/1,780). Male GPs (50.32% on average, 791/1,572) 
would work fewer hours in higher proportions compared to male hospital 
doctors (44.82% on average, 1,137/2,537). Among GPs 95.44% (1,214/1,272) 
reported wanting to work fewer hours (49.07% amongst those who only wanted 
working fewer hours at current pay, 1,214/2,474), and 94.56% of males 
(748/791 or 47.58% 748/1,572) and 96.88% females (466/481 or 51.66% 
among females wanting to work less 466/902) with an overall average number 
of desired fewer hours of 6.14 which is 6.35 for males and 5.78 for females. For 
hospital doctors, 42.45% of males reported the number of hours they would like 
to work (1,077/2,537) of whom 56.40% of females (1,004/1,780) and 48.20 % 
overall figure (2,081/4,317). Besides, 95.46% of hospital doctors reported the 
number of fewer hours they wished to work (2,081/2,180 or 48.2% of those 
wanting to work less reported the number of hours they would like to work, 
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2,081/4,317) and 94.72% of males (1,077/1,137 or 42.45% 1,077/2,537) and 
96.26% females (1,004/1,043 or 56.40%, 1,004/1,780). The fewer average 
hours they claimed for less pay were, on average 6.14 hours overall, and 5.43 
for males and 7.16 hours for females. 
Figure 2.18 Average Fewer Hours Wanted for Less Pay 
(A) Male GPs    (B) Female GPs 
  
(C) Male Hospital   (D) Female Hospital 
 
 
We also explore information from those reporting wanting more hours (Figures 
2.19 and 2.20). Figure 2.19 conveys a falling interest in working more hours for 
female GPs and increasing for male GPs while hospital doctors show slightly 
higher proportions. In general, 2,70% of GPs (202/7,470 from 1996 to 2014) 
with 2.06% of males (89/4,313) and 3.58% females (3,157). Among all those 
who reported wishing to work more hours, 55.94% were females and 44.06% 
male GPs over time. For hospital doctors, 3.15% wanted longer hours from 
1996 to 2014 (421/13,348), 3.79% males (307/8,092) and 2.17% females 
 61 
(114/5,256). Among all those who reported wanting more hours, 72.92% were 
males (307/421) and 27.08% females (114/421). Figure 2.19 shows more 
volatility for GPs than for hospital doctors. On average, GPs wished to work 
8.19 more hours (8.72 male GPs and 7.70 females) and hospital doctors 
reported 10.53, 11.22 and 9.83 respectively. 
Figure 2.19 Average Hours Work (left axis) and Desired More Hours Wanted 
(right axis) at Current Basic Pay 
(A) Male GPs         (B) Female GPs 
  









Figure 2.20 Average More Hours Wanted at Current Basic Pay 
(A) Male GPs          (B) Female GPs 
   
 
(C) Male Hospital         (D) Female Hospital 
   
 
2.4.2.5. IMMIGRANTS, ETHNICITY AND HOURS OF WORK 
We explored average weekly hours of work of doctors by country of birth and 
ethnicity by year and gender (Figures 2.21 and 2.22). Table 2.6 summarises 
overall figures by country of birth and ethnicity for GPs and hospital doctors 
over the whole period of analysis. Average hours of work per week are 42.99 
for GPs and 49.29 hours per week for hospital doctors over the whole period. 
Native GPs work 42.59 hours per week on average and foreign GPs 44.66 
hours per week. Native hospital doctors work, on average, 49.62 hours per 
week and immigrant hospital doctors 48.65 hours over the period of analysis. 
By gender breakdown, average hours of work per week report male GPs work 
48.18 hours while females 35.49 hours per week. Among males, native GPs 
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work 48.16 hours and immigrants 48.25 whilst among female GPs, native 
reported 35.04 hours per week and immigrant 37.78 hours. For hospital 
doctors, males work 51.89 hours and females 45.16. Among males, native 
hospital doctors work 53.18 hours per week and immigrants 49.97 hours whilst 
native females 45.13 hours and foreign females 45.24. 
By ethnicity (Figure 2.21), white GPs work on average 42.55 hours per week 
and non-white 45.32 hours. White male GPs averaged 48.08 hours per week 
and non-whites 48.67. White female GPs worked on average 34.91 hours and 
non-whites 39.16. White hospital doctors averaged 49.36 hours and non-whites 
49.13 hours. White male hospital doctors reported working 52.78 hours per 
week and non-whites 50.28 hours. Female white hospital doctors worked 44.81 
hours and non-whites 46.32 hours per week. 
Figure 2.21 Ethnicity (White versus Non-whites) 
(A) Male GPs         (B) Female GPs 
  
(C) Male Hospital         (D) Female Hospital 
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In Figure 2.22 we do not find relevant differences between the hours worked 
among respondents (native versus immigrants and white versus non-whites) 
and figures followed similar downward trends confirming fewer hours for 
females, which is wider among GPs. Therefore, although doctors coming to 
work to the UK used to work more hours in the past, their hours of work 
converge to those native doctors. 
Figure 2.22 Country of Birth (Native versus Immigrants) 
(A) Male GPs          (B) Female GPs 
  
(C) Male Hospital         (D) Female Hospital 













Table 2.6 Country of Birth and Ethnicity 
 
The QLFS also reports precise information for country of birth. Table 2.7 shows 
all observations and proportions and Figure 2.23 depicts the decomposition of 
country of birth into UK-born, EU-27 born and respondent born in other 
countries (mainly African and Asian countries).  
Figure 2.23 conveys the decomposition of doctors by country of birth. The 
QLFS sample contains 290 GPs coming from the EU (3.48% of all GPs) and 
628 EU trained hospital doctors (4.35%). These figures differ from the GMC 
figures where, in 2017, approximately 6% of all GPs are EU-trained and 17% 
of hospital doctors. Also, the GMC31 reports 16% of GPs trained in other 
countries and 25% hospital doctors. The LFS tracks well the proportions for 
UK-trained doctors and other countries but not as accurate for EU-trained 
doctors. 
                                               
31 http://www.gmc-uk.org/doctors/register/search_stats.asp  
  General Practitioners   
Country 
of birth Males % Female % Total % 
Native         3,849  78.10%         2,842  83.47%         6,691  80.30% 
Immigrant         1,079  21.90%             563  16.53%         1,642  19.70% 
Totals         4,928            3,405            8,333    
              
Ethnicity Males % Female % Total % 
White         3,987  80.91%         2,890  84.88%         6,877  82.53% 
Non-white             941  19.09%             515  15.12%         1,456  17.47% 
Total         4,928            3,405            8,333    
       
  Hospital doctors   
Country 
of birth Males % Female % Total % 
Native         5,306  59.77%         4,191  75.19%         9,497  65.72% 
Immigrant         3,571  40.23%         1,383  24.81%         4,954  34.28% 
Totals         8,877            5,574          14,451  100% 
              
Ethnicity Males % Female % Total % 
White         5,595  63.03%         4,158  74.60%         9,753  67.49% 
Non-white         3,282  36.97%         1,416  25.40%         4,698  32.51% 
Total         8,877            5,574          14,451    
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    GPs   Hospital doctors Overall 
    Males Females Total   Males Females Total Totals 
N 
UK born 3,849 2,842 6,691   5,306 4,191 9,497 16,188 
EU-27 165 125 290  364 264 628 918 
Others 914 438 1,352  3,207 1,119 4,326 5,678 
Totals 4,928 3,405 8,333   8,877 5,574 14,451 22,784 
          
% 
UK born 78.10% 83.47% 80.30%  59.77% 75.19% 65.72% 71.05% 
EU-27 3.35% 3.67% 3.48%  4.10% 4.74% 4.35% 4.03% 
Others 18.55% 12.86% 16.22%  36.13% 20.08% 29.94% 24.92% 
Totals 100% 100% 100%   100% 100% 100% 100% 
          
Avg. 
Hours 
UK born 48.16 35.04 42.59  53.18 45.13 49.63 46.72 
EU-27 44.80 33.19 39.80  48.46 45.45 47.19 44.86 
Others 48.88 39.09 45.70  50.14 45.19 48.86 48.11 
Total 48.18 35.50 43.00   51.89 45.16 49.29 46.99 
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2.4.2.6. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF HOURS 
We show the regional distribution of doctors’ hours to reflect whether there are 
inequalities in the distribution of doctors’ hours. For this purpose, we first 
compute the regional distribution of LFS doctors working32 in each region. Then 
we multiply the number of GPs in each region using DDRB headcount by the 
average proportion of LFS doctors in each region. Next, we work out the 
average weekly hours of work in each region and convert into annual hours 
multiplying by 52 weeks. Then, we get the total annual stock of hours for each 
region multiplying the average annual hours by the number of GPs in each 
region. Besides, we collected population data by region from ONS for each year 
and got the average population over the period for each region. Dividing total 
hours by the average population in each region, we get the total average hours 
for each person living in the region and, multiplying by 60 minutes per hour, we 
get the time per patient in minutes. 
Figure 2.24 summarises the distribution of total annual time per patient by 
region for GPs and hospital doctors. Figure 2.24(A) shows that Eastern 
England and London are the regions with the lowest time per patient in primary 
care followed by the Midlands and the North East. The result for London may 
reflect a population effect, emphasising that more GPs would be required. The 
bottom figure, Figure 2.24(B), portrays the situation for hospital doctors. Again, 
East of England scores lower than other regions in the ranking followed by 












                                               
32 Data combined with the living region, shows that doctors usually live in the region they work but our 
data shows that 23 % of GPs (5 % of hospital doctors) living in the North East work in the North West and 
22 % of GPs (25 % hospital doctors) living in the South East work in East of England.   
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Figure 2.24 Regional Distribution of Hours (annual time per patient)  
 
(A) General Practitioners  
 
(B) Hospital doctors 
 
2.4.3. OVERALL SUPPLY 
So far, we can conclude that the LFS has many benefits and can become a 
potential resource for the analysis of doctors’ labour supply. In this section, we 
provide a snapshot on the trends of the extensive and the intensive margin that 
aims to be a baseline for prospective analyses. Thus, by way of conclusion, we 
construct a measure of overall supply by multiplying what we know about the 
headcount from other sources by what we now know about the supply of the 
average member of the headcount over time. For this purpose, we multiply the 
headcount figures from DDRB reports by the QLFS average hours every year. 
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This provides a stock supply measure of hours available every year, separately 
for GPs and for Hospital Doctors every year (Table 2.833). Figure 2.26, below, 
shows that the total annual stock of hours for GPs has hardly changed in 2014 
compared to 1994 (panel A) and averaged about 87m hours – that makes an 
annual average of 88 minutes per person over the period. In contrast, the 
supply of hospital doctor time has risen from 156m hours in 1994 to 298m, 
averaging 226m hours – giving the population an average 223 minutes over the 
period. The tiny panel at the bottom, convey the overall supply for GPs and 
hospital doctors.  
The important takeaway is that the headcount gives a wildly optimistic view 
about supply.  
 
Figure 2.25. Overall supply of hours (headcount, average weekly hours and 
annual stock hours) 




                                               
33 Two quarters are missed in the QLFS (2001q1 and 2004q1) and got no occupation figures with End 
User License data. However, we fixed this rolling forward figures from the immediate previous quarter. 
Also, total figures differ from previous because we added those inactive workers as they represent a 
potential labour force in the future. 
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In this chapter, we restrict ourselves to describing the results from the LFS and 
have not explored any possible causal effects that may arise from any model 
(for example, DiD). Nonetheless, we consider this analysis may be useful for 
policymakers for the following reasons. For the first time, we now have, a 
systematic picture of the intensive supply side from a large random sample, to 
augment what we already knew about the extensive margin. Secondly, it shows 
that the headcount measure gives an optimistic view of supply – especially for 
GP services. This vindicates the use of LFS data for investigating the intensive 
margin. Despite the large expansion in the headcount of doctors, both GPs and 
hospital doctors, the overall hours of GP work supplied to the UK population 
has fallen over the period, while the overall supply of hours of hospital doctors 
have grown dramatically. This may be quite the opposite to what is likely to be 
required to match the pattern of demand – where there has been an impressive 
growth in the number of patients who may require long term care outside of 
acute care environments.  
The main results confirm a fall in the average hours worked by doctors between 
1994 and 2014, both GPs and hospital doctors. One potential explanation may 
be that doctors have reported being overworked and stressed in recent years. 
However, these downward trends are greater between 1994 and 2004 than 
since 2004 and yet reports of stress continue to abound. In addition, female 
doctors have experienced the largest fall in hours, especially in primary care. 
The takeaway is that the expansion in the headcount of doctors has not 
succeed in providing the available GP hours for patients (although it may be 
true that GPs have made greater use of other inputs in an effort to compensate 
for this fall in the supply of their own time) but our work does not include any 
analysis on the impact of GP time on the quality of care provided. The 
information about desired hours is an interesting feature of the LFS and we 
report that there are fewer doctors who would prefer working lower hours for 
less pay but since 2012 we notice that this has been broadly static. This is 
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surprising – we might imagine that falling desired hours would be a symptom of 
being overwhelmed by the increasing workload over time.   
There are some limitations in this work. The LFS sample of doctors do not 
reflect overall sample weights. We get too few doctors from LFS relative to what 
we would expect but we believe the sample is representative34. Moreover, using 
pooled cross section data does not allow us to follow up individuals over time. 
The 5-quarters panel formed by the longitudinal LFS is rather too short to 
analyse dynamic behaviour. Moreover, the overall sample is small and the fact 
that we have only 20-year worth of data implies that we cannot rely on LFS to 
form a pseudo panel dataset. A further issue is that previous occupation and 
education data is only collected for pre-70-year olds in LFS. Thus, we can get 
only an imperfect view of early retirement issues, which is a strong constrain 
because surveys collected by the BMA suggest that GPs report growing 
intentions to retire early. Only in recent years (from 2011) has LFS collected 
data on several aspects of well-being. This will become an important element 
of understanding why doctors wish to work less as this data builds. Finally, the 
LFS is self-reported data, which may suffer from measurement error. However, 
unless this measurement is systematically related to the variables that we are 
interested in, such as gender, immigration etc., this will not have any 
implications for the trends that we showed. Moreover, it seems likely that the 
LFS is still a better guide to the hours that doctors usually work than the 
administrative data that might be available. The only other dataset that could 
potentially be used to address this could be personnel records, where we could 
compare earnings with known points on the pay scale to infer wage rates and 
hours of work. However, we are pessimistic about doing this because there is 
much heterogeneity in pay arrangements around the scale. Indeed, most GPs 
are self-employed and so are residual claimants. Here the LFS is disappointing, 
relative to FRS, in not collecting self-employed incomes. Despite these 
limitations, we still believe that the LFS is the best survey for these purposes.  
                                               
34 Indeed, the proportion of doctors we get from the LFS is 0.96% of DDRB GP (including registers and 
retainers) and 0.78% of hospital doctors’ headcount (including all hospital doctors and doctors in training) 





DO DOCTORS WORK HARDER 
THAN OTHER 
PROFESSIONALS? A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
THE HOURS OF WORK 
 
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter expands on the existing literature on the labour supply of doctors 
in the UK comparing the hours of work of doctors with other professionals such 
as lawyers and accountants using a pooled cross-section dataset from the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). There are several contributions of this 
work. Building on Gravelle and Hole (2007), we extend their analysis for 
General Practitioners (GPs who are the gatekeeper community-based 
physicians in the UK) and incorporate hospital doctors in the analysis. Then, 
we compare doctors with lawyers and accountants. The latter have been widely 
used as comparator groups by the Doctors and Dentists’ Review Board 
(DDRB)35 – one of the UK pay review bodies that makes recommendations on 
pay awards for public sector employees.  
                                               
35 Comparator occupation groups, from private and public sectors, for pay comparability in DDRB reports 
to help them deliberate their main comments, considerations and conclusions on retention and 
recruitment. Amongst these groups there are lawyers (solicitors) and accountants. These groups share 
similar criteria with doctors and dentists: similar entry requirements, qualifications and intellectual rigour. 
According to DDRB “these are careers which might reasonably be thought of as possible alternative 
careers by individuals joining the medical and dental professions and which have clearly defined career 
progressions” (DDRB, 2003, page 20). 
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The pay review recommendations are supposed to ensure that the UK NHS is 
able to recruit, retain and motivate sufficient doctors for its purposes. In fact, 
the current concern is the widespread perception that there is shortage of 
doctors in the country that may threaten the quality of the service delivered. 
Since 2008 there have been some reasons that may exacerbate this shortfall 
of doctors. Firstly, the austerity “cap” on pay rises that have been imposed on 
public employees (doctors included) may well have exacerbated the shortage. 
Secondly, the advent of Brexit and the electorate’s desire to reduce immigration 
raises further supply side concerns because, for several decades now, EU-
immigrants have made an important contribution to the overall supply of doctors 
to the NHS. Finally, there has been concern over the extent to which the 
profession is well placed to cope with the desire to provide more care in the 
community via GPs reflecting the needs of an ageing population. There has 
been a long-term commitment to encourage more entry doctors to choose 
General Practice. While the DDRB “headcount” data suggests a steady rise in 
the supply of doctors on the extensive margin, the division between hospital 
and General Practice has not shifted towards the latter. On the contrary, the 
proportion of trainees who choose to enter the profession as GPs has been 
falling over time. Moreover, little is known about the hours of work of doctors, 
i.e. the intensive margin. In chapter 2, we showed that there has been a 
reduction of average total weekly hours. Now, we break down that trend by type 
of specialty and try to give an explanation on the main reasons that potentially 
could explain this fall. 
The motivation for this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it broadens the literature on 
the labour supply of doctors in the UK looking at the main determinants that 
could explain why hours of work have dropped. The traditional policy response 
to tackle any perceived shortage of doctors has been to expand the headcount 
of doctors and to implement strategies to attracting more medical students to 
the GP route. For example, in England, under the Health Education England 
(HEE) Mandate, passed in 2013, the Department of Health (DoH) tried to 
increase the number of GPs by setting a target of 50% of the flow of new 
medical students to become GPs by 2015 (NHS England, 2014; NHS England, 
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2016). However, this target was missed by a wide margin and its limited 
success may have helped in contributing to the belief that there is a shortage 
of GPs. Secondly, from 1994 to 2014, there has been a growing female 
participation in this job market, which is a result of the expansion of the British 
universities in the 1990s. Both have helped to expand the supply of doctors and 
have changed the composition of doctors, where females have now 
outnumbered males, especially in Primary Care.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the most relevant 
literature on the labour supply. Section 3.3 describes and explains the data 
source. Section 3.4 presents the main models used. Section 3.5 shows results 
both from the econometric models and counterfactual analysis. Finally, the 
main conclusions of the analyses are drawn. 
3.2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1. LABOUR SUPPLY LITERATURE 
BY GENDER 
Since the 1970s, the interest in understanding the main determinants of labour 
supply has increased motivated, for example, by the growing female 
participation (Mincer, 1962). Empirical studies reflect that males’ participation 
has dropped since then while females’ participation has grown. These changes 
in males’ participation can be explained by the expansion on education (more 
years of schooling), a growing proportion of males taking early retirement, a fall 
in weekly hours worked, increase in holiday entitlement or exerting lower effort 
have been signalled as main causes to explain why males have reduced their 
hours supplied over time (Pencavel, 1986). In the meantime, females’ average 
weekly hours of work have declined secularly too, but their participation in the 
labour market has grown substantially. Here, we focus on exploring the 
intensive margin rather than the extensive margin or the average number of 
weeks worked per year (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986).  
 77 
At the extensive margin, most research exploring females’ labour supply 
showed that females are more likely to work part-time than males because they 
demand more flexibility in their jobs (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). At the 
intensive margin, researchers conveyed that females’ elasticity was larger than 
males and ranged 0.5 to 2.2 in some studies, but not all. So that, female 
workers are more sensitive for changes in wages, for example, than males. In 
particular, women with children have larger elasticity than females without 
children; single workers are less responsive (smaller elasticity) than married or 
cohabiting workers. At the extensive margin, males’ elasticity is larger than 
females ranging from 0.2 to 0.7 for males and from 0.1 to 0.4 respectively 
showing that there are some determinants that may harm female participation 
(Reichling and Whalen, 2013; Ilmakunnas and Pudney, 1990).  
The literature on females’ labour supply is big (Mincer, 1962; Heckman and 
MaCurdy, 1980; Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Mroz, 1987; Ilmakunnas 
and Pudney, 1990; Attanasio et al, 2008) and most studies have focused on 
understanding the main determinants at the intensive margin. While wage 
rates, taxes and unearned income may impact little on the labour supply of 
married females (Mroz, 1987), other determinants such as domestic work, 
qualifications and, especially, children can have a bigger impact. To foster 
female participation and, thus, hours of work, the cost of childcare must reduce 
(a 15% reduction will enhance participation of mothers around 25 years old 0.47 
to 0.7) must increase as well as a reduction in the gender wage-gap (Antonazzo 
et al, 2008). Females are more likely to reduce their labour supply in their late 
20s and 30s for childbearing in motherhood (Montgomery and Trussell, 1986; 
Antonazzo et al, 2008). The role of unearned income is explained as the effect 
of former saved assets or partners’ income on family decisions such as 
childbearing. This unearned income is considered an exogenous variation on 
family income and fertility which may change depending on spouse’s labour 
force participation. When the spouse is working, income effects will be large 
compared to the situation when they are not working. Hence, the larger the 
unearned income, the fewer hours supply and the greater the time devoted to 
home production, leisure and family decisions such as childbearing 
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(Montgomery and Trussell, 1986; Kniesner, 1976; Devereux, 2004; Blau and 
Kahn, 2007). This is due to the fact that females have more substitutes of work 
time than males (home production and leisure versus males’ substitution 
decisions with leisure only). Other authors posit that the increase in female 
participation in the 1980s and the 1990s is explained by females married with 
males with high wages. However, they find that married females’ wage elasticity 
converged to males’ and observed a reduction in females’ elasticity to 
husband’s wage becoming less responsive at least at the extensive margin 
(Juhn and Murphy, 1997). 
BY OCCUPATIONS 
In the UK, there has been an uneven distribution of females in the labour force, 
possibly indicating that there may be segregation in some occupations. Indeed, 
in the 1980s the number of females overcame number of males in the UK (52% 
of population), but they only accounted for 45% in terms of labour participation 
(Roberts, 1992). Then, the proportion of paid employed females rose to 48% in 
1990 and 57% in 2001 (Crompton and Lyonette, 2011). Moreover, part-time 
has widely spread amongst females where, approximately, 44% of females 
worked part-time in the UK compared to 8% of males. Finally, there was an 
hourly gender wage gap, which accounted for 74% in 1986 (measuring females’ 
hourly wage over males’ hourly wage). The concentration of females in some 
occupations has been widely discussed as evidence on horizontal segregation 
in the UK (Roberts and Coutts, 1992). The existence of this kind of segregation 
difference occupation by gender. Females usually concentrate in occupations 
in healthcare (81.3%), social care (84%) or even accountancy or law but due to 
the gender differences on preferences and determinants, the preference for 
part-time work may limit their career aspirations in some occupations.  
Law firms have been recruiting females since the 1970s (Menkel-Meadow, 
1989). But females might see their career promotions limited by own 
preferences on wanting more flexible jobs. In the UK, for example, the 
proportion of female lawyers rose from 39.5% in 2001 to 43% in 2006 and 48% 
in 2010 (Michelson, 2013). Workers in law firms usually work large number of 
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hours and promotions can come up as a result of a rat race selection where law 
firms signal inefficient long hours (Landers et al, 1996). And those working long 
hours are being promoted. Signalling long hours jobs may discourage workers 
wanting to work fewer hours in their firms and females worked fewer hours than 
males though still long hours. For example, lawyers’ average hours of work are 
about 50 hours per week, but it ranges from 45 to 55 weekly hours depending 
on the quartile workers belong to (Kay and Hagan, 1995; Landers et al, 1996; 
Wallace, 1997). In Canada, female lawyers worked 45.94 hours per week on 
average while males did nearly 50 hours per week (Kay and Hagan, 1995); 
males worked 18 more hours than females and children reduced females 
labour supply by 10 hours on average (Landers et al, 1996). 
The other comparator group we use here are accountants, which has been 
recently surveyed (Haynes, 2017). The reason why we pick these three groups 
for our analysis (doctors, lawyers and accountants) is because all require high 
investments in training and qualifications in early careers, both at 
undergraduate and graduate levels, in their careers. Specifically, for 
accountancy, women started to enter accounting in 1980s while in law firms 
this gender boost started in the 1970s. Between 1978 and 1987 the number of 
female accountants grew 12% versus the 2.8% increase of male accountants 
(Ciancanelli et al, 1990) according to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW). In 1987, the inflow of female dropped the 
average age in the distribution of female accountants and 82% of female 
accountants aged under 36 while for males this proportion was 35%.  
Between 1990 and 1995 the average age of women working in accounting 
based on figures from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) 
was 35.3 years (Gammie et al, 2013). Usual hours of work in accountancy are 
long, especially since available data usually comes for workers in the Big 4 and 
males work longer weekly hours than females. On average, accountants work 
45 hours per week, but full-time workers usually do between 50 and 60 hours 
regularly while part-time females report working 40 hours per week (Gammie 
et al, 2013). Specifically, Gammie et al worked out that approximately 85% of 
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full-time workers worked between 31 and 50 hours where the majority reported 
working between 41 and 50 (55% of all full-time accountants). Only 13% of 
female employees reported working more than 50 hours per week and 19% of 
contracted females outside the accounting firm. Part-time workers reported 
doing between 21 and 30 hours per week and this accounted for 47.8% of 
females but proportions may change depending on the area (24% in audit and 
assurance, 70% in taxes, 75% corporate finance, 40.7% general practice and 
83.35 in other functional areas). Crompton and Lyonette reported similar hours 
for accountants for male GPs (around 44 hours per week) but lower work time 
for female GPs who reported working 35 weekly hours on average. Females 
working in these areas complain about long-working hours (Crompton and 
Lyonette, 2011; White et al, 2003). The proportion of female workers doing part-
time identified this as a big career limitation in their future promotions. Indeed, 
most part-time females (and males) reported that their even work more hours 
than contracted in part-time. This excess of hours is unpaid overtime. Long 
hours may be a determinant on career progression in lawyers and accountants, 
but this is not the case for doctors where progression rather depends on long 
hours but seniority and skills (competence tests).  
The analysis of hours of work by occupation draws some conclusions. Firstly, 
we may expect some rat race phenomenon of working longer hours for lawyers 
and accountants, but not for doctors. The reason why we do not expect this is 
because doctors is a career based on competence tests rather than working 
harder. This is, for example, the situation for hospital doctors (consultants) 
where the number of available jobs is fixed and, secondly, promotion is 
competence based. Also, the introduction of a revalidation scheme may 
determine career promotion. Moreover, we could have combined these two 
control groups into one single comparator group. But the fact that doctors are 
different from both lawyers and accountants is more informative and persuasive 
than being different from the average of the two combined control groups. This 
motivates us to explore differences in the labour supply of these three main 
occupations. 
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DOCTORS’ LABOUR SUPPLY 
Flexibility at work and possibility to work part-time has been identified as strong 
valuable job characteristics. This may be interpreted as a reverse causality 
situation which may attract certain workers to specific occupations. Specifically, 
for doctors, there are two factors that may help in explaining the growing female 
participation in general practice. Firstly, the main contract agreed in the 2004 
contract, which included an opt-out on-call and weekend working (Crompton 
and Lyonette, 2011). Secondly, the easiness to change from one hospital 
specialty to general practice after a few years of working experience.  
Childbearing prospects also influence in doctors’ decision to switch. Crompton 
and Lyonette reported that there is a growing proportion of females who 
changed to general practice in their late 20s. Moreover, with regards to hours 
of work per week, male GPs usually work on average 44 hours per week while 
females do 35 hours per week. In fact, females reported working long hours but 
have flexibility to manage their agenda as long as they work the contracted 
hours. This means that a GP can work 10-11 hours a day and only work 3.5 
days per week, which accounts for nearly 40 hours. 
For the UK, there has been an increasing number of studies on the labour 
supply of doctors in recent years. Notable studies for the UK include Fox (2007) 
and Gravelle and Hole (2007); Crossley et al (2009), Sarma et al (2011), or 
Wang and Sweetman (2013) in Canada; Baltagi et al (2005), and Johannessen 
and Hagen (2012) in Norway; Kalb et al (2017) in Australia; and, finally, 
Thornton (1998) or Staiger et al (2010) in the US. Some look at the labour 
supply of hospital doctors (Baltagi et al, 2005; Johannessen and Hagen, 2012) 
or the self-employed physicians (Thornton, 1998) but most focus on Primary 
Care (GPs) where the shortage has been more widely discussed (see, for 
example, Elliot, 2003).  
The existing studies in England for GPs mainly have focused on the analysis of 
payment mechanisms (Morris et al, 2011) or the evaluation of the 2004 contract 
examining hours of work and on-call hours (Gravelle and Hole, 2007). Dolton 
et al (2015) look at senior doctors in the UK to assess the effect of the European 
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Working Time Directive (EWTD), which estimates the effect of the EWTD on 
the hours of work of senior and junior doctors. 
In the UK, some authors explained how medical careers choices are made 
(Jones and Fisher, 2006) tracking medical students for 10 years after 
graduation (1994 to 2004) from a Medical school to explore their career 
preferences using an annual postal questionnaire. Their findings suggest that 
General Practice usually is not a first option for medical students when choosing 
medical careers. Only 17.6% (96/544) picked this career path after graduation 
in 1994. In 2004, the number of GPs rose to 159 doctors, which accounts for 
almost 30% of the cohort sample. This may confirm what the literature states: 
after a few years of experience, doctors may consider switching to primary care. 
Therefore, there may be some factors such as better work-life balance and 
working reduced hours that may facilitate that more doctors can become GPs 
Gravelle and Hole studied hours of work of English GPs (Gravelle and Hole, 
2007). Based on a self-made questionnaire, Gravelle and Hole send it out to a 
random sample of GPs in England in February 2004 and compare their results 
with other sources like the LFS or the DDRB annual reports. Their main findings 
suggest that females work fewer hours than males and that GPs in England 
work, on average, 44.5 weekly hours. These are larger hours than those 
reported in the DDRB (38.8 in 1992-93 and 39 in 1998) but the authors´ 
estimates are close to those from the LFS for the same period. Also, they find 
that the size of the partnership influences the number of hours of work supplied, 
obtaining a positive correlation between partnership size and hours of work.  
In England, other studies have used data from the Electronic Staff Records and 
the National Primary Care Research and Development Centre (NPCRDC), as 
Gravelle and Hole. These studies are the biennial series of the National GP 
Surveys for England (for example see Hann et al, 2013; Gibson et al, 2015). 
Gibson et al pointed out that average hours of work of English GPs were 41.4 
hours per week in 2015. This confirms a downward trend over time where hours 
from previous surveys carried out in 1998, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2010 and 
2012 reported average weekly hours of 46.4, 47.7, 46.4, 40.9, 42.1, 41.4 and 
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41.7 respectively. They also incorporate information on job satisfaction, 
stressors or intentions to quit the profession. The latter increases over time, 
which may be explained by the growing job dissatisfaction of GPs. 
Finally, other analyses have preferred a cohort-focus using year of graduation 
from Medical School as the key variable to define cohorts (Crossley et al, 2009; 
Sarma et al, 2011; Wang et al, 2013; Jones and Fisher, 2006; Gravelle and 
Hole, 2007). Studies in Canada suggest that the decline in the hours of work of 
doctors is explained by a drop in the average hours of work of female GPs and 
the change in the proportion of time spent on direct patient care over time 
(Crossley et al, 2009). Crossley et al measure direct patient care work hours of 
GPs and emphasise the importance of doing analyses of the intensive margin 
rather than for the extensive margin (Crossley et al, 2009). Their findings 
suggest that growing bureaucracy help explain the fall in hours of work in direct 
patient care. They find a zero-income effect and advocate for technological 
changes or the expansion (or reduction) of the number of practices to explain 
this effect, as Johannessen and Hagen also do. Most studies also found 
predictable effects of other potential drivers of, especially for female GPs, such 
as children (Sarma et al, 2011 and Kalb et al, 2017) and marital status (Wang 
et al, 2013). Other variables that affect the number of working hours are 
geographical job location (doctors in rural areas work less) or being employees 
(self-employed GPs work fewer hours that hospital doctors who are invariably 
employees).  
3.3.  DATA 
This chapter benefits from the QLFS pooled cross-section data generated in 
chapter 2 of this thesis. The data covers twenty-one years (1994-2014) and is 
accessible from the UK Data Service. The LFS has been used extensively for 
labour supply modelling in the UK economy. Here, the chapter only refers to 
labour supply for different groups of occupations: doctors (partner GPs, salaried 
GPs and hospital doctors), lawyers and accountants.  
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3.3.1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
The occupation variable in the main job is generated using the 4-digits Standard 
Occupation Codes (SOC) available in the survey (SOC1990, SOC2000 and 
SOC2010). The reference occupation variables are the 4-digits minor 
occupation group in main job, with codes 240, 241 or 242 for lawyers and 250, 
251 or 252 for accountants and occupation codes 221 and 2211 for medical 
practitioners. Classifying doctors by type of premises (primary vs secondary 
care) requires combining information from the occupation codes with the 
available the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes which allows to 
distinguish doctors working in hospital premises from those in primary care. 
Furthermore, we break down primary care physicians in partner GPs (self-
employed) and salaried GPs (employees) using the self-employed and 
employee variables available. A set of control variables are also included: 
country of birth, ethnicity, and marital status. Immigrants were defined as being 
born outside the UK; although, because of Brexit, a new variable breaks down 
immigrants into European immigrants and other immigrants. Ethnicity takes 
value 1 for whites and zero otherwise; and the variable married takes value 1 
for those whose marital status is married or cohabiting, and zero otherwise; and 
ever married takes value 1 for those who ever were married (married, 
cohabiting, separated, divorced, widowed) and zero otherwise. Childbearing is 
also included with variables that show whether individuals had children aged 0-
2, 2-4, 5-9,10-15, where comparator group is having no children. Several 
measures of hours of work are available in the data: usual hours of work 
reported in main job (basic, paid and unpaid overtime, and total hours). Actual 
hours in second job were recoded to zero when answers did not apply. The 
overall hours (in both main and second jobs) was defined as the sum of total 
usual hours in main job and in second job. Eventually, real earnings variables 
(hourly wage, gross weekly earnings and net weekly earnings) were computed 
based on 2014 price indices. Then, I included variables such as age at 
graduation from full-time studies or years of experience. 
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3.3.2. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Our pooled cross-section data results in a sample size of 85,583 observations 
of which 8,333 were currently working as GPs in main job36, 14,451 hospital 
doctors, 21,647 lawyers and 41,152 accountants over the twenty-one-year 
period (1994-2014). By gender breakdown 62.98% were males (53,898) and 
37.02% females (31,685). By occupation, the gender breakdown shows similar 
proportions with 59.14% (4,928), 61.43% (8,877), 58.13% (12,583) and 66.85% 
(27,510) being male GPs, hospital doctors, lawyers and accountants 
respectively and 40.86% (3,405), 38.57% (5,574), 41.87% (9,064) and 33.15% 
(13,685) female workers.  
The proportion of natives and white workers is very similar across groups 
except for hospital doctors, which is lower (66% and 71% respectively). Also, 
doctors have a larger share of immigrant workers than lawyers and 
accountants, and this is higher for hospital doctors (34.28% overall, but as 
much as 40.23% for male hospital doctors). Approximately, 80% of GPs were 
married, 69% for hospital doctors and 63% of lawyers and accountants. 
However, the proportion of single hospital doctors, lawyers and accountants 
are very similar.  
The average age of doctors is 45.72 for GPs, with partner GPs averaging 47.34 
and salaried GPs 39.90. Tables 3.1(A) and 3.1(B) show the information by 
gender breakdown and Table 3.2. shows the differences in means. Female 
salaried GPs average 36.88 years, similar to other lawyers and accountants 
and slightly below hospital doctors (See Table 3.1(B)) but partner GPs aged 
43.88 years on average, 7 years older than female salaried GPs. Doctors’ 
earnings are larger than those for lawyers or accountants. Hospital doctors 
have the largest yearly earnings averaging £72,000 for males and £55,761 for 
females, followed by salaried GPs (£64,075 for males and £47,363 for 
females), lawyers (£58,979 for males and £45,606 for females) and 
accountants (£52,638 for males and £39,815 for females). Male partner GPs 
                                               
36 Amongst GPs, 78% are partner GP (6,514/8,333) and 22% salaried GPs (1,818/8,333). 
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have more years of experience than other workers (16 years on average) 
followed by lawyers, salaried GPs, hospital doctors and accountants. Female 
parent GPs also reported the largest number of years of experience (11.56) 
followed by hospital doctors, accountants, lawyers and, salaried GPs (5.34). 
In Table 3.2(A), male partner GPs are 6 years older than lawyers and 7 than 
accountants. Salaried GPs show a similar average age and hospital doctors 
are the youngest. Males do not have many children at different ages. Salaried 
GPs work less than lawyers but similar to accountants. In Table 3.2(B) female 
doctors work significantly fewer hours than female lawyers and accountants. 
The difference is 5 less for female partner GPs compared to lawyers and 7.5 
fewer hours for salaried GPs compared to lawyers. Hospital doctors work 




























Table 3.1. (continues) 
(B) FEMALES 
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37 Differences are obtained subtracting the average of the second group (lawyers or accountants) from 





3.3.3. CHANGE IN HEADCOUNT OVER TIME 
Figure 3.1 plots information from the extensive margin and then we compare 
with information from the intensive margin (hours of work). For this purpose, we 
create an index to show how headcount changed using year 2003 as the base 
year (2003=100)38. Sample sizes get small when we break down the data by 
type of doctor. There is an important but relatively smoothed growth in the 
headcount of female salaried GPs which increases by around a factor of three 
over these 21 years. There was a sharp spike in the number of salaried male 
GPs after the 2004 contract change. So, male GPs increased approximately by 
                                               
38 Quarter 1 is missed in years 2001 and 2004 for all occupations. The headcount figures are adjusted for 
this to reflect this missing data. 
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a factor of two on average. Male hospital doctors remained more and less 
constant but there was a smooth growth in female hospital doctors who 
approximately doubled in number. In contrast, the overall number of lawyers 
remained, fairly, static with just a modest trend towards feminisation. Also, there 
was a big increase in the accountant headcount around 2010, which was larger 
for females. Prior to this, there was a gradual change in the gender balance 
towards women.  
Figure 3.1 Change in Headcount by Gender (2003=100) 
FEMALES     MALES 
 
 
3.3.4. AGE PROFILES IN OBSERVED HOURS 
Figure 3.2 shows the self-reported average hours of work by age conditional 
on working positive hours in main job by gender breakdown, using the definition 
of total hours in main and second job proposed in chapter 2. The age profile 
seems similar for men across occupations. There is a marked drop near the 
age of 60 which is more pronounced for GPs. Hospital doctors work markedly 
longer hours in their late 20’s and early 30’s which is the period of most 
intensive training for them (basically when they are junior doctors). The number 
of hours for female GPs drops during potential childbearing ages, which data 





Figure 3.2 Observed Average Total Hours of Work (main & 2nd) 




3.4.1. LABOUR SUPPLY OVER THE LIFECYCLE 
In this chapter, we provide estimates of average weekly hours of work using 
simple labour supply models, conditioned on occupation in main job. Firstly, we 
estimate a pooled model for all 5 occupations (partner GPs, salaried GPs, 
hospital doctors, lawyers and accountants) where accountants are the 
comparator group.  
We include an occupation-specific model, by gender breakdown, where we 
condition our estimates on occupation in main job positive total hours in main 
and second job and aged 26-70. The reason why we picked up that age range 
(26-70) is because doctors typically have a longer training period than lawyers 
and accountants. They usually spend 5 or 6 years, on average, in medical 
education, and a further 2 years in postgraduate work-based training (referred 
to as Foundation Years 1 & 2 which are based largely in hospitals). This means 
that they usually end their degrees aged 23-24 and their postgraduate studies 
at 25-26. Therefore, doctors start working at age 26 at the earliest though they 
need to undertake further training (as doctors in training) for 3 further years in 
primary care and 5 to 8 years in secondary care. The upper-bound age is a 
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Doctors’ occupation can be interpreted more like a career than a typical job. In 
this context, much of the variation in wages is likely to be driven by a lifecycle 
path of wages over which agents can reasonably expect to experience is 
unlikely to reveal parameters that would be useful for policy analysis. This 
justifies ruling out wages in our model. In the face of fully anticipated wage 
variation, lifecycle optimisers will have hours of work variation that is highly 
correlated with expected wage variation in the absence of credit constraints. 
However, nothing is learnt about the effects of reforms to wage profiles by 
knowing about movements along them. Moreover, our data only reports 
information on earnings for employees and information for self-employed is 
missed. Nevertheless, we expand on our analysis on individual characteristics 
running a household analysis. For this purpose and for the sake of providing a 
more comprehensive analysis, our household level analysis includes earnings 
when available and partner’s education/occupation as a proxy to partner’s 
earnings when data on wages is missed. 
The analysis restricts to reduced form modelling, where our person-
specification labour supply model is as follows 
𝐻"#D = 𝛼D +	𝛽E𝑋"#D + 𝛾𝐷# +	𝑢"#D     (1) 
Where the superscript 𝑗 stands for the occupation held in main job (GP, Partner 
GP, salaried GP, hospital doctors, lawyer or accountant), subscript 𝑖 stands for 
the individual respondent (conditioned on gender, male or female) and t for 
survey year, respectively. Variable H measures the total hours of work in main 
and second job. Then, 𝑋 is a vector of covariates that contains a set of 
demographics: gender, age, age2, white vs non-white).  
The extended version of the model incorporates more covariates: 
married/cohabiting vs single, native vs immigrant, working in London or South 
East of England vs other region and family characteristics (number of 
dependent children aged under 16 and dummy variables for those aged 0-2, 2-
4, 5-9 and 10-15) and, finally, 𝐷# is a set of time dummies (survey years).  
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Then, we complement this analysis with a year of birth cohort analysis and, 
finally, a household-specification analysis. Year of birth cohort is an excellent 
proxy of year of graduation because almost all medical students start their 
degrees at the age of 18 and almost all complete on time. 
𝐻I#JD = 𝛼D +	𝛽E𝑋I#JD + 𝛾𝐷# + 𝛿𝐶# +	𝑢I#JD     (2) 
Where the superscript j stands for the occupation (GP, hospital doctors, lawyer 
or accountant) and subscripts g stands for gender (male or female), t for survey 
year and c for cohort. Variable H measures the total hours of work in main and 
second job, X is a vector that contains a set of demographics that include 
variables such as age, age2, ethnicity (white vs non-white), marital status 
(married, which includes widowed, divorced or separated, vs single), country of 
birth (native, for those who were born in the UK, vs immigrant) and region of 
residence (living in London or South East of England vs other region) and family 
characteristics in terms of whether they have children aged under 19 and 
dummy variables to check whether there are dependent children aged under 5, 
between 5 and 9 and between 10 and 15. Finally, 𝐷#  is a set of time dummies 
and 𝐶# is a set of cohort dummies. The year dummies capture seasonality every 
year and this nets out the average change in a variable resulting from any 
seasonal fluctuation. 
The introduction of cohorts in the analyses requires collapsing values of the 
observed variables either dependent or independent variables, where the 
individual subscript is no longer required and is replaced by the cohort where 
individuals belong to. Hence, models 1 and 2 would be, under Deaton 
assumptions, 𝐻LI#JD = 𝛼MD + 	 ?̅?E𝑋MI#JD + ?̅?𝐷# + 𝛿̅𝐶# +	𝑢MI#JD     (2.1) 
There are some limitations using cohorts that would be worth to acknowledge. 
Despite cohort studies with pseudo-panels have advantages such as less 
attrition bias than panel data, there is still the possibility that individuals may 
leave their household or drop out the survey. Also, sample sizes may differ 
depending on the periods of time considered, being smaller in some years. 
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Finally, our household labour supply model specification is as follows 
𝐻O#D = 𝛼D +	𝛽E𝑋O#D + 𝛾𝐷# + 𝛿 log(𝑤) + 𝜃	𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑜𝑏 + 	𝜑𝐷2# +	𝑢O#D   (3) 
Now, the superscript 𝑗 still stands for the occupation in main job (GP, partner 
GP, salaried GP, hospital doctors, lawyer or accountant) and subscript ℎ stands 
for each household (conditioned on gender, male or female) and t for survey 
year, respectively. Variable H still measures the total hours of work in main and 
second job. Hourly wage is included in variable w is expressed in real terms 
with base price index 2014. And variable ‘partnerjob’ denotes partner’s 
occupation/education level. The LFS only reports earnings for employees. 
Therefore, information for 80% of GPs (partner GPs – self-employed) is missed. 
We try to overcome this limitation using partner’s occupation/education as 
proxy of partner’s earnings. Finally, variable 𝐷2#  reflects a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if household partner is also a doctor (includes GP and hospital 
doctors). 
3.5. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
3.5.1. ESTIMATES OF LABOUR SUPPLY MODELS 
The OLS coefficients are obtained running the aforementioned models. All 
include a vector of demographics and a vector of survey year dummies to 
account for time fixed effects and are conditioned on gender and occupation, 
for those working positive hours and in the age range 26 to 70 years old both 
included. There are two main models: one that includes estimates from a 
parsimonious specification that includes a pooled model and conditioned 
models on occupation by gender breakdown (Table 3.3) and an extended 
version39 (Tables 3.4). The predicted values are plotted for both models though 
the extended version is shown in Figure 3.3. These figures depict a fall in the 
hours of work for doctors with all coefficients significant and that salaried GPs 
are working the fewest number of hours in all models. Lawyers and 
accountants’ average hours have been more regular and consistent over time. 
                                               
39 All coefficients of the extended version are included in Appendix 4. 
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For doctors, the big drop in hours occurs from 2000 for males and in 2004 for 
females. Eventually, we plot residuals from individual estimated models for 
pooled and conditioned models (Appendix 4.1.). 
For males, most coefficients are significant in the pooled model. Conditioned 
models report most coefficients significant except controls for ethnicity (white 
race) and country of birth (native). Native male workers work fewer hours than 
non-native for both genders, except salaried GPs and hospital doctors. The 
coefficient for native male salaried GPs is not significant (2.5 hours more than 
immigrant workers) but for hospital doctors is significant at a 1% significance 
level (near 2 more hours). The average weekly hours difference for native 
partner GPs is -2.2 and -1.8 hours per week for male accountants. White GPs 
also seem to work fewer hours than non-whites, while hospital doctors, lawyers 
or accountants seem to work longer hours. For females, native salaried GPs 
work nearly 6 hours less than non-natives and the coefficient is statistically 
significant, while for lawyers or accountants these differences are close to 2 
hours less. White doctors tend to work fewer hours (almost 8 hours less for GP 
partners) but lawyers and accountants work, on average, 0.5 to 1 hour more 
per week.  
The predicted hours confirm that male doctors work more than lawyers and 
accountants. Nevertheless, there may be some unobservable variables (family 
characteristics) that will help to explain these differences why female salaried 








Table 3.3 Parsimonious OLS Estimates 
      
The extended model (Table 3.4) expands on the reduced form adding more 
controls such as region of residence, marital status and children (number of 
children and dummies for dependent children within certain age range). 
Dependent children are aged under 16 but children aged 16-18 are considered 
dependent should they are enrolled in full-time education. We simplify our 
models only controlling for the number of dependent children aged under 16.  
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Our extended pooled model in Table 3.4. convey that doctors and lawyers work 
larger hours than accountants although the coefficient for salaried GPs is not 
significant. Females work near 8 hours less on average than males; natives 
work 1 hours less than immigrants; and white workers 1 hour more than non-
white workers. We also control for family characteristics such as number of 
children and age of youngest and eldest children. Our estimates are not 
significant in the pooled model when controlling for family characteristics. They 
are only significant when the eldest child is aged 3-4 when the labour supply 
drops 2.21 hours. When there are 2 children and the eldest ages 5-9, the fall in 
hours is only 1.651. Therefore, the supply of hours is reduced when there are 
dependent children in the family and the youngest children are aged 0-2 and 3-
4, except when there are 2 children at home and the youngest is aged 5-9.  
The conditioned models portray increasing hours of work for married males 
except hospital doctors. Females’ hours decrease, and the effect is more 
negative for doctors than lawyers or accountants (around 3.3 hours less for 
partner GPs, 2.2 for salaried GPs and 3.6 for hospital doctors, 0.5 hour less for 
lawyers and 1.4 for accountants). The coefficient is significant for male lawyers 
and accountants but not for any male doctor type. It is significant for all female 
workers except salaried GPs who work mostly 1 hour less than peers in other 
regions, GP partners work nearly 2 more hours. But the coefficient for salaried 
GPs is not significant. Working in London and the South-East is associated with 
higher hours of work for both males and females, especially male partner GPs 
and lawyers, except for female salaried GPs and hospital doctors 
(approximately 2 hours less). Living in London and South East is associated 
with fewer hours for male partner GPs, lawyers and accountants and more 





Table 3.4 Extended OLS Model  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that having children lowers hours of work, 
especially for females both quantitatively (number of children) or qualitatively 
(age of dependent children). We observe this when we control for number of 


























Age 1.805*** 2.609*** 3.150*** 1.537*** 1.851*** 2.009*** 2.743*** -2.204*** 1.102*** 1.464*** 0.983***
(0.047) (0.277) (0.501) (0.174) (0.108) (0.066) (0.228) (0.470) (0.194) (0.153) (0.111)
Age2 -0.024*** -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.031*** 0.022*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Native -0.967*** -2.133** 2.318 1.762*** -0.815* -1.684*** 2.397** -5.946*** -0.976* -1.508*** -1.531***
(0.159) (0.913) (2.037) (0.420) (0.448) (0.234) (1.079) (1.277) (0.538) (0.428) (0.297)
White 1.060*** -2.866*** -1.440 0.127 3.148*** 2.699*** -8.439*** -0.830 -1.923*** 1.511*** 1.231***
(0.173) (1.091) (2.080) (0.423) (0.534) (0.246) (1.340) (1.220) (0.540) (0.403) (0.304)
Married 0.124 3.674*** 3.271* -1.718*** 1.826*** 1.829*** -3.353*** -2.208** -3.577*** -0.541** -1.426***
(0.119) (0.941) (1.827) (0.462) (0.300) (0.180) (0.830) (1.001) (0.478) (0.265) (0.203)
Number of children
1 -2.753 5.385*** 3.054 2.261 1.934*** -1.933 -3.942*** 0.756 -12.268*** -8.551*** -4.964
(2.200) (0.953) (2.333) (3.097) (0.504) (2.559) (1.025) (2.183) (0.877) (0.759) (7.445)
2 -4.226 1.900** -3.530 3.614 -0.051 4.074 -5.329*** -0.780 -1.793** -9.473*** -14.581***
(6.777) (0.893) (2.733) (3.231) (0.573) (4.534) (1.164) (1.637) (0.901) (1.340) (0.361)
3+ 15.864 2.712* -4.160 1.974 1.034 18.112 -3.072 5.025*** 2.484 -3.349 -19.214***
(13.846) (1.636) (5.466) (3.474) (1.251) (11.878) (2.353) (1.679) (4.589) (2.768) (2.769)
Age youngest child
0-2 years -19.741 -1.294 -2.734 -4.548 -3.767** -17.523 -3.103 -15.728*** -13.761*** -7.267** 4.283
(13.855) (2.062) (5.348) (3.643) (1.537) (11.900) (3.071) (3.370) (5.005) (3.646) (3.176)
3-4 years -20.134 -6.151*** -1.151 -4.252 -0.625 -18.049 -6.905** -13.274*** -13.694*** -5.742 10.248***
(13.856) (2.261) (5.739) (3.708) (1.582) (11.892) (3.178) (2.184) (5.058) (3.764) (3.194)
5-9 years -18.239 -0.424 2.113 1.399 -0.176 -17.184 -6.475*** -10.917*** -10.504** -7.115** 10.490***
(13.850) (1.778) (5.415) (3.614) (1.335) (11.887) (2.505) (3.397) (4.760) (2.990) (2.906)
1 child & age youngest child 0-2 19.509 -3.699 -3.689 9.796*** -5.766 21.649* -3.929** -5.010*** -7.771*** -9.243*** -6.293***
(14.127) (4.962) (7.377) (2.095) (8.038) (12.400) (1.716) (1.485) (0.747) (0.471) (0.365)
1 child & age youngest child 3-4 19.665 -1.645 -24.046*** -0.375 -4.783** 23.086* -9.371*** -13.117*** -9.858*** -8.855*** -6.942***
(14.055) (4.548) (7.307) (2.892) (2.222) (12.243) (2.329) (2.392) (1.635) (1.083) (0.574)
1 child & age youngest child 5-9 18.327 -3.446 -11.712 -8.344*** -4.514** 18.138 -12.682*** -8.024** -2.845** -7.634*** -5.406***
(14.032) (4.147) (7.668) (2.343) (1.792) (12.175) (2.642) (3.299) (1.157) (0.743) (0.531)
2 children & age youngest child 0-2 20.805 -2.635 2.416 -0.806 3.880** 13.899 -1.156 -5.143 -8.334*** -6.332*** -7.783***
(15.426) (3.128) (6.605) (2.237) (1.891) (12.742) (2.472) (3.838) (1.795) (1.400) (1.036)
2 children & age youngest child 3-4 21.119 1.434 0.196 1.276 -0.035 15.124 -6.776** -7.263** -9.990*** -5.653*** -10.592***
(15.426) (2.985) (7.933) (2.320) (1.818) (12.732) (2.759) (3.622) (1.693) (1.354) (0.994)
2 children & age youngest child 5-9 19.105 -1.015 -4.304 -6.367*** 0.976 13.277 -7.373*** -8.034*** -6.505*** -9.503*** -9.461***
(15.418) (2.085) (6.120) (2.000) (1.506) (12.721) (1.689) (2.585) (1.126) (0.841) (0.626)
Age eldest child
0-2 years -1.147 -2.986 -3.507 -8.059*** 6.574 -3.499 -37.653*** -11.732*** 5.415** 9.155*** -2.889
(1.816) (4.712) (4.503) (1.650) (7.982) (2.583) (4.209) (4.079) (2.312) (3.159) (4.481)
3-4 years -2.210** -1.357 11.973*** -0.574 2.103 -5.216*** -8.182*** -9.020** -4.410* 1.712 6.406***
(0.943) (2.983) (4.165) (2.041) (1.511) (1.478) (2.825) (3.986) (2.540) (3.084) (2.417)
5-9 years -0.487 0.513 1.212 1.422 1.474* 0.425 -6.993*** -8.542*** 1.609 -4.841** -0.623
(0.506) (1.613) (3.575) (1.221) (0.895) (0.631) (2.274) (2.976) (2.063) (2.145) (1.766)
2 children & age eldest child 0-2 -1.207 1.000 0.000 9.139*** -8.177 1.369 -7.694** -11.732*** 1.159 -4.239** -1.986
(1.900) (5.385) (0.000) (2.369) (8.071) (2.678) (3.781) (4.079) (2.508) (1.790) (1.300)
2 children & age eldest child 3-4 -1.067 1.388 -15.679*** -0.001 -4.702** 3.121* -12.591*** -9.678** -4.470** -4.333*** -4.698***
(1.055) (3.781) (5.505) (2.386) (1.845) (1.609) (2.615) (3.965) (1.968) (1.542) (1.127)
2 children & age eldest child 5-9 -1.651*** -2.907 -10.566** -2.778* -2.864*** -1.697** -5.462*** -3.746 -2.128 -4.640*** -1.488*
(0.605) (2.155) (4.758) (1.543) (1.096) (0.769) (2.070) (3.131) (1.434) (1.154) (0.781)
Constant 17.030*** 17.714** 15.275 35.634*** 8.329*** 5.295*** 1.937 110.617*** 40.207*** 17.884*** 26.499***
(1.099) (7.112) (15.305) (3.938) (2.457) (1.472) (6.669) (10.988) (4.652) (3.264) (2.387)
N 74,885 3,756 626 7,719 10,899 23,424 2,125 1,007 4,693 7,728 11,762
R2 0.18 0.32 0.27 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.39 0.24 0.17 0.20
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Total hours (main & 2nd) POOLED MODEL MALES FEMALES
CONDITIONED MODELS CONDITIONED MODELS
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Nevertheless, interacting these two variables reports interesting results. While 
the number of children does not refrain male workers to work longer hours, the 
negative effect is more evident for females. Male hospital doctors with one 
single child aged 0-2 increase their labour supply 9.796 hours but when the 
child’s age is 5-9 we get a negative coefficient (-8.344 hours). Results for 
‘partner’ GPs are not significant and for ‘salaried’ GPs we only get a significant 
result when there is one child aged 3-4. The reduction is so high that this is 
explained by an outlier in our sample. For male lawyers and accountants there 
is a fall in hours of work when children aged 3-4 and 5-9.  
For female workers, overall, our results convey a general reduction in hours of 
work. Controlling for age of the youngest (eldest) child and number of children, 
we get that female workers reduce their labour supply largely when their 
children age 3-4 and 5-9.  The interaction of these two controls reports the 
following findings. The coefficient for female partner GPs with 3 or more 
children and the eldest is aged 0-2 represents a single observation in 1994 
aged 35 and working 8 hours per week. Despite this outlier, our results are 
consistent with the literature (Sarma et al, 2011; Crossley et al, 2009) and 
depict that females experience a larger reduction in their labour supply for 
childbearing, which is more noticeable when the number of children increases 
and are aged 0-4 and 5-9. Finally, the trend in hours over time is consistent with 
the literature.  
Within the age range 30-5040, male partner GPs work more than 50 hours per 
week while lawyers work between 4 and 7 fewer hours than partner GPs (8 to 
12 less hours for accountants). Beyond the age of 50, all professions reduce 
their supply of hours. Hours of work of female partner and salaried GPs show 
the opposite behaviour: they work fewer hours than lawyers and accountants. 
Hospital doctors work the largest number of hours with no gender distinction.  
Figure 3.3 displays the predicted hours using estimates from the extended 
model and conveys that female GPs work fewer hours than lawyers and 
                                               
40 Appendix 5. 
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accountants. The predictions rely on the OLS coefficients in Tables 3.4. Overall, 
male Partner GPs work harder than lawyers and accountants until aged 60 
where the sharp fall may be interpreted as an increasing number of partner GPs 
retiring above that age. Male Salaried GPs behave similarly to the other groups, 
but the confidence interval widens after age 65 because fewer people are 
working beyond that age. Male hospital doctors work harder than the other 
groups. In summary, male doctors usually work harder than lawyers and 
accountants and seem to start leaving the profession at the age of 60. 
The analysis for females is quite different. The labour supply curve does not 
show the usual inverted U-shape form. What is interesting is that figures clearly 
depict that females reduce their labour supply for childbearing. The raw data 
and the graph confirm that childbearing occurs between the late 20’s and early 
40’s for all professions. Our data shows that the representative female reduces 
her hours of work in her thirties, which is consistent with the literature (Sarma 
et al, 2011; Crossley et al, 2009) and after that, females increase their hours of 
work gradually. The lifecycle labour supply curve is more striking for female 
salaried GPs because the current recruitment policy addresses to recruit 
salaried GPs rather than partner GPs to tackle the alleged shortage of GPs. It 
seems likely that the financial incentives of partner GPs to expand by adding a 
partner are lower than those if the increase in headcount relies on salaried GPs. 
Female salaried GPs reduce their labour supply during childbearing 
significantly (about 40-50% of average hours worked) but after that, they 
increase their hours of work gradually. The hours of work after 60 years old are 
noisy for retirement reasons. The NHS pension scheme is typically much more 
generous than the private sector schemes that accountants and lawyers will 
find themselves in. So, there is large variation in the results. 
With average weekly hours worked, it is possible to work out total annual hours 
worked summing up the predicted average week total hours for each age (Table 
3.5). Full-time NHS doctors benefit from a minimum of 6-week holiday pay 
yearly, except junior doctors under the 2016 contract who only have 27 days41. 
                                               
41 https://www.bma.org.uk/advice/employment/leave/leave-overview  
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Full-time lawyers and accountants have 5.6 weeks. Hence, we will use a 6-
week holiday entitlement as a rule of thumb. 
Figure 3.3 Predicted Average Hours of Work (extended model) 
(A) Pooled model 
MALES     FEMALES 
 
 
(B) Conditioned models 
MALES     FEMALES 
 
 
Table 3.5 shows the predicted average total hours of work per annum. So, 
summing up all average weekly hours worked over a substantial number of 
years across each lifecycle profile (in this analysis the lifecycle is 45 years, 
ranging ages 26 to 70 both included). However, legal retirement ages are, 
currently, 60 for females and 65 for males. Hence, our whole lifecycle working 
life spans 35 years for females and 40 years for males. Hence, assuming that 
holiday entitlement is 6 weeks per year, we multiply average weekly hours by 
44 working weeks per year to get average annual hours. Then, we multiply by 
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35 working years for females and 40 for males to get all predicted hours worked 
over the whole lifecycle for the representative agent (Table 3.6).  
Table 3.5 Predicted Average Annual Hours  
 Model 1 (simple) Model 2 (extended) 
  Males Females Males Females 
Partner GPs 2,101.39 1,603.75 2,117.86 1,585.85 
Salaried GPs 1,885.43 1,370.43 1,882.37 1,326.47 
Hospital doctors 2,200.75 1,815.68 2,188.62 1,764.74 
Lawyers 2,004.69 1,671.30 2,008.02 1,635.01 
Accountants 1,794.48 1,709.33 1,793.18 1,532.57 
 
Table 3.6 Predicted Average Total Hours Worked over Whole Lifecycle 
 Model 1 (simple) Model 2 (extended) 
  Males Females Males Females 
Partner GPs 84,055.46 56,131.18 84,714.30 55,504.74 
Salaried GPs 75,417.01 47,965.05 75,294.75 46,426.40 
Hospital doctors 88,029.85 63,548.94 87,544.64 61,765.75 
Lawyers 80,187.44 58,495.43 80,320.63 57,225.48 
Accountants 71,779.03 59,826.65 71,727.27 53,639.82 
 
COHORT MODEL RESULTS 
Our cohort models follow Deaton’s methodology (Deaton, 1997) and 
complement our previous analysis. The LFS does not include a variable 
reporting the year of graduation from a medical school. But it does include two 
variables that could be possible to use: firstly, the age when completed full-time 
education and it is available from 2000 quarter 2 (previously it was only 
available in two quarters along the year). Secondly, year/age when obtained 
the highest qualification which is reported from 2001 onwards. These two 
variables could be used as a proxy for year of graduation from higher education. 
However, as they do not provide that information accurately, we opted for 
setting year of birth as the cohort variable.  
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In our case, we construct our cohort variable (year of birth) using the other two 
variables, subtracting age from year. However, this could lead to potential 
confounding problems. Hence, our models include dummies for ages and 
cohorts but exclude year dummies, which differs from Deaton who controls for 
age, year and cohort dummies. Figure 3.4 portrays the predicted values by 
cohorts (Appendix 6 reports the estimates). 
Figure 3.4 (A) depicts the usual U-inverted shape of the labour supply over the 
lifecycle, both for men and women. Overall, females work fewer hours than 
males at all ages. The reduction of hours of work in cohort 1971-1975 (blue 
line9 in their thirties is larger for females (from 43 hours in their 30s to 
approximately 37 hours in their 30s) than males (50 hours to 46 hours). The 
conditioned models show that younger cohorts usually work fewer hours than 
older cohorts. Male salaried GPs’ hours are very volatile which could be 
explained by sample bias (the number of salaried GPs is very low and irregular). 
On the other hand, females show the U-shape that individual OLS models 
report. Cohort coefficients are not significant for salaried GPs. They are for 
younger cohorts of male hospital doctors and partner GPs (both males and 
females). 
Figure 3.4 Predicted Average Hours of Work by cohorts (extended model) 
(A) Pooled model 





































Next, we complement this analysis with regressions from household models. 
We include partner’s occupation as a proxy of partner’s income for all workers. 
As earnings information is not available for self-employed workers and 80% of 
GPs work as partner GPs, we preferred to include a proxy for partner’s earnings 
to capture the effect of partner’s occupation should partner work as a self-
employed (either as partner GP or other occupation). Males are majority playing 
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a head of household role (Table 3.7) while females are more numerous 
classified as spouse/partner in interview date in the survey (Table 3.8). 
Table 3.7 reports estimates for the extended household model conditioned on 
males. Males are play a head of the household role in most cases when the 
couple is married. For other marital statuses this can change. We estimate a 
pooled model and conditioned models for each occupation to ascertain whether 
earnings variables and partner’s occupation may affect the weekly hours of 
work supplied.  
Our earnings variable is hourly pay. This variable is only reported in 2 of the 5 
waves (wave 1 and 5) in the LFS for employees, excluding this information for 
self-employed. We account for inflation changes in hourly pay setting the 
inflation base year in 2014 (100=2014). This allows us to control for real wages 
rather than nominal wages. Table 3.7 shows that real hourly wages are 
significant for hospital doctors and accountants at all levels and lawyers at 5%. 
A 1% increase in real wages reduces total weekly hours of work for hospital 
doctors while it increases lawyers and accountants’ hours of work. The 
coefficient is not significant for salaried GPs. This coefficient enables us to get 
the elasticity of labour supply deriving equation 3. Hence, the elasticity for 
males could be computed as ]^_`a]b = cdefgOhidjfk. The elasticity of head of 
household members’ (males) labour supply is -0.16 for salaried GPs though it 
is not significant; -0.18 for hospital doctors, 0.13 for lawyers and 0.12 for 
accountants who are head of household (males).   
The effect of partner’s occupation in the decision of hours of work is uneven. In 
general, when the partner has a manager position or a wealthy occupation (for 
example doctors, business and finance), then that reduces labour supply. This 
is the case for partner GP when their partners are hospital doctors (-4 hours 
per week at 1% level of significance); chartered accountant, economist, or 
similar this drop is larger (-13 hours). However, other occupations may enhance 
the supply of hours like engineer or technician (+6 hours) or business associate 
(+15 hours). For salaried GPs, we only found positive effects on hours of work 
when partner is a scientist (+16 hours) or, for hospital doctors’ when the partner 
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is a health associate (+3.5 hours per week. For lawyers and accountants, 
partner’s occupation reduces labour supply when coefficients are significant. 
Table 3.8 depicts information for spouse/partners in the household. This 
analysis reports that when real hourly wages increase by 1%, it reduces labour 
supply for salaried GPs and hospital doctors while it increases lawyers and 
accountants. The elasticity of spouse/partner’s labour supply is, thus, -0.28 for 
salaried GPs and -0.19, 0.13 and 0.17 for hospital doctors, lawyers and 
accountants respectively. When occupation of the head of household, in this 
case, is in the health sector, the reduction of hours for partner/spouse is larger 
than in the previous analysis. Overall, spouse/partner reduces their labour 
supply regardless their partner’s occupations except for accountants when their 
partner works as a partner GP. Then they increase their labour supply by 5 
hours per week. 
Number of children are more important for household spouses. When there are 
2 children in household, spouses reduce their hours of work compared to 
households where there are no children. The largest reduction is for salaried 
GPs followed by hospital doctors. Lawyers and accountants’ coefficients are 
similar and around 5 hours. Contrary to what we could expect, age of the 
youngest and eldest children is not as determinant as we could have expected. 
This interaction is only significant for spouse/partners with one child aged 5-9 
































The sample characteristics are relatively homogeneous across occupations. 
Therefore, decomposing the gap in hours using the classical Blinder-Oaxaca 
(BO) decomposition would not add much to our understanding of the variation 
of hours across occupations conditional on gender. However, over time, it is 
likely that the gender composition changes over time in each occupation which 
may also change the proportion of full-time workers. For example, the 
proportion of full-time workers in one group might be different from other groups 
where there might be more people working part-time. 
3.5.2. EXPLAINING THE GAPS IN HOURS 
Previous results suggest a gap in hours by gender and amongst occupations. 
It is possible to explain this gap in hours using counterfactuals to acknowledge 
how the growth in headcount may have contributed to widen or narrow the gap 
in hours. To get the counterfactuals used in this chapter we, firstly, obtained the 
estimates from an OLS pooled model. Then, we worked out the average of 
every covariate for each year and occupation group (also conditioning on 
gender). Next, we multiplied both to get the predicted hours for each group. 
Two counterfactuals are calculated in this chapter: first, a weighted predicted 
hour variable using the weights for each group and year; finally, a second 
counterfactual that weights the predicted hours by the group someone is 
interested in studying. For example, it is possible explore the extent to which 
the increase in the proportion of has contributed to the weighted average hours 
of work. Figure 3.5 depicts the gap in hours by gender for each occupation and 
Figure 3.6 does the same for each occupation controlling for gender.  
Figure 3.5 shows the difference in predicted hours for males and females and 
the gap between the weighted hours variables for each occupation. In essence, 
the closer the weighted variables are to either the predicted male or female 
hours, the higher proportion of those workers in the sample. As it is a time trend 
graph, it will reflect changes in the composition of males and females within 
occupations. 
The gap between the weighted variables widens over time in Figure 3.5(A). It 
is the fall in the number of male partner GPs what explains the narrow gap. 
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Female proportions are from 25% in 1994 to 40% in 2014. This proportion can 
be tricky. Absolute figures do not change a lot for females. It is the drop of male 
number what increases the proportion of female partner GPs. Over time, this 
gap widens relative to the total hours weighted by gender proportions up to 6.5 
hours in 2014.  
Figure 3.5(B) is more irregular, and this volatility is explained by the few 
observations in the sample. Also, salaried GPs have been traditionally 
dominated by females in all years, ranging from 58.5% in 1994 to 73.2% in 
2014. The high variation until 200 is explained by big increases of male salaried 
GPs in the sample. Then that effect is smoothed by a higher number of 
observations for females.  
Figure 3.5(C) shows a gap in hours of 8 hours in 2013 and 2014 and it is 
explained by the growing female hospital doctors. Figure 3.5(D) explains the 
six-hours difference with the same argument and it is the same for Figure 3.5(E) 
where the widest gap is about 7 hours.  
In a nutshell, the graphs included in Figure 3.5 convey that females work fewer 
hours than males if we take the counterfactual as the reference. So, it is the 
increase in the number of female workers what may explain this gap, which is 
especially wide when the proportion of females grew more dynamically than the 
change in male.
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Figure 3.6 and 3.7 show the gap in hours comparing different occupation 
groups for each gender. Males are depicted in Figure 3.6 and females in Figure 
3.7. The counterfactual is built upon GP samples in 1994 unless comparing 
Partner GPs and Salaried GPs, which, in that case, it is Salaried GPs the 
counterfactual used for 1994.  
Figure 3.6(A) shows that while the number of observations for male salaried 
GPs doubled and those of male Partner GPs halved, the gap in hours expanded 
and partner GPs worked larger hours than salaried GPs. The maximum 
difference is in 2010 and 2011 where the gap widens to 13 hours. Then it 
continues to fall since 2012 to levels close to 11 hours.  
Figure 3.6(B) inverts that trend which is explained by the high proportion of 
male hospital doctors that grows 20% approximately. The following graphs are 
explained by similar reasons. When the gap in hours widens, this may be 
explained by the male partner GPs proportions dropping over time. When it 
narrows, the most reasonable explanation is that the proportion of lawyers or 
accountants change but their hours of work per week are steadier over time. 
For salaried GPs (Figures 3.6(E) onwards) the change in the proportion of 
salaried males impacts little on the weighted hours variables. 
Figure 3.7 portraits the gap in hours across occupations for females. The 
argument that lies in most graphs is that when the proportion of female workers 
grew, the gap in hours widened as it is shown in Figure 3.7(A) or (E). 
So, the main conclusion that we can get from the hours’ gap graphs is that 
when the proportion of females grew significantly, it increased the gap in hours 
especially when the proportion was not too small. So, when females 
represented beyond 30 or 35% of all the proportion of workers, the hours of 
work dropped, explaining why those gaps widened. The increase in the sample 
for salaried GPs increased substantially in 2013 and 2014 making the gap 
bigger than earlier and near to 13 or 15 hours per week. 
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Figure 3.7 Hours Gap Among Occupations (FEMALES) 
(A)   
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Since there is virtually no UK literature on this topic it seemed sensible to start 
with basic descriptive statistics and reduced form econometric summaries of 
the data, rather than attempting to model labour supply in any structural way.  
There are a few limitations to this work. First, OLS, cohorts and household 
regressions are conditioned on occupation, working positive hours and a 
specific age range which may lead to sample biases. However, we think that 
occupational choice is not a serious source of selection (on unobserved 
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senior High School curriculum will determine entry into the medical and other 
professions. While we select on starting age, there are very few observations 
working in these professions below age 26 or above 69. So, this source of bias 
will be small. Conditional on working at all is a much more serious source of 
potential bias. However, this is likely to be less of a problem than for other 
workers because these are graduate professions that lead to what, even now, 
is effectively a lifetime career. These are expensive careers to enter and 
someone would expect the utilisation rates of these skills to be high across the 
lifecycle. Of course, there are career interruptions for women largely associated 
with children, but this is something that affects all professions and it is unclear 
that any bias would differ much across occupations. 
A second reservation is that data is cross-section data rather than panel data. 
Using cross-sectional data, it is not possible to track individuals over time and 
their transitions in-and-out the labour market. However, sample size for the 
longitudinal version of the QLFS was very small whilst the pooled cross-section 
is richer in the variables available as well as being much larger. 
Thirdly, years of education variables were not included but this is not likely to 
be an important issue. These are careers so age tracks experience very well, 
and the variation in years of education across individuals in these professions 
is likely to be relatively small since entry requires very specific trainings.  
Finally, the definition for GPs and Hospital doctors is broad and it is not possible 
to make comparisons between GPs, Junior Hospital Doctors, Consultants (i.e. 
Senior Hospital Doctors), or within specialties. The data simply does not allow 
us to identify these distinctions and only administrative data is likely to allow 
such work to be done.  
Further work, nonetheless, suggests itself. Regrettably they mostly require 
longitudinal data and existing panels datasets are far too small to generate 
sufficient sample sizes, and such work must, in the UK, await the availability of 
register administrative data (for example from NHS contracts and payroll, or 
from the NHS pension scheme). Firstly, retirement decisions would be worth 
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exploring. This has been a recurrent issue in Australia (Brett et al, 2009; Pit and 
Hansen, 2014) and the UK (Sibbald et al, 2003; Hann et al, 2010; BMA surveys 
2014a-2015d). Australia has had the foresight to create a panel dataset 
(Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life, MABEL) specifically of 
medical workers and this has been used creatively for research purposes.  
Secondly, increasing early retirement intentions have been reported among 
GPs in England in the BMA surveys (BMA surveys 2014a-2015d). Among all 
doctors, it is GPs who have been consistently reporting the highest rate of 
uptake for early retirement (45% on average) which grew to 46.5% in last 
quarter in 2015 (BMA, 2014a-d; BMA, 2015a-d). Hann et al studied the 
relationship between job satisfaction and intentions to leave the profession, 
finding that 16.5% of GPs who reported moderate or higher intentions to leave 
their job, did eventually leave (Hann et al, 2010). However, this has been an 
underexplored area and the few existing studies, again, rely on self-reported 
questionnaires and the BMA surveys. An important issue with retirement is to 
look at whether doctors coordinate their retirements with their partners (Hurd, 
1990; Gustman et al, 2004; Merkurieva, 2015; Warren, 2013). The analysis of 
career interruptions is a further topic that is important and would also demand 
panel data. 
Finally, the chapter did not analyse earnings thoroughly. This is something that 
could have done with the LFS cross-sections. However, this will be part of our 
future research agenda. In the medical profession wages are determined by a 
pay scale, and although there is increasing ability for there to be departures 
from these scales several DDRB reports that this flexibility is hardly ever used. 
Thus, in the context of doctors, explaining wage rates is less important than 
would normally be the case. 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has compared hours of work of partner GPs, salaried GPs, and 
hospital doctors with those of lawyers and accountants. It has been tested that 
the QLFS is a useful survey to track the hours of work of doctors. It is the main 
survey in the UK that monitors the performance of the labour market every 
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month and reports a good array of variables regarding hours and earnings for 
different types of workers (employees, self-employed). The sample size is 
large, and it offers a wide array of variables to be used. 
This analysis documents that GPs work fewer hours than other occupations 
and much of this fall has been driven by the increased proportion of female 
entrants to the profession. The rate of feminisation has grown much faster for 
doctors than lawyers and accountants. But, female GPs work fewer hours than 
females in other occupations during most of their career. The baseline model 
reports lower hours for native and white workers with a larger difference for 
doctors than for lawyers and accountants.  
The lifecycle hours for salaried GPs are interesting for females, who work fewer 
hours until middle age. After that, they start to work more hours and converge 
to a similar number of average hours than other occupations. However, the data 
conveys that the number of females salaried GPs grows up to the age of 40 
and then declines, which may be considered as a cohort effect.  
The extended version of the model includes some additional covariates such 
as marital status, regional dummies and family characteristics using number of 
children and dependent children as proxies. Children impact more in the 
decisions of females than males. Those estimates imply that female doctors, 
especially GPs, reporting having children worked less than mothers in other 
professions.  
On average, over the lifecycle, female GPs show the biggest hours’ gap (14 
hours less than males). Meanwhile, the predicted total hours of work showed 
that female salaried GPs worked the fewest total hours over their lifecycle for a 
representative individual that worked between 26 and 70 years old. Children 
reduce the total hours of work supplied by females about 2,000 hours over their 
lifetime compared to the parsimonious model. However, although the analysis 
fitted to current retirement ages (60 for females and 65 for males) is consistent 
with the assertion that female salaried GPs rank bottom among these 





THE WELL-BEING OF DOCTORS 




The conventional approach to explore the main issues of the intensive margin 
of doctors’ labour supply is to estimate a model of the economic determinants 
of hours of work. There are two examples of such work that explicitly model the 
behaviour of physicians (Saether, 2005; Kalb et al, 2017). However, this is a 
difficult task in a context where almost all of the observational variation in the 
wage rate is associated with anticipated movements along a lifecycle career 
path. At best, such econometric work will provide estimates of Frisch labour 
supply elasticities of hours’ response to expected changes in wage rates. 
However, those elasticities are not appropriate for simulating the effect of 
exogenous variation in wage profiles induced, for example, by some reform, as 
opposed to movements along them.  
There is considerable literature on job satisfaction of doctors, especially general 
practitioners (Sibbald et al (2003); Hann et al (2009, 2010); Whalley et al (2005, 
2006); French et al (2007)), and there is considerable research on the issue of 
burnout amongst physicians. However, there is very little research on the well-
being levels of doctors, and what does exist is for small snapshots and 
unrepresentative samples. 
This paper offers a novel approach to understand the main implications of 
wellbeing on physician’s labour supply. For the first time, we are able to exploit 
a large well-established dataset such as the Annual Population Survey (APS). 
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In particular, we explore the self-reported subjective wellbeing variables 
available (anxiety, happiness, depression, feeling worthwhile, illness). We 
examine the distribution of physicians’ wellbeing, other metrics such as health 
problems, and their proximate determinants. Then, we compare UK physicians’ 
wellbeing levels (GPs and Hospital Doctors separately) with other professional 
groups (lawyers and accountants) and show how these metrics vary with hours 
of work.  
The notable contribution of this paper is that we propose and implement an 
innovative idea to explore and test the extent to which individuals, across 
different professions, are “on/off” their respective labour supply equations. We 
are particularly interested in how the working hours of these professionals affect 
their self-reported wellbeing outcomes.  
Sometimes a causal correlation is made between certain occupations triggered 
by the presence of intrinsic motivation provided by having a mission orientation 
(Belsey and Ghatak, 2005). A good example of this is the standard view of 
public servants, where having a public-sector ethos is viewed as a form of 
intrinsic motivation. So, the existence of intrinsic motivation implies that the 
effect of incentive schemes is low to enhance workers carry out their assigned 
tasks effectively (Heyes, 2005).  
The classical view of the medical profession is similar. Physicians will treat 
patients in the best possible way without the need for monitoring or demand 
specific incentives. The idea that physicians perform according to the edicts of 
a Hippocratic Oath is a vivid illustration that non-pecuniary motivation might be 
even more important than financial incentives. Arguably, these ideas apply 
more forcefully to contexts where there are professionals whose occupations 
bring specific ethics and obligations to act in a responsible way.  
We are particularly interested in the following issues about physicians’ 
wellbeing. Firstly, how long working hours, and especially those dimensions of 
hours that are effectively elective (overtime and second job hours), affect their 
wellbeing outcomes. Secondly, we examine preferences in working more or 
fewer hours. We inspect how reporting working too few or to many hours than 
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desired hours affects outcomes may alter their wellbeing levels. Finally, since 
there is a widespread belief that physicians may be mission oriented, we also 
investigate how these effects might differ across occupations. So, we might 
expect this to be reflected in how their wellbeing is affected by the hours that 
they work. 
Our headline findings are that, contrary to popular belief, physicians (GPs and 
hospital doctors) are less anxious, happier and more satisfied than other 
professionals. Hospital doctors are less depressed and less likely to self-report 
being sick, than either accountants or lawyers who reported similar levels to 
GPs. More predictably, doctors report that they feel that their life is worthwhile 
– somewhat more so than accountants and lawyers. 
Finally, we explore whether there is potential for expansion of supply along the 
intensive margin since this is likely to be an inexpensive solution to the 
perceived shortage in the supply of, for example, GP time. When we explore 
the relationship with hours of work we find that, that a marginal extra hour has 
virtually no effect on physicians’ wellbeing outcomes, but this does not happen 
for accountants and lawyers. This might signal that physicians are, on average, 
“on” their labour supply curve. However, a small proportion of individuals 
declare being underemployed and would like to work more hours compare to 
the self-reported hours they currently work. Controlling for the wage rate, we 
find that those individuals have lower values of the wellbeing measures. In 
particular, this is true for lawyers and accountants, but not for physicians. This 
could be viewed as evidence of doctors’ intrinsic motivation exhibited by the 
mission orientation. Finally, the main policy implication for being “on” their 
labour supply curve implies that a small overtime premium rate would be 
required to incentivise them to expand their hours of work. This could be a 
policy to be implemented quickly to tackle the shortage of doctors, and 
alongside the current policy of expanding along the extensive margin42. 
                                               
42 Unofficial estimates of the cost of training a doctor are upwards of £300,000 each. And the reported shortfall in the supply of 
doctors is upwards of 5,000. So, the overall cost of such an expansion of supply along the extensive margin is at least £1.5 billion. 
The working life of a doctor is unlikely to average over 40 years, even in the long term. So, we might expect sustaining this 
expansion in supply would add approximately £400m pa to the current costs. In contrast, the existing stock of GPs amount to 
approximately 60 thousand who work, on average, around 38 hours per week (in our APS data). An additional 3 hours per GP per 
week, on average, from the existing stock of GPs would provide approximately same additional supply as expanding the 
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4.2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
GENERAL LITERATURE 
There has been a bourgeoning interest in understanding well-being measures 
(Erdogan et al, 2012) and also in Economics. Here, the main focus has been 
on understanding how economic variables correlate with well-being. So far, 
most studies have focused on understanding how income at all levels correlate 
with happiness (Oswald, 1997; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006), but the 
understanding of how people can be happier has expanded to other areas such 
as labour markets (Alesina et al, 2005; Golden and Wiens-Tuers, 2006; 
Wooden et al, 2009). Perhaps, one of the key questions using these measures 
is how reliable they are to make consistent and unbiased conclusions (Krueger 
and Schkade, 2008).  
Exploring these relationships with subjective well-being measures lies in the 
idea of understanding how people maximise their utility and, thus, what drive 
their decisions. Easterlin, for example, studied whether the growth in GPD in 
the US in the post-war period (1946-1957) led to a similar trend in happiness 
(Easterlin, 1974) and concluded that the growth in happiness was a small 
proportion of the growth in national income. Other authors tested whether 
certain variables may lead to greater levels of happiness being those controls 
married, high income, females, white ethnicity, high education or retired 
workers (Oswald, 1997).  
The main variables that usually measure well-being are happiness and life 
satisfaction. Overall, income is correlated with well-being variables when these 
are dependent variables, but this correlation is weaker when the measure of 
well-being is experienced happiness than life satisfaction (Kahneman and 
Krueger, 2006). One of the problems that subjective well-being measures face 
is that should there be low correlation between well-being variables and 
controls, that could be partially due to attenuation biases or the presence of 
                                               
headcount by 5,000. The hourly rate for salaried GPs is about £25. So, the cost of the additional time at the margin would up 
upwards of £250m pa. On the face of it, these crude calculations suggest there may be some headroom to provide overtime rates 
of 50% above the regular rate and still be cheaper than the alternative expansion along the extensive margin. 
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high measurement error in the sample. In fact, if the well-being variables are 
self-perceptions the biggest limitation is how to infer any utility measure from 
those analyses. Nevertheless, Kahneman and Krueger state that well-being 
data are not expected to provide utility measures but just correlations with other 
demographic controls. Thus, for that purpose, they would be good measures to 
predict future outcomes.    
If we compare well-being measures with other reliable ratios found in other 
microeconomic variables, they underperform: 0.9 versus 0.5-0.7. But the 
scores resulted from well-being variables would be reliable enough to make 
conclusions (Krueger and Schkade, 2008). When those measures of well-being 
are more reliable is when analyses compare group means and have benefited 
from statistical aggregation and regression coefficients showed attenuation 
bias. 
DOCTORS’ LITERATURE 
Healthcare workers, like teachers and other public-sector workers, are often 
seen to having a mission orientation relative to other professionals. This may 
lead to higher levels of satisfaction in their jobs and better performance. 
However, recent surveys have reported the opposite with higher levels of 
discontent for doctors in their jobs, mostly GPs. This may imply a degree of 
demotivation, lower job satisfaction and higher “burnout” (BMA, 2014a-2015d). 
The literature on burnout in the context of (mostly US) physicians suggests that 
burnout is associated with worse clinical outcomes for patients. We might 
expect this to be indicative of high turnover rates, and growing absenteeism 
through increasing number of reported sick days. 
The literature on job satisfaction is large, especially for nurses (Lu et al, 2005, 
2012) or GPs (Whalley et al, 2005, 2006; Hann et al, 2009, 2010; Sibbald et al, 
2003). Variety in professional tasks, relationships, contact with colleagues and 
patients, and supervising medical students have typically been found to be 
positive sources of higher job satisfaction. Low income, long working hours, the 
size of the bureaucratic burden, work-life imbalance, and not having enough 
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recognition have been widely reported as sources of lower job satisfaction 
among GPs (Van Ham et al, 2009). Practising in large cities or depressed areas 
also correlate negatively with job satisfaction (Sibbald et al, 2003). Hence, 
decreasing job satisfaction may lead to increasing burnout and, thus, more 
likely intentions to quit.  
Research in occupational psychology classifies stressors in five categories: 
intrinsic to the job (such as workload or work-life balance), the role in the 
institution, career promotion, relationships at work, and organisational structure 
and environment (Cooper and Marshall, 1976). Higher levels of stress mean 
poorer physical health, worse psychological well-being or lower job satisfaction. 
Johnson et al (2005) compare physical health, psychological well-being and job 
satisfaction among 26 occupations, which included accountants and medical 
workers. Accountants and medical workers reported similar levels of physical 
health (12.66 for accountants and 12.67 medical/dental workers), psychological 
well-being (17.47 and 17.82) but higher job satisfaction for doctors (25.66 
versus 18.74 for accountants). The analysis of stress and these three variables 
report that both medical workers and accountants rank higher in physical health 
and psychological well-being compared to their means, but it is job satisfaction 
what makes the big difference. When doctors ranked 8th, accountants ranked 
24th in this league table suggesting that stress appears to impact more 
negatively on accountants than doctors. 
Higher levels of stress can lead to growing burnout and, thus, increasing 
intentions to leave the profession or, even, mental health illnesses (psychiatric 
morbidity). Doctors have been reporting higher levels of burnout for the last 
years (Lemaire and Wallace, 2017) and hours of work, job stress and workload 
have been reported as the main drivers of stress. Females are more likely to 
suffer from stress, but it is not clear the effect of age on stress as the literature 
offers mixed results: some studies show a negative correlation with burnout, for 
example for part-time GPs; and others address a positive correlation between 
being single and burnout (Imo, 2016). 
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Workload and well-being have been reported in two main surveys in the UK 
that assess doctors’ job satisfaction, for example: the British Medical 
Association Quarterly Tracker Survey (BMAQTS) and the series of the National 
General Practice Worklife Survey (NGPWS). The BMAQTS reports high levels 
of stress among doctors (61 % of doctors reported being stressed in the 2017 
quarter 2 survey). It also contains information on morale levels, work-life 
balance and current workload. GPs reported the highest proportion of medical 
practitioners working ‘very often’ outside regular hours compared to hospital 
consultants, junior doctors or specialists and associate specialists (SAS). 
Likewise, the NGPWS also includes job satisfaction, stressors, hours of work 
and intentions to quit variables. Importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, 
the survey includes a question about satisfaction with life ‘Overall, how satisfied 
are you with life?’  
In the 8th Report of the National GP Worklife Surveys, Gibson et al report lower 
job satisfaction levels for GPs than previous years and stress that this is the 
lowest level since 2001 (Gibson et al, 2015). Hours work is found to be the main 
detractor of job satisfaction (mean 3.56 on a seven-point scale) where 48.5% 
of respondents reported being very unhappy with the hours they work 
compared to the 34% who reported being satisfied. Remuneration is other 
source of high job dissatisfaction, although 45.5% reported being satisfied with 
their remuneration versus compared to 41% being dissatisfied. They also report 
an average life satisfaction analysis for each of the eight cross sections that 
have been carried out so far: the relationship between average life satisfaction 
and average hours worked across surveys is negative but almost flat and the 
relationship between satisfaction and hours is not well-fitting. Unfortunately, the 
individual data from these publicly funded surveys is not made available to other 
researchers and, so, it is not possible to conduct any secondary analysis of the 
type conducted here on the APS data. 
The traditional labour supply literature has relevance to our analysis. It has 
been conventional to think of hours of work being determined by maximising an 
objective 𝑈(∙) function, defined on consumption expenditure, 𝑐, and hours of 
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work, ℎ, subject to the constraint that consumption expenditure equals 
unearned income, 𝑚, plus earned income, 𝑤 ∙ ℎ, where 𝑤 is the hourly wage 
rate. This determines the optimal hours of work, ℎ∗ = ℎ(𝑤,𝑚), consumption 𝑐∗ = 𝑚 +𝑤 ∙ ℎ(𝑤,𝑚) and the maximised level of the objective function, 𝑈∗ =𝑈(ℎ∗, 𝑐∗). Since the arguments of 𝑈(∙) are functions of 𝑤 and 𝑚 it follows that 𝑈∗ can be rewritten such that 𝑈∗ = 𝑉(𝑤,𝑚) which is sometimes referred to as 
the indirect utility function. The shapes of 𝑉(∙) and the labour supply function, ℎ(∙), are determined by the assumed shape of 𝑈(∙). It is possible to depict 𝑉(∙) 
in Figure 4.1, which is drawn for an arbitrary fixed level of 𝑚 which is assumed 
to be exogenous (and which we will henceforth omit).  
The typical sources of data used to estimate ℎ(𝑤) do not provide measures of 𝑉 directly – only 𝑤 (and other determinants of ℎ) and the choice of ℎ are directly 
observed. However, there is a direct correspondence between the shape of 𝑉(∙) and that of ℎ(∙), which we can observe. The traditional labour supply literature 
estimates ℎ(∙), using observable data on the levels of ℎ and 𝑤 in large samples 
of individuals, and backs out from those estimates the shape of 𝑉(∙), which can 
then be used to make inferences.  
At a wage rate of 𝑤r, in Figure 4.1, the optimal level of hours lies on ℎ(𝑤) and 
is given by ℎr = ℎ(𝑤r). The level of indirect utility is 𝑉r = 𝑉(𝑤r). Note that 𝑉smust be lower than 𝑉r for any value of ℎ ≠ ℎr (for example, points 𝐴 and 𝐴′) 
and will decrease the further away from the labour supply curve, ℎ(𝑤). That is 
any other value of ℎ will be “off” the labour supply curve. Note also that the 
value of 𝑉 is monotonically increasing in w along ℎ(𝑤) as 𝑤 rises, indicated by 
the arrow in Figure 4.1. So, at 𝑤w, for example, optimal hours are higher and 𝑉w = 𝑉(𝑤w) > 𝑉r.  
If the individual is working the desired level of hours at any wage, then the 
shape of 𝑉(∙) around the intersection with ℎ(𝑤) is locally flat by definition. The 
empirical implication of this is that the effect of a marginal increase in working 
hours, from ℎ(𝑤), at a given hourly wage, 𝑤, would have only a very small 
impact on the level of 𝑉. In contrast, suppose the individual were “off” the labour 
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supply curve, sat at 𝐴 or 𝐴′ - perhaps because the employer can, at least in the 
short run, dictate hours of work (although in the longer run this might result in 
the worker moving jobs to get a better match to the desired level of hours). Then 
the slope of 𝑉(∙) would be positive or negative depending on whether hours 
were above, at 𝐴,  or below (i.e. to the left of) ℎ∗(𝑤), at 𝐴′. That is, a marginal 
increase (decrease) in hours if ℎ > ℎ∗(𝑤)) at 𝐴 would decrease (increase) 𝑉, 
and vice versa if ℎ < ℎ∗(𝑤) at 𝐴′.  
Thus, if there is an observable metric for 𝑉, it could be possible to explore the 
effects of hours of work, and wanting to work more of fewer hours, on 𝑉. What 
is interesting is the relationship between the well-being outcomes and hours of 
work. This stems from the desire to explore the possibility that there is potential 
for expansion of supply along the intensive margin since this is likely to be an 
inexpensive solution to the perceived shortage in the supply of GP time, for 
example. 
Figure 4.2, below, attempts to operationalise the implications of the theory to 
evaluate the effect of being “off” the labour supply curve on the level of well-
being. Suppose the wage is 𝑤r and the corresponding optimal labour supply 
were ℎr and the level of indirect utility would be 𝑉r. However, an individual who 
reported wanting to work more hours at the existing wage might be constrained 
to work a level of hours equal to ℎd < ℎr. In this case, the level of well-being 𝑉r 
could only be attained if the individual were paid a wage equal to 𝑤d > 𝑤r, 
where 𝑤d is defined, implicitly, by 𝑉(𝑤d|ℎd) = 𝑉(𝑤r). Thus, an individual who 
was constrained to work ℎd < ℎr would attain the same level of indirect utility if 
paid 𝑤d per hour rather than being unconstrained with a wage of 𝑤r. Thus, the 
value of relaxing the constraint is approximately 𝑤d − 𝑤r  per hour, given in 
Figure 4.2 by the angle 𝜃. The approximation is better the shallower is the 
shape of the indirect utility line and the smaller is the constraint on hours. The 
approximation provided by this linear approximation will, in general, be an 
upper bound to the exact welfare loss. 
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The theory described above is quite standard and it presumes that individuals 
are motivated to work by the financial return (i.e. w). There is a literature that 
suggests that public sector workers may have mission orientation that provides 
(additional) motivation. There is a suggestion here that the supply decisions of 
public sector workers might be less sensitive to financial considerations. In the 
context of our theory such mission orientation might be manifested in the desire 
to deal with whatever workload that their patient lists throw at them. Greater 
reliance in community-based care and the increase in conditions associated 
with old age are likely to add disproportionately to their workload. Indeed, 
Gibson et al report that 95% of respondents to the 2015 survey agree or 
strongly agree that they “have to work intensively”, 89% report that they” have 
to work too fast”, and 80% say that “they do not have time to carry out all work”.  
All these adverse responses have grown consistently over successive workload 
surveys. Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess the impact of the 2004 
contract on well-being, before and after, as APS data go from fiscal year 
2011/12 onwards. 
















Figure 4.2 The Welfare Effect of Working Fewer than Desired Hours 
 
Table 4.1 provides some summary statistics that depicts the extent of “off the 
labour supply curve” behaviour since 2011 quarter 2. The proportion of 
individuals wanting more hours differs little across occupations, except for male 
salaried GPs. Indeed, it is a modest proportion for all occupations (about 4%).  
The number of additional hours per week of those who say wanting to work 
fewer hours is quite considerable – 13.31 hours for partner GPs, 10.82 hours 
for salaried GPs and 11.76 hours for hospital doctors. The proportion who want 
to work fewer hours for less pay is much larger – averaging over 20% for all 
doctors (salaried GPs and hospital doctors), slightly more for women (20.75% 
of all female doctors) than men (19.24%). The proportions for lawyers (15.46%) 
and accountants (12.22%) are somewhat smaller, but still sizeable. The 
number of hours they would like to cut is slightly larger for lawyers (around 12 
hours per week on average) but similar to salaried GPs for accountants (10.82 
















Table 4.1 "Off" the Labour Supply Curve Behaviour (data from 2011) 
  
    Partner GPs 
Salaried 
GPs Hospital doctors Lawyers Accountants 
N 
Males 587 148 1,705 2,069 6,203 
Females 343 375 1,359 1,980 4,112 
Total 930 523 3,064 4,049 10,315 
Average weekly        
hours worked  
Males 43.95 40.76 48.16 45.91 42.15 
Females 33.03 33.37 43.31 39.90 37.20 
Total 39.92 35.46 46.01 42.97 40.18 
              
Want more hours            
(N) 
Males 9 14 79 67 274 
% 1.53% 9.46% 4.63% 3.24% 4.42% 
Females 13 10 32 84 182 
% 3.79% 2.67% 2.35% 4.24% 4.43% 
Total 22 24 111 151 456 
% 2.37% 4.59% 3.62% 3.73% 4.42% 
Number more         
hours wanted 
Males 6.63 12.86 11.00 8.89 9.03 
Females 9.00 8.90 8.64 11.01 7.49 
Total 8.10 11.21 10.31 10.06 8.41 
Average weekly          
hours worked  
Males 25.33 32.21 45.27 34.01 36.62 
Females 24.23 25.30 37.95 28.35 30.01 
Total 24.68 29.33 43.16 30.86 33.98 
              
Want fewer hours           
less pay (N) 
Males 152 24 266 313 659 
% 25.89% 16.22% 15.60% 15.13% 10.62% 
Females 78 67 294 313 601 
% 22.74% 17.87% 21.63% 15.81% 14.62% 
Total 230 91 560 626 1,260 
% 24.73% 17.40% 18.28% 15.46% 12.22% 
       
Number fewer         
hours for less                 
pay wanted 
Males 13.22 13.48 12.03 14.15 11.28 
Females 13.50 9.95 11.53 12.51 10.70 
Total 13.31 10.82 11.76 13.32 11.00 
Average weekly        
hours worked 
Males 49.02 42.38 52.53 49.81 44.92 
Females 40.15 37.12 47.17 45.40 41.01 




This chapter benefits from data on individuals in specific occupation groups, 
drawn from the Annual Population Survey (secure access version, SN7961). 
These datasets provide information on well-being variables from 2011 quarter 
2 (April-June) to 2015 quarter 1 (January-March). These data are rich and 
comprehensive enough to generate the required variables for occupation 
groups (GPs, hospital doctors, lawyers and accountants). The coding of 
occupation reflects that used in earlier chapters (chapter 2 and 3) that were 
based on using the QLFS (that makes up the APS) over a longer period. Here, 
the well-being variables are only available from 2011 because those questions 
were only asked from that point. So, now, the sample size shrinks compared 
with former chapters. The questions that are of most interest for the well-being 
issue are: 
• Anxiety – How anxious did you feel yesterday? (where nought is ‘not at 
all anxious’ and 10 is ‘completely anxious’). 
• Happiness – How happy did you feel yesterday? (where nought is ‘not 
at all happy’ and 10 is ‘completely happy’) 
• Satisfaction – Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays? 
(where nought is ‘not at all satisfied’ and 10 is ‘completely satisfied’) 
• Worthwhile – Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your 
life are worthwhile? (where nought is ‘not at all worthwhile’ and 10 is 
‘completely worthwhile’) 
Data accessed from the secure server of the UK Data Service requires 
collapsing the bins of several of the available variables when needed because 
of the small numbers of observations in certain cells. In any event, the 
distribution of the responses in raw data is not presented, because the shapes 
of the distributions are very similar across occupations. What is interesting is 
that these comparisons can be best summarised by the means of these 
distributions. These averages of responses are depicted in Figure 4.3, for 
males and females separately because there are well known differences in 
 139 
some of these variables by gender in the existing literature, and in the data the 
gender balance differs across these professions. 
Anxiety is clearly less of an issue for GPs and hospital doctors overall. The 
distribution of happiness responses shows that, on average, doctors are slightly 
happier than lawyers, again with accountants somewhere in between. Similar 
patterns can be seen for life satisfaction and feeling their lives are worthwhile. 
There is no evidence in any of these metrics that doctors, both GPs and hospital 
doctors, have lower well-being than other professions. In anything, the 
evidence points they have higher well-being. 
These conclusions are robust over time. Looking at differences by year there is 
no substantive changes across time despite the advent of austerity policies that 
begin to impact, in the middle of our period, on public sector workers. The 
consistency of the results across time is remarkable, despite limitations in 
sample cell sizes. 
Figure 4.3 Average Measures of Well-being by Gender (10-categories scale) 
     MALES     FEMALES 
 
Low levels of wellbeing might generate different health problems. This 
possibility motivates our work to expand our wellbeing analysis exploring health 
status. We investigate two self-reported variables reporting information on 
health problems. The survey question asks whether “Do you have any of the 
following…?”. The 17 possible responses include hypertension (“… heart, 
blood pressure, or circulation problems”?), and depression (the question asks, 
“Do you have depression, bad nerves or anxiety?”). Workers are also asked 
“Does your health problems limit your work activity?”. 
 140 
Table 4.2 shows the raw data on the three main health variables that we 
generate from the original question on health problems, available since 2011 
quarter 2. These three variables are binary, taking value 1 if respondents 
reported suffering the health problem in question (depression, hypertension or 
whether their health problem limit their amount of work). Approximately, 27% 
(19%) of GPs (hospital doctors) self-reported suffering from any of the 19 
illnesses alternatives. About 21% (12%) of these illnesses limit their activity at 
work, while 24% of lawyers (25% of accountants) self-report illness with 17% 
(17%) being work limiting. Hypertension rates are slightly larger for doctors, 
both GPs (4.9%) and hospital doctors (3.5%), than lawyers (3.2%) and 
accountants (3.5%). Depression rates for hospital doctors (1%) are similar to 
accountants (1.2%), but larger for GPs (1.8%) and lawyers (1.9%). 
Figure 4.4 shows the proportion of each occupation group, by gender, who say 
that they would like to work more hours Despite the reputation that doctors have 
for claiming to be overworked, the occupational group who are most likely to 
claim to want to work more hours is male hospital doctors (7%) compared to 
6% of male accountants and 5% of male lawyers. Among females, 5% of GPs 
and accountants want more hours, compared to 3% of hospital doctors and 
lawyers. Unfortunately, data restrictions prevent this work from looking at the 
proportion who say that they would like to work fewer hours43.  
Figure 4.4 Percentage Wanting to Work More Hours 
 
                                               
43 Variable reporting wanting to work fewer hours than at current or for less pay are not included in the 
dataset. 
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Table 4.2 Health Problems 
 
The regression analysis, below, explores the role that hours, and hours 
constraints, have in well-being across occupations. The above proposition 
stated in the theoretical background from is that if hours of work are such that 
individuals are “overworked” (i.e. working to the right of the labour supply curve) 
would have a negative effect on well-being measures. The effect is likely to be 
smaller, perhaps zero, for intrinsically motivated doctors. 
 
4.4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
There is a considerable literature on the determinants of well-being measures. 
Comparing the raw data responses across occupational groups fails to account 
for the differences in the determinants of well-being across groups. For 
example, it is well known that well-being varies across the lifecycle, following a 
U-shaped pattern. Thus, part of the variation in well-being variables (anxiety, 
happiness, life satisfaction and worthwhile) in the raw data may be due to 
differences in average age, sex or other specific characteristics of the relevant 
occupational workforces. Here, we explore the use of regression analysis to 
  
GPs 
Hospital            
doctors Lawyers Accountants 
DNA 660 1,534 1,650 5,151 
ALL ill 248 360 521 1,698 
N 908 1,894 2,171 6,849 
% ill over sample size 27.31% 19.01% 24.00% 24.79% 
          
Depression (n) 16 19 41 82 
% over sample size 1.76% 1.00% 1.89% 1.20% 
% over ill 6.45% 5.28% 7.87% 4.83% 
     
Hypertension (n) 44 67 69 242 
% over sample size 4.85% 3.54% 3.18% 3.53% 
% over ill 17.74% 18.61% 13.24% 14.25% 
     
Health problem limits work (n) 53 42 86 288 
% over sample size 5.84% 2.22% 3.96% 4.20% 
% over ill 21.37% 11.67% 16.51% 16.96% 
 
 142 
control for these cofounding differences to examine whether any remaining 
differences across occupations remain. 
The workhorse of this specification is given by 𝑊 = 	𝛽𝑋" + 𝛿𝑇" + 𝛾 ln(𝑤") + 𝜁𝐻" + 𝜀_𝑖 
where W is a vector of outcomes (anxiety, happiness, life satisfaction, and feel 
that life is worthwhile). Dependent variable is standardised in mean and 
standard deviation so that 𝑊 = 2() . T is a vector of occupations; X is a set 
of labour market variables and characteristics (including Female, age, age 
square); the wage is denoted w; and H is a vector of measures of hours of work. 
Estimates of these equations are reported in Table 4.3 and the following tables. 
The variable explaining total hours encompasses main and second job, which 
includes basic and overtime hours in main job and hours in second job. 
We refrain to control for unearned income in our regression analysis. Firstly, we 
cannot work out the variable because the household identifier variable 
(hserialp) is not available in the data. Also, that variable could be more useful 
to examine well-being amongst unemployed, but we are focusing our analysis 
on people working in week of reference. Besides, introducing this variable could 
introduce endogeneity in our analysis failing to show any causal effect on every 
estimated parameter. Moreover, assuming we could have arranged our data by 
household, there is no point on controlling by partner’s education/occupation 
because that would cause endogeneity in the model. We did not include in our 
analysis because we selected our sample to be relatively homogeneous where 
all are professional workers and married with partners with similar education 
levels and professional characteristics.  
Table 4.3 portrays that females have significantly higher anxiety. Since the 
dependent variable is standardised this coefficient of 0.10 in Table 4.3 implies 
that females are 10% of a standard deviation (SD) more anxious than males. 
There is a correspondingly positive effect on feeling that life is worthwhile of 
15% of a SD. The occupation effects (relative to accountants) convey that 
hospital doctors are 0.18 of a SD more satisfied with life, and 0.13 of a SD 
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happier, relative to an accountant, and lawyers 0.07 of an SD less satisfied. 
Coefficient for GPs is not significantly different from accountants in terms of 
happiness, life satisfaction and anxiety. 
However, Table 4.3 restricts the effects of hours of work to be the same across 
occupational groups. Tables 4.6 to 4.9 contain separated coefficients of models 
conditioned on occupations for each of the four well-being measures. Thus, 
each column provides estimates that are conditional on working in that 
occupation. 
Table 4.4 confirms that women tend to be more anxious but the coefficient 
effect for GPs is not statistically significant, although it is for hospital doctors at 
a 10 % significance level. There is no significant effect of hours on anxiety. 
Former results suggest that the significant coefficients for lawyers and 
accountants are mostly explained by the effect of overtime hours on total hours. 
The idea that burnout might occur posits that anxiety rises across the lifecycle 
and well-being measures might fall. Neither age nor age-square are significant 
in Table 4.4 which does not support the idea that burnout occurs. However, this 
is supported in Table 4.5 when the hourly wage variable is ruled out. Although 
the effect of overtime hours might reflect stress experienced when one is under 
pressure of work, this is something that does not seem to be a feature for 
doctors (GPs and hospital doctors).  
Table 4.6 looks at happiness and, contrary to the literature, there does not seem 
to be systematic effects of gender or age. However, the adverse effect of hours 
for lawyers and accountants support the findings in Table 4.4, although it is not 









Table 4.3 OLS Estimates (pooled model) 
 
Table 4.4 OLS Estimates - Anxiety 
 
          
     
VARIABLES Anxiety Happiness Satisfaction Worthiness 
          
     
Female 0.107*** 0.018 0.020 0.151*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
Age  0.008 -0.021*** -0.051*** -0.020*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age2 -0.000 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Occupation (main job)     
(Accountants reference 
group)     
GPs -0.060 0.115* 0.110* 0.603*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.063) 
Hospital doctors -0.132*** 0.138*** 0.179*** 0.574*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) 
Lawyers 0.164*** -0.031 -0.081*** 0.025 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) 
Hourly wage (log) -0.028 0.034 0.095*** -0.054** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) 
Total hours (main & 2nd job) 0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
More hours wanted 0.106** -0.003 -0.202*** -0.007 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) 
Constant -0.339** 0.547*** 1.132*** 0.340** 
 (0.168) (0.167) (0.159) (0.161) 
     
Observations 8,011 8,011 8,011 8,011 
R-squared 0.013 0.008 0.024 0.066 
Adj. R-squared 0.012 0.007 0.023 0.065 
F-test 11.520 7.117 22.150 62.920 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
          
 ANXIETY 
          
VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS 
     
Female 0.172 0.091* 0.225*** 0.071** 
 (0.165) (0.052) (0.062) (0.030) 
Age  -0.045 -0.005 0.018 0.011  (0.049) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) 
Age2 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hourly wage (log) 0.163 -0.004 -0.011 -0.048 
 (0.144) (0.061) (0.059) (0.030) 
Total hours (main 
& 2nd jobs) 0.004 0.001 0.012*** 0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
More hours 
wanted 0.280 -0.080 0.180 0.157** 
 (0.269) (0.105) (0.154) (0.066) 
Constant -0.150 -0.002 -0.841** -0.336 
 (1.119) (0.359) (0.396) (0.222)      
Observations 245 1,595 1,234 4,937 
R-squared 0.024 0.006 0.025 0.005 
Adj. R-squared 0.000 0.002 0.020 0.004 
F-test 0.987 1.530 5.201 4.162 
Prob>F 0.434 0.165 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 4.5 OLS Estimates – Anxiety (no wage) 
 
Table 4.6 OLS Estimates - Happiness 
 
 
          
 ANXIETY 
          
VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS 
     
Female 0.291*** 0.090* 0.182*** 0.098*** 
 (0.074) (0.047) (0.047) (0.026) 
Age  0.046** -0.014 0.033*** 0.015* 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) 
Age2 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hourly wage (log)          
Total hours (main & 2nd 
jobs) 0.006*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.002** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
More hours wanted 0.246 -0.085 0.160 0.095* 
 (0.165) (0.099) (0.112) (0.053) 
Constant -1.731*** 0.193 -1.067*** -0.421** 
 (0.452) (0.301) (0.281) (0.163) 
     
Observations 904 1,886 2,171 6,849 
R-squared 0.028 0.006 0.024 0.005 
Adj. R-squared 0.023 0.003 0.022 0.004 
F-test 5.237 2.203 10.750 6.914 
Prob>F 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
          
 HAPPINESS 
          
VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS 
     
Female 0.019 -0.007 -0.090 0.055*  (0.169) (0.052) (0.061) (0.030) 
Age  -0.012 -0.015 -0.029 -0.019* 
 (0.050) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) 
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hourly wage (log) -0.115 -0.049 0.042 0.072** 
 (0.148) (0.061) (0.057) (0.030) 
Total hours (main & 2nd 
jobs) -0.003 -0.005** -0.012*** -0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
More hours wanted -0.260 0.194* -0.090 -0.049 
 (0.276) (0.105) (0.150) (0.066) 
Constant 1.069 0.858** 1.147*** 0.293 
 (1.148) (0.359) (0.386) (0.222) 
     
Observations 245 1,595 1,234 4,937 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Adj. R-squared -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 
F-test 0.80 2.70 4.97 4.13 
Prob>F 0.58 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 4.7 shows the usual life satisfaction U-shape with age, but the effect of 
females is not statistically significant (ruling out the wage variable in Table 4.8, 
females is significant for GPs). The hourly wage effect is positive and significant 
for lawyers and accountants, but not significantly different from zero for hospital 
doctors, and strongly (and perversely) significantly negative for GPs. The latter 
effect is difficult to rationalise, but it might reflect differences in the type of work 
done by better paid GPs. The 8th report of the NGPWLS (Gibson et al, 2015) 
posits that 80% of GPs say that they find that unimportant work prevents 
completion of more important work. One might speculate that it is the higher 
paid GPs (those who receive higher hourly wage) who carry more 
administrative responsibility and do more bureaucratic work, while they would 
rather spend their time seeing patients (which the survey reckons accounts for 
only 80% of GP time). 
Table 4.9 explores the effect on feeling that life is worthwhile. This feeling is 
much greater for females, in all occupations, although that for GPs is not 
statistically significant. The negative effect on the wage for GPs is repeated 
here. The effect of total hours in lawyers and accountants may be driven by 
hours in main job (basic and overtime), which is confirmed after running the 
model with the breakdown of hours. In Table 4.10, excluding the hourly wage 
variable (logs), the coefficient for more hours has a negative effect on 











Table 4.7 OLS Estimates - Life Satisfaction 
 
Table 4.8 OLS Estimates - Life Satisfaction (no wage) 
 
 
          
 SATISFACTION 
          
VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS 
     
Female 0.162 0.055 -0.042 0.031 
 -0.159 -0.049 -0.059 -0.028 
Age  -0.009 -0.049*** -0.091*** -0.039*** 
 -0.047 -0.016 -0.018 -0.01 
Age2 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hourly wage (log) -0.385*** 0.055 0.089 0.133***  -0.139 -0.057 -0.056 -0.028 
Total hours (main & 2nd 
jobs) -0.002 -0.003 -0.011*** -0.007*** 
 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
More hours wanted -0.081 -0.02 -0.346** -0.246***  -0.261 -0.098 -0.146 -0.062 
Constant 1.691 1.150*** 2.247*** 0.795*** 
 -1.083 -0.337 -0.376 -0.21 
     
Observations 245 1,595 1,234 4,937 
R-squared 0.055 0.010 0.048 0.018 
Adj. R-squared 0.031 0.006 0.044 0.017 
F-test 2.311 2.733 10.420 14.950 
Prob>F 0.035 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
          
 SATISFACTION 
          
VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS 
     
Female -0.164** 0.018 -0.002 0.028 
 (0.076) (0.045) (0.048) (0.025) 
Age  -0.058*** -0.042*** -0.086*** -0.043*** 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) 
Age2 0.001** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hourly wage (log)          
Total hours (main & 2nd 
jobs) -0.007*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
More hours wanted -0.370** -0.018 -0.315*** -0.292*** 
 (0.171) (0.095) (0.116) (0.052) 
Constant 2.074*** 1.115*** 2.125*** 1.116*** 
 (0.469) (0.289) (0.290) (0.162) 
     
Observations 904 1,886 2,171 6,849 
R-squared 0.029 0.008 0.030 0.014 
Adj. R-squared 0.024 0.005 0.028 0.013 
F-test 5.419 2.843 13.510 19.140 
Prob>F 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 4.9 OLS Estimates - Worthiness 
 
Table 4.10 OLS Estimates – Worthiness (no wage) 
 
          
 WORTHINESS 
          
VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS 
     
Female 0.214 0.176*** 0.170*** 0.139*** 
 (0.150) (0.048) (0.064) (0.028) 
Age  0.015 -0.019 -0.005 -0.027*** 
 (0.045) (0.016) (0.019) (0.010) 
Age2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hourly wage (log) -0.280** 0.061 -0.069 -0.042 
 (0.131) (0.056) (0.060) (0.028) 
Total hours (main & 2nd 
jobs) 0.008 0.001 -0.005* -0.004** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
More hours wanted -0.046 0.019 -0.034 0.000 
 (0.245) (0.097) (0.158) (0.063) 
Constant 0.741 0.541 0.163 0.477**  (1.019) (0.331) (0.407) (0.212)      
Observations 245 1,595 1,234 4,937 
R-squared 0.059 0.013 0.017 0.014 
Adj. R-squared 0.035 0.009 0.012 0.013 
F-test 2.487 3.474 3.444 11.690 
Prob>F 0.024 0.002 0.002 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
          
 WORTHINESS 
          
VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS 
     
Female 0.038 0.119*** 0.185*** 0.147*** 
 (0.066) (0.044) (0.049) (0.025) 
Age  -0.061*** -0.020 -0.040*** -0.030*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hourly wage (log)          
Total hours (main & 2nd 
jobs) -0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
More hours wanted -0.164 0.005 -0.183 -0.147*** 
 (0.148) (0.092) (0.119) (0.051) 
Constant 1.904*** 0.673** 0.538* 0.326**  (0.408) (0.280) (0.297) (0.159)      
Observations 904 1,886 2,171 6,849 
R-squared 0.018 0.008 0.015 0.017 
Adj. R-squared 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.017 
F-test 3.269 3.094 6.394 23.920 
Prob>F 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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A robustness check is included in Appendix 7 expanding the workhorse of the 
above models to include additional control variables like marital status controls, 
ethnicity controls and regional and survey year fixed effects. While the effects 
on some of these additional controls are common in the literature, some are 
not. The ones that are in the existing literature generate similar effects to the 
obtained estimates here but are not central to the objective of this chapter. In 
no case, does the inclusion of the additional covariates make any substantive 
difference to the central conclusions. Tables A6 to A10 in the Appendix 7 
provide estimates of the extended model without the hourly wage variable. 
Next, the chapter explores self-reported health problems: work limiting 
conditions (Table 4.11), hypertension (Table 4.12) and depression (Table 4.13). 
Since the dependent variables, in these models, are binary, these models make 
use of a simple probit analysis and report the computed average marginal 
effects (AME) from those estimates. 
In Table 4.11, female lawyers are 4.1% greater to have health problems that 
limit activity to work than males. The pooled model (last column) suggests that 
hospital doctors have a -1.7% probability than accountants to suffer from any 













Table 4.11 Average Marginal Effects - Work Limiting Health Condition 
 
Table 4.12 shows estimates for hypertension. Males are more likely to suffer 
from blood pressure problems than females although the coefficient for GPs is 
not significant. None of the coefficients reported in the model including all 
occupations is significant. However, former models that broke down hours in 
basic, overtime and second job hours provided that the coefficient for hospital 
doctors was significant about 1.1% higher than accountants. Age is significant 
meaning that there is a positive correlation between ageing and the likelihood 
to suffer hypertension problems. This is consistent with that one would expect. 
Finally, Table 4.13 contains depression marginal effects. The average marginal 
effect reported show small changes among occupations (pooled column). 
Lawyers are 0.7% more likely to have depression than accountants. 
Coefficients for females are not significant neither extending the model with 
variables such as more hours or total hours nor with the breakdown of hours 
(basic, overtime and second job). 
 
 
            
Variables GPs Hospital doctors Lawyers Accountants Pooled 
      
Female 0.023 0.005 0.041*** 0.008 0.015*** 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) 
Age  0.004 0.006** 0.002 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age2 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Occupation (main 
job)      
Accountants      
      
GPs     0.011 
     (0.008) 
Hospital doctors     -0.017*** 
     (0.004) 
Lawyers     -0.002 
     (0.005) 
Total hours (main & 
2nd) -0.000 -0.001** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
More hours wanted 0.070** 0.008 -0.025 -0.019 -0.005 
 (0.030) (0.013) (0.030) (0.012) (0.008) 
      
Observations 904 1,886 2,171 6,849 11,810 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 4.12 Average Marginal Effects - Hypertension 
 
 
Table 4.13 Average Marginal Effects - Depression 
 
 
            
Variables GPs Hospital doctors Lawyers Accountants Pooled 
      
Female -0.019 -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.014*** -0.020*** 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
Age  0.012** 0.006** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Occupation (main job)      
Accountants      
      
GPs     0.007 
     (0.007) 
Hospital doctors     0.009 
     (0.005) 
Lawyers     -0.001 
     (0.004) 
Total usual hours (main 
& 2nd) 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
More hours wanted  0.001  0.010 0.002 
  (0.018)  (0.009) (0.007) 
      
Observations 868 1,886 2,083 6,849 11,810 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
            
Variables GPs Hospital doctors Lawyers Accountants Pooled 
      
Female 0.010 -0.003 0.008 0.003 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
Age  0.009* 0.001 0.005** 0.002* 0.002*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age2 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Occupation (main 
job)      
Accountants      
      
GPs     0.006 
     (0.005) 
Hospital doctors     -0.002 
     (0.003) 
Lawyers     0.007** 
     (0.003) 
Total usual hours 
(main & 2nd) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
More hours wanted 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.007* 
 (0.019) (0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004) 
      
Observations 904 1,886 2,171 6,849 11,810 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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4.5. LABOUR SUPPLY AND WELFARE 
The raw data suggests that being overworked is much more prevalent than 
being underworked. Figure 4.5 is, therefore, the empirically more relevant case. 
Figure 4.2 is a general case, Figure 4.6 is more specific and shows the situation 
of those wanting to work more hours. Around 20% of doctors are in this position 
and, on average ℎd − ℎr ≈ 10. Estimates of 𝜃 are required, then. This chapter 
confines to set a theoretical framework for this analysis but the figures below 
portray the general idea quite well. 
The APS data suggests that, although there is a large minority of GPs who 
would like to work less, there is also some slack for increasing hours, at least 
for a small minority. The question that arises, then, is how to do this and what 
it would be the cost. Raising wages overall would clearly generate a large 
deadweight since this would go to the large majority who do not wish to raise 
their hours. It would be considerably cheaper to have a nonlinear schedule as 
in Figure 4.6. However, further work is required to get more reliable estimates 
before committing to this. 
 



















This chapter explored the relationship between well-being outcomes (anxiety, 
happiness, satisfaction, worthwhile) and hours of work. This stems from our 
desire to explore the possibility that there is potential for expansion of the supply 
of medical services along the intensive margin. Given the large fixed cost of 
training doctors that are borne almost entirely by taxpayers, exploiting the 
intensive margin is likely to be a more affordable and inexpensive solution to 
the perceived shortfall in the supply of GP time and has, so far, been neglected 
by policymakers. 
The chapter addresses some important propositions about the labour market 
behaviour of doctors. Firstly, doctors are stressed, anxious, have low morale 
and suffer from depression. This is driven, in part, by occupation considerations 
such as being overworked. Hence, doctors are to the right of their labour supply 
curves. However, in the comparative chapter in this thesis (chapter 3) there was 
no evidence that doctors experience lower well-being than other professionals. 
Moreover, across all the metrics used, there is still no evidence that the 
sensitivity of well-being to possible work-related drivers is any greater for 











Controlling for hourly wage rate, across all well-being measures, the effect of 
hours, at the margin is precisely estimated, and it is large and negative for 
lawyers and accountants but not significantly different from zero for doctors. 
This could posit that doctors are “on” their labour supply curves and the other 
professionals may be overworked, more than doctors. However, as we only 
have information on hourly wages for salaried GPs this conclusion would be 
taken with caution. Also, the chapter finds that a rather low proportion of 
respondents declare that they would like to work longer hours. Those hours 
accountants and lawyers do, are estimated to have much lower well-being than 
those who do not say that they want to work more. In contrast, those doctors 
who say they would like to work more hours have smaller and statistically 
insignificant loss in well-being to those who say that they do not want to work 
longer hours. 
The policy implication of these results will be that only a modest overtime 
premium should be enough to elicit a large increase in hours of work for doctors. 
So, expansion along the intensive margin is likely to be a cheaper solution to 
the shortage in the supply of physician services than the expansion of the 
number of trainees. Moreover, since the training period of doctors is very long, 
and expensive, this alternative solution can be implemented very quickly. New 
estimates using a larger dataset will be required before further analysis could 










5.1. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
This thesis explores the main issues on the labour supply of doctors using 
secondary data from the LFS. Although policymakers have tackled the 
perceived shortage of doctors from the extensive margin, expanding the 
headcount of medical practitioners, no attempt has been done in the UK to 
understand what underlies from the intensive margin. Also, the little existing 
evidence relies on data which is granted access from the NHS, which is difficult 
to access and requires special access. So, this thesis narrows these gaps.  
Chapter 2 provides comprehensive and detailed results using the LFS. 
Because the LFS is the main source available to track changes in the labour 
market regularly, it makes sense to explore this data widely and test the results 
obtained with those in the literature. We support our results on the 
methodological identification of GPs and hospital doctors using the Standard 
Occupation and Industry classifications. The chapter makes the following 
contributions: firstly, from the extensive margin, the LFS tracks well the 
headcount of doctors compared to other sources in England, for example. In 
the UK, the headcount of GPs and hospital doctors grew 44.50% and 136% 
respectively. 
Secondly, it confirms a fall in the year trends of doctors’ weekly hours of work 
which is consistent with results in the literature. The fall of average weekly hours 
of work was 30% for GPs and 19% for hospital doctors. Hence, the expansion 
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of headcount did not restrain the fall in hours of work. However, the stock of 
hours shows that the expansion of headcount only increased the stock of hours 
of GPs by 1% whereas the hours supplied by the hospital doctors grew by 91%. 
Therefore, it is the primary care where there may be more problems. 
Thirdly, there is a gap in the hours of work of doctors which confirms that female 
doctors work, on average, fewer hours than males. In fact, the growing 
feminisation of the medical profession has not helped to expand the stock of 
hours although the gender gap in hours shortened. One possible explanation 
of the low average weekly hours of work of female GPs may be due to growing 
part-time arrangements, which seems to be preferred for female salaried GPs.  
Chapter 3 extends the previous analysis exploring the labour supply over the 
lifecycle of a representative worker. Using simple labour supply models, it 
investigates what the main determinants of the labour supply are for doctors by 
gender breakdown. The chapter confirms that GPs work fewer hours compared 
with hospital doctors and other occupations. Should the feminisation of the 
medical careers highly impact on the fall of hours, the chapter tests comparing 
with the other occupations using the proportion of female workers in 1994 as a 
counterfactual.  
Two reduced-form models are included for this purpose. A parsimonious model 
reports that native and white workers account for a large difference in hours. 
So, native and white doctors work fewer hours than lawyers and accountants.  
The extended version (model 2) adds some additional covariates such as 
marital status, regional dummies and children. The results are consistent with 
the literature too and children highly impact on the hours of work supplied, 
especially, by female GPs, particularly salaried GPs. The second model (the 
extended version) clearly conveys the fall in hours for females is mainly 
explained by childbearing. In their 30s, female doctors (especially salaried GPs) 
supply fewer hours of work for motherhood reasons and to look after children. 
However, after that time, they slightly increase their hours of work. The analysis 
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is complemented with extended versions of the model controlling by cohorts 
and household characteristics. 
On average, over the lifecycle, female GPs work 14 hours less than male GPs 
and children reduce the total hours of work supplied by females about 2,000 
hours over their lifetime compared to the parsimonious model.  
Finally, chapter 4 explores the main well-being measures (anxiety, happiness, 
satisfaction and worth of life) using the Annual Population Survey (APS), which 
is made up with the most relevant variables from the LFS. The main contribution 
of this chapter is to explain whether it would be possible to expand the labour 
supply of doctors from the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin. 
This would be more cost-and-time efficient than expansion from the extensive 
margin. So, it is possible to do so by offering an overtime premium to doctors. 
Though this analysis is still very preliminary and needs more robustness 
checks. 
Well-being measures show the opposite reported in other surveys. UK doctors 
are stressed but they have less anxiety and are happier, have higher life 
satisfaction and rank high when they report whether their life is worthwhile. The 
stress finding may be explained by the overwork feeling continuously reported 
by doctors. If that is true, doctors may be “off” their labour supply and they could 
be offer an overtime premium to help them to work their optimal hours. 
However, this is a weak assumption that was not robust with results in chapter 
3.  
 
5.2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
There are two main conclusions that we can get from our results, though we 
must be cautious because we did not prove any causal-effect. Firstly, the 
analysis offers strong evidence to the labour supply, which means to be a 
starting point to help policymakers in their workforce planning decisions for 
doctors. Perhaps, it would be worth looking at the intensive margin before 
deciding to expand the headcount of doctors (extensive margin). they should 
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consider re-thinking the existing contracts incentivising workers that are “off” 
their labour supply. Also, the medical profession needs to be more attractive for 
medical students, so designing a more appropriate contract may help more 
students to find this occupation more appealing or encourage more females to 
work at the community level. 
Secondly, although it has not been tested yet, overtime hours may be the target 
to incentivise doctors to work more hours. Hence, a modest overtime premium 
may help to expand the hours of work of doctors. Therefore, the expansion 
along the intensive margin could be possible, cheaper and would take less time 
than increasing the headcount of doctors.  
 
5.3. FUTURE RESEARCH  
For future research, we would explore other data sources such as BHPS or 
Understanding Society. To expand and improve the well-being chapter 
(Chapter 4), we now are aware that year datasets from 2015 may include the 
missed fewer hours wanted variable and the household variable that would help 
us to convert individual data into household data.  
There are a few topics that were not included in this thesis and are prospective 
topics for the author, some are ongoing research. For example, the earnings 
distribution of doctors needs to be explored to explain how the doctors’ income 
changed over time. This could be useful for the contract design proposed in the 
previous section. Secondly, using longitudinal data, it would be worth to look at 
early retirement decisions or decisions to drop out the labour market because 
of the high stress they report. Finally, it would be more appropriate to work on 
an evaluation of the 2003/04 contract and see how it impacted on the labour 
supply of doctors from the intensive margin. Though we include a simple 
difference-in-differences (DiD) models in chapter 2, we do not attribute any 
causal effect to hours of work with this model.  
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APPENDIX 1 -  MEDICAL CAREERS AND MAIN DEFINITIONS 
The figure below summarises medical careers (OECD. 2016). 
Medical Education and Training Paths in the UK 
 
There have been some changes since 2005 (see figure below) that introduced 
some medical postgraduate training (Foundation Programme), increasing the 
number of years until fully licensed by two. 
NHS Medical Career Grades before and after 2005 
 
Definitions of each of those categories can be found in DDRB reports included 
in the bibliography44. 
                                               
44 Sources: DDRB reports 31 (2001) to 43(2014), NHS, GMC and BMJ. 
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APPENDIX 3.1. – DECOMPOSITION DISTRIBUTION OF HOURS 
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GPs (proportion over total female GPs) 
  
 












APPENDIX 3.3. – KERNEL DENSITIES TOTAL WEEKLY HOURS 
(COHORT ANALYSIS) 
  GPs     HOSPITAL DOCTORS 
 
MALES 
  GPs     HOSPITAL DOCTORS 
 
FEMALES 











APPENDIX 4 – MODEL 2 OLS COEFFICIENTS 
MALES 
 
Total hours          
(main & 2nd)
GP          
Partners
GP          
Salaried
Hospital          
doctors Lawyers Accountants
Age 4.432*** 2.950*** 1.539*** 1.713*** 1.968***
(0.273) (0.458) (0.170) (0.105) (0.064)
Age2 -0.052*** -0.037*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Native -2.480*** 2.796 2.003*** -0.450 -1.353***
(0.845) (1.841) (0.400) (0.423) (0.224)
White -3.082*** -1.706 -0.031 1.896*** 2.086***
(0.951) (1.944) (0.404) (0.461) (0.227)
Married 7.680*** 2.993 -1.977*** 2.193*** 2.003***
(1.214) (1.859) (0.503) (0.319) (0.177)
London & SE -0.793 1.112 -0.445 2.010*** 0.958***
(0.559) (1.326) (0.336) (0.213) (0.135)
Children under 
19
One 2.025** 3.063 0.342 0.654* 0.399*
(0.830) (2.375) (0.571) (0.380) (0.235)
Two -0.582 -1.982 0.449 -1.134*** -0.089
(0.904) (2.971) (0.668) (0.417) (0.246)
Three or more 0.355 -0.200 1.186 -0.646 0.172
(1.148) (3.685) (0.853) (0.477) (0.267)
Child aged             
0-4 -2.050*** -5.669*** -1.553*** -1.136*** -0.968***
(0.785) (2.012) (0.499) (0.339) (0.207)
Child aged      
05-09 -1.214* -3.368* -0.928** 0.570* 0.268
(0.661) (1.869) (0.461) (0.315) (0.194)
Child aged      
10-15 1.107 2.926 0.711 1.686*** 0.878***
(0.746) (2.229) (0.562) (0.368) (0.227)
Year 1995 -3.840** -23.479*** -2.234* 0.905 0.041
(1.558) (6.161) (1.260) (0.642) (0.461)
Year 1996 -7.862*** -17.309*** -0.572 2.283*** 0.677
(1.607) (5.566) (1.267) (0.664) (0.436)
Year 1997 -12.663*** -13.895** -2.716** 2.118*** -0.371
(1.579) (5.555) (1.345) (0.633) (0.452)
Year 1998 -12.143*** -13.593** -1.822 1.838*** 0.106
(1.575) (6.016) (1.248) (0.599) (0.449)
Year 1999 -9.347*** -17.900*** -3.489*** 1.626*** -0.123
(1.498) (5.525) (1.184) (0.604) (0.438)
Year 2000 -13.212*** -21.429*** -5.706*** 0.490 -0.722*
(1.792) (5.211) (1.209) (0.640) (0.427)
Year 2001 -13.360*** -19.283*** -5.584*** 0.105 -0.564
(1.581) (6.332) (1.315) (0.677) (0.517)
Year 2002 -13.949*** -16.799*** -6.099*** 0.034 -1.581***
(1.537) (5.705) (1.198) (0.656) (0.452)
Year 2003 -16.572*** -18.980*** -4.930*** 0.652 -1.385***
(1.707) (4.918) (1.196) (0.648) (0.433)
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(1.707) (4.918) (1.196) (0.648) (0.433)
Year 2004 -16.613*** -20.290*** -7.080*** -0.541 -1.398***
(1.562) (5.188) (1.234) (0.678) (0.483)
Year 2005 -18.037*** -22.728*** -8.772*** -1.309** -2.195***
(1.516) (5.209) (1.144) (0.657) (0.454)
Year 2006 -16.981*** -17.787*** -9.028*** 0.255 -1.348***
(1.507) (5.141) (1.143) (0.662) (0.446)
Year 2007 -17.423*** -19.050*** -11.805*** -0.174 -1.448***
(1.541) (5.414) (1.115) (0.649) (0.446)
Year 2008 -17.293*** -19.115*** -10.948*** 1.354** -0.553
(1.428) (5.000) (1.086) (0.660) (0.463)
Year 2009 -16.150*** -14.518*** -9.805*** 0.153 -1.427***
(1.666) (5.309) (1.085) (0.693) (0.464)
Year 2010 -16.792*** -20.588*** -10.525*** 1.046 -1.603***
(1.564) (4.982) (1.103) (0.693) (0.447)
Year 2011 -19.554*** -18.458*** -10.655*** 0.656 -0.543
(1.603) (5.081) (1.083) (0.736) (0.423)
Year 2012 -16.545*** -25.176*** -10.639*** 1.052 -1.237***
(1.613) (5.200) (1.101) (0.710) (0.413)
Year 2013 -16.288*** -26.583*** -9.750*** 1.342* -0.912**
(1.671) (5.312) (1.113) (0.688) (0.428)
Year 2014 -16.082*** -20.111*** -9.962*** 1.643** -0.913**
(1.699) (5.217) (1.148) (0.751) (0.407)
Constant -26.683*** 9.245 34.410*** 10.684*** 5.866***
(6.321) (10.801) (3.507) (2.170) (1.317)
N 3,992 662 8,217 11,688 25,047
R2 0.307 0.265 0.136 0.096 0.142
Adj. R2 0.301 0.228 0.132 0.0939 0.141
F-test 41.03 7.694 31.48 26.68 75.73
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0




Total hours          
(main & 2nd)
GP          
Partners
GP           
Salaried
Hospital         
doctors Lawyers Accountants
Age 3.116*** -1.628*** 0.902*** 1.492*** 0.838***
(0.361) (0.474) (0.194) (0.147) (0.108)
Age2 -0.035*** 0.014** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Native 1.542 -5.783*** -0.735 -1.632*** -1.297***
(1.052) (1.263) (0.523) (0.421) (0.288)
White -7.487*** -1.853 -2.368*** 0.701* 0.892***
(1.255) (1.170) (0.523) (0.396) (0.285)
Married -2.706*** -2.467** -2.717*** -0.974*** -0.804***
(1.010) (1.138) (0.489) (0.273) (0.202)
London & SE 1.869*** -0.975 0.960** 1.076*** 0.843***
(0.685) (0.835) (0.419) (0.253) (0.190)
Children under 
19
One -2.325** 0.232 -1.508** -4.106*** -1.907***
(1.163) (1.542) (0.743) (0.486) (0.368)
Two -7.095*** -4.986*** -3.785*** -5.039*** -5.253***
(1.202) (1.512) (0.858) (0.616) (0.434)
Three or more-8.752*** -5.687*** -3.523*** -2.891*** -3.094***
(1.618) (1.829) (1.023) (0.480) (0.420)
Child aged       0-
4 -1.799* -6.748*** -6.798*** -4.687*** -5.230***
(1.073) (1.380) (0.695) (0.505) (0.370)
Children aged        
05-09 -4.065*** -3.991*** -1.757*** -4.522*** -3.418***
(0.871) (1.264) (0.651) (0.473) (0.344)
Children aged        
10-15 2.198** 4.285*** -1.915** -1.409** -1.447***
(1.055) (1.528) (0.751) (0.552) (0.413)
Year 1995 -3.417 -6.946 0.896 -0.639 -1.337
(2.413) (6.166) (2.048) (1.039) (0.829)
Year 1996 -3.153 2.165 0.815 1.013 0.337
(2.543) (4.628) (1.913) (0.931) (0.719)
Year 1997 -6.117*** 0.816 4.065** 2.244** 0.200
(2.273) (4.192) (1.964) (1.012) (0.743)
Year 1998 -5.116* -6.943 1.825 1.993** -0.684
(2.677) (4.710) (1.820) (0.971) (0.723)
Year 1999 -4.885** -5.943 0.363 1.878* -2.135***
(2.366) (3.914) (1.743) (0.964) (0.729)
Year 2000 -7.146*** -3.391 -0.101 2.524*** -0.768
(2.292) (4.603) (1.787) (0.968) (0.741)
Year 2001 -7.971*** -6.530 0.957 2.571** -1.206
(2.356) (4.068) (1.830) (1.021) (0.769)
Year 2002 -8.028*** -8.278** 1.886 0.964 -1.444**
(2.238) (3.960) (1.746) (0.964) (0.721)
Year 2003 -10.512*** -10.106*** -0.151 1.582* -1.844**
(2.218) (3.744) (1.723) (0.937) (0.718)
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(2.218) (3.744) (1.723) (0.937) (0.718)
Year 2004 -10.424*** -10.405*** -2.894* 1.509 0.710
(2.249) (3.910) (1.721) (0.998) (0.749)
Year 2005 -8.043*** -8.301** -3.804** 1.704* -0.038
(2.245) (3.598) (1.682) (1.006) (0.712)
Year 2006 -12.786*** -7.319** -1.535 1.078 -1.533**
(2.135) (3.699) (1.636) (0.985) (0.678)
Year 2007 -12.169*** -7.421** -1.101 0.311 -0.594
(2.359) (3.744) (1.601) (0.919) (0.673)
Year 2008 -10.500*** -4.432 -2.595 1.995** -1.948***
(2.338) (3.811) (1.617) (0.901) (0.699)
Year 2009 -12.214*** -12.170*** -1.674 1.501 -2.128***
(2.251) (3.562) (1.615) (0.924) (0.704)
Year 2010 -13.321*** -6.564* -0.672 1.160 -1.519**
(2.213) (3.521) (1.615) (0.911) (0.701)
Year 2011 -14.984*** -8.147** -1.768 1.235 -0.896
(2.249) (3.504) (1.624) (0.963) (0.681)
Year 2012 -15.267*** -6.864** -1.876 2.146** -0.609
(2.276) (3.450) (1.593) (0.912) (0.664)
Year 2013 -12.059*** -6.162* -1.317 1.636* -1.210*
(2.320) (3.518) (1.561) (0.934) (0.648)
Year 2014 -10.098*** -6.366* -1.809 1.874** 0.138
(2.272) (3.556) (1.585) (0.936) (0.647)
Constant -8.532 94.327*** 43.951*** 17.836*** 30.109***
(8.026) (10.196) (4.085) (2.940) (2.149)
N 2,223 1,070 4,931 8,194 12,373
R2 0.158 0.345 0.216 0.160 0.185
Adj. R2 0.146 0.325 0.211 0.156 0.183
F-test 13.63 20.45 40.95 46.96 89.09
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 7 – ROBUSTNESS CHECK  
Table A1  OLS estimates (POOLED MODEL) 
 
 
VARIABLES Anxiety Happiness Satisfaction Worthiness
Female 0.100*** 0.040* 0.062*** 0.169***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023)
Age 0.013 -0.040*** -0.077*** -0.050***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age2 -0.000 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Occupation (main job)
(Accountants reference group)
GPs -0.046 0.076 0.052 0.536***
(0.067) (0.066) (0.062) (0.063)
Hospital doctors -0.124*** 0.100*** 0.126*** 0.512***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Lawyers 0.154*** -0.019 -0.076** 0.029
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Immigrant -0.006 0.060* 0.049 0.103***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Hourly wage (log) -0.059** 0.034 0.109*** -0.046*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024)
Basic usual hours (main job) 0.002* -0.003** -0.002* -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Overtime hours (main job) 0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Actual hours (2nd job) -0.001 0.004 0.005* 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married -0.019 0.238*** 0.303*** 0.299***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
Divorced -0.062 0.152*** 0.079* 0.145***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048)
Separated -0.012 -0.045 -0.236*** 0.090
(0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.068)
Widowed 0.154 0.049 -0.330** -0.077
(0.146) (0.145) (0.136) (0.138)
Ethnic group
(white reference group)
Black -0.057 0.074 0.016 0.197**
(0.081) (0.080) (0.075) (0.077)
Asian 0.065 -0.042 -0.143*** -0.167***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039)
Other 0.112* -0.164** -0.184*** 0.015








North East -0.075 -0.050 0.093* 0.129**
(0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.055)
North West -0.077* 0.057 0.083** 0.218***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043)
Yorkshire and Humberside -0.045 -0.037 0.015 0.158***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048)
East Midlands -0.016 -0.071 0.056 0.213***
(0.062) (0.061) (0.057) (0.058)
West Midlands -0.087 -0.040 0.019 0.115**
(0.054) (0.054) (0.050) (0.051)
Easter -0.039 -0.002 0.115** 0.199***
(0.057) (0.056) (0.053) (0.054)
London
South East -0.048 0.002 -0.033 0.110***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039)
South West -0.057 0.009 0.094** 0.066
(0.049) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046)
Wales 0.010 -0.015 0.146*** 0.191***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.044) (0.045)
Scotland -0.137*** 0.046 0.170*** 0.264***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041)
Northen Ireland -0.285*** 0.057 0.131 0.096
(0.102) (0.101) (0.095) (0.097)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 0.030 -0.033 -0.024 -0.031
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
FY 2013/14 0.014 0.028 -0.013 0.006
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
FY 2014/15 -0.008 0.054* 0.099*** 0.064**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
Constant -0.238 0.768*** 1.320*** 0.639***
(0.178) (0.176) (0.166) (0.169)
Observations 7,970 7,970 7,970 7,970
R-squared 0.020 0.025 0.062 0.096
Adj. R-squared 0.016 0.021 0.058 0.092
F-test 5.047 6.277 16.280 26.260
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS
Female 0.144 0.139** 0.175*** 0.064**
(0.181) (0.055) (0.063) (0.031)
Age -0.091* -0.023 0.021 0.020*
(0.054) (0.019) (0.020) (0.011)
Age2 0.001* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant -0.255 0.164** -0.184** -0.003
(0.220) (0.064) (0.093) (0.043)
Hourly wage (log) 0.169 0.034 -0.046 -0.088***
(0.155) (0.064) (0.064) (0.032)
Basic usual hours (main job) -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.003
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Overtime hours (main job) 0.024 0.008** 0.025*** 0.012***
(0.021) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Actual hours (2nd job) -0.012 0.005 0.010 -0.002
(0.016) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married 0.069 0.069 -0.029 -0.041
(0.173) (0.067) (0.069) (0.035)
Divorced 0.675* -0.028 -0.022 -0.098
(0.376) (0.136) (0.125) (0.062)
Separated -0.055 -0.111 0.186 0.014
(0.311) (0.174) (0.198) (0.090)




Black 1.486*** -0.320** 0.007 0.011
(0.569) (0.141) (0.223) (0.114)
Asian 0.348 -0.004 0.107 0.040
(0.227) (0.070) (0.125) (0.062)
Other 0.561* 0.019 -0.028 0.124









North East 0.315 -0.016 0.037 -0.178**
(0.348) (0.113) (0.154) (0.082)
North West 0.271 -0.168 -0.096 -0.049
(0.323) (0.103) (0.115) (0.060)
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.297 -0.095 0.023 -0.059
(0.321) (0.113) (0.126) (0.067)
East Midlands 0.832* 0.073 0.023 -0.104
(0.429) (0.144) (0.155) (0.079)
West Midlands 0.385 -0.274** 0.118 -0.109
(0.357) (0.128) (0.139) (0.070)
Easter 0.696* -0.063 -0.250 -0.040
(0.388) (0.142) (0.160) (0.070)
London 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South East 0.459 -0.138 0.090 -0.072
(0.315) (0.110) (0.112) (0.051)
South West 0.389 -0.164 0.123 -0.088
(0.325) (0.112) (0.129) (0.062)
Wales 0.367 -0.035 -0.105 0.033
(0.313) (0.109) (0.126) (0.062)
Scotland 0.162 -0.173 -0.024 -0.173***
(0.339) (0.105) (0.105) (0.055)
Northen Ireland -0.067 -0.393* -0.739** -0.189
(0.629) (0.222) (0.287) (0.129)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 -0.174 0.047 -0.113 0.070*
(0.187) (0.066) (0.077) (0.038)
FY 2013/14 -0.056 -0.004 0.055 0.004
(0.171) (0.067) (0.077) (0.038)
FY 2014/15 0.072 0.015 -0.085 -0.014
(0.169) (0.067) (0.087) (0.041)
Constant 0.499 0.255 -0.546 -0.278
(1.217) (0.396) (0.420) (0.237)
Observations 245 1,585 1,227 4,913
R-squared 0.143 0.027 0.060 0.014
Adj. R-squared 0.027 0.009 0.037 0.008
F-test 1.237 1.535 2.639 2.348
Prob>F 0.198 0.037 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS
Female -0.093 -0.006 -0.053 0.061**
(0.185) (0.054) (0.061) (0.030)
Age -0.020 -0.049** -0.061*** -0.029***
(0.055) (0.019) (0.019) (0.011)
Age2 0.000 0.000** 0.001** 0.000**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant -0.019 -0.130** 0.103 0.114***
(0.226) (0.064) (0.090) (0.043)
Hourly wage (log) -0.115 -0.071 0.043 0.073**
(0.159) (0.064) (0.062) (0.032)
Basic usual hours (main job) -0.004 -0.003 -0.006* -0.004*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Overtime hours (main job) -0.007 -0.004 -0.022*** -0.011***
(0.021) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Actual hours (2nd job) 0.013 -0.001 -0.007 0.007**
(0.016) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married 0.432** 0.311*** 0.334*** 0.176***
(0.177) (0.067) (0.066) (0.035)
Divorced -0.229 0.253* 0.361*** 0.072
(0.386) (0.136) (0.121) (0.062)
Separated -0.043 0.166 0.114 -0.141
(0.319) (0.174) (0.191) (0.089)




Black 0.354 0.167 0.346 -0.058
(0.584) (0.141) (0.215) (0.114)
Asian -0.094 0.123* -0.290** -0.064
(0.233) (0.070) (0.120) (0.061)
Other -0.394 -0.266*** -0.021 -0.028







North East -0.230 -0.071 -0.014 -0.025
(0.357) (0.113) (0.149) (0.082)
North West -0.112 0.184* -0.053 0.046
(0.331) (0.103) (0.111) (0.059)
Yorkshire and Humberside -0.221 0.044 -0.020 -0.053
(0.329) (0.113) (0.122) (0.067)
East Midlands -0.692 -0.100 0.151 -0.104
(0.440) (0.144) (0.150) (0.079)
West Midlands -0.316 0.117 -0.150 -0.031
(0.366) (0.127) (0.134) (0.069)
Easter -0.151 0.156 0.111 -0.055
(0.398) (0.141) (0.154) (0.070)
London 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South East -0.980*** 0.175 -0.022 -0.008
(0.323) (0.110) (0.108) (0.051)
South West -0.459 0.123 -0.073 -0.003
(0.334) (0.112) (0.125) (0.062)
Wales -0.173 0.109 -0.027 -0.033
(0.321) (0.109) (0.122) (0.062)
Scotland -0.459 0.028 0.081 0.070
(0.348) (0.105) (0.101) (0.055)
Northen Ireland 0.125 0.236 0.309 -0.040
(0.646) (0.221) (0.277) (0.129)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 -0.196 0.051 -0.046 -0.050
(0.192) (0.066) (0.074) (0.038)
FY 2013/14 -0.202 0.066 0.074 0.019
(0.175) (0.067) (0.074) (0.038)
FY 2014/15 -0.103 0.017 0.095 0.066
(0.173) (0.067) (0.084) (0.041)
Constant 1.563 1.307*** 1.477*** 0.423*
(1.249) (0.395) (0.405) (0.236)
Observations 245 1,585 1,227 4,913
R-squared 0.138 0.041 0.073 0.021
Adj. R-squared 0.021 0.024 0.051 0.015
F-test 1.182 2.386 3.253 3.529
Prob>F 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A4 OLS estimates – Satisfaction 
 
  
VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS
Female 0.052 0.042 0.025 0.067**
(0.173) (0.051) (0.059) (0.028)
Age -0.024 -0.056*** -0.125*** -0.064***
(0.052) (0.018) (0.019) (0.010)
Age2 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant 0.099 -0.125** 0.128 0.103**
(0.211) (0.060) (0.087) (0.040)
Hourly wage (log) -0.505*** 0.019 0.123** 0.160***
(0.148) (0.060) (0.060) (0.029)
Basic usual hours (main job) -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Overtime hours (main job) 0.021 -0.005 -0.022*** -0.012***
(0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Actual hours (2nd job) 0.021 0.001 0.005 0.007**
(0.015) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married 0.348** 0.150** 0.309*** 0.336***
(0.165) (0.063) (0.064) (0.032)
Divorced -0.063 0.053 0.253** 0.042
(0.360) (0.128) (0.117) (0.057)
Separated -0.373 0.189 -0.487*** -0.287***
(0.297) (0.164) (0.184) (0.083)




Black -0.436 0.047 0.116 -0.019
(0.545) (0.133) (0.208) (0.105)
Asian -0.433** -0.002 -0.262** -0.164***
(0.217) (0.066) (0.116) (0.057)
Other -0.172 -0.175* -0.178 -0.068









North East 0.015 -0.003 0.128 0.169**
(0.333) (0.107) (0.144) (0.076)
North West -0.244 0.075 -0.105 0.167***
(0.309) (0.097) (0.107) (0.055)
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.151 0.037 -0.038 0.014
(0.307) (0.106) (0.118) (0.062)
East Midlands 0.221 0.019 0.364** 0.012
(0.410) (0.135) (0.145) (0.073)
West Midlands -0.172 0.050 -0.045 0.075
(0.341) (0.120) (0.129) (0.064)
Easter -0.295 -0.011 0.427*** 0.122*
(0.371) (0.133) (0.149) (0.064)
London 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South East -0.535* 0.107 0.100 -0.065
(0.301) (0.104) (0.104) (0.047)
South West -0.383 0.238** 0.090 0.064
(0.311) (0.105) (0.120) (0.057)
Wales 0.117 0.200* 0.027 0.176***
(0.300) (0.103) (0.117) (0.057)
Scotland 0.003 0.179* 0.166* 0.190***
(0.324) (0.099) (0.098) (0.051)
Northen Ireland -0.457 0.185 0.155 0.169
(0.602) (0.208) (0.267) (0.120)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 0.288 -0.076 -0.056 -0.002
(0.179) (0.062) (0.072) (0.035)
FY 2013/14 -0.143 0.027 -0.033 -0.007
(0.163) (0.063) (0.072) (0.035)
FY 2014/15 0.045 0.028 0.168** 0.121***
(0.162) (0.063) (0.081) (0.038)
Constant 2.437** 1.228*** 2.453*** 0.925***
(1.165) (0.372) (0.391) (0.219)
Observations 245 1,585 1,227 4,913
R-squared 0.188 0.034 0.118 0.069
Adj. R-squared 0.078 0.016 0.097 0.064
F-test 1.712 1.946 5.527 12.570
Prob>F 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A5 Model 2 - OLS estimates (Worthiness) 
 
  
VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS
Female 0.096 0.171*** 0.209*** 0.144***
(0.167) (0.050) (0.064) (0.029)
Age 0.007 -0.045** -0.048** -0.053***
(0.050) (0.018) (0.020) (0.010)
Age2 -0.000 0.000** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant -0.110 0.061 0.156* 0.151***
(0.204) (0.059) (0.094) (0.041)
Hourly wage (log) -0.319** 0.058 -0.051 -0.021
(0.143) (0.058) (0.064) (0.030)
Basic usual hours (main job) 0.008 0.000 0.002 -0.004*
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Overtime hours (main job) 0.011 0.006* -0.010** -0.002
(0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Actual hours (2nd job) 0.023 0.011* -0.017 0.008**
(0.014) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married 0.341** 0.231*** 0.385*** 0.288***
(0.160) (0.062) (0.069) (0.033)
Divorced -0.019 0.153 0.269** 0.099*
(0.348) (0.125) (0.126) (0.058)
Separated -0.190 0.556*** 0.037 0.020
(0.287) (0.160) (0.199) (0.084)




Black -0.261 -0.012 0.335 0.274**
(0.527) (0.130) (0.224) (0.107)
Asian -0.120 -0.187*** -0.204 -0.117**
(0.210) (0.064) (0.125) (0.058)
Other -0.219 0.014 0.045 0.066









North East -0.111 -0.191* -0.042 0.384***
(0.322) (0.104) (0.155) (0.077)
North West -0.014 0.057 0.047 0.352***
(0.299) (0.095) (0.116) (0.056)
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.146 0.135 0.119 0.172***
(0.297) (0.104) (0.127) (0.063)
East Midlands 0.198 -0.025 0.723*** 0.165**
(0.396) (0.132) (0.156) (0.074)
West Midlands -0.247 0.119 -0.111 0.203***
(0.330) (0.117) (0.140) (0.065)
Easter 0.216 0.163 0.369** 0.187***
(0.359) (0.130) (0.161) (0.065)
London 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South East 0.030 0.106 0.048 0.130***
(0.291) (0.101) (0.113) (0.048)
South West -0.007 0.142 -0.040 0.048
(0.301) (0.103) (0.130) (0.058)
Wales 0.129 0.163 -0.091 0.281***
(0.290) (0.100) (0.127) (0.058)
Scotland 0.015 -0.010 0.338*** 0.343***
(0.313) (0.097) (0.106) (0.051)
Northen Ireland 0.374 -0.086 -0.121 0.196
(0.582) (0.204) (0.289) (0.121)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 0.014 -0.057 -0.129* 0.004
(0.173) (0.060) (0.077) (0.035)
FY 2013/14 -0.203 -0.017 -0.071 0.046
(0.158) (0.061) (0.078) (0.035)
FY 2014/15 -0.128 0.045 0.040 0.088**
(0.156) (0.062) (0.087) (0.039)
Constant 0.957 1.006*** 0.539 0.649***
(1.126) (0.363) (0.422) (0.222)
Observations 245 1,585 1,227 4,913
R-squared 0.146 0.048 0.096 0.057
Adj. R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.074 0.051
F-test 1.265 2.829 4.360 10.090
Prob>F 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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VARIABLES Anxiety Happiness Satisfaction Worthiness
Female 0.126*** 0.030 0.048** 0.169***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Age 0.019*** -0.045*** -0.075*** -0.059***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age2 -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Occupation (main job)
(Accountants reference group)
GPs -0.176*** 0.099*** 0.135*** 0.479***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Hospital doctors -0.133*** 0.110*** 0.168*** 0.461***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Lawyers 0.117*** -0.013 -0.039 0.032
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Immigrant -0.009 0.040 0.027 0.077***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Hourly wage (log)
Basic usual hours (main job) 0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Overtime hours (main job) 0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Actual hours (2nd job) 0.001 0.003 0.005** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married -0.026 0.215*** 0.325*** 0.309***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Divorced -0.055 0.127*** 0.089** 0.184***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040)
Separated 0.012 -0.044 -0.264*** 0.077
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.056)
Widowed 0.146 -0.019 -0.345*** 0.002
(0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.100)
Ethnic group
(white reference group)
Black -0.108* 0.074 -0.128** 0.065
(0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062)
Asian 0.049 -0.014 -0.140*** -0.156***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Other 0.090 -0.103* -0.171*** 0.002







North East -0.089* -0.057 0.032 0.106**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047)
North West -0.052 0.017 -0.008 0.151***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035)
Yorkshire and Humberside -0.054 -0.053 -0.050 0.115***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
East Midlands -0.078 -0.034 0.075 0.211***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050)
West Midlands -0.104** -0.063 -0.031 0.082**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Easter -0.108** -0.003 0.100** 0.232***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
London 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South East -0.065* -0.010 -0.032 0.096***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
South West -0.050 0.009 0.069* 0.070*
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
Wales -0.041 0.016 0.102*** 0.199***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Scotland -0.105*** 0.024 0.098*** 0.209***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Northen Ireland -0.218*** 0.172** 0.166** 0.179**
(0.079) (0.079) (0.077) (0.076)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 -0.011 0.013 -0.002 -0.028
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
FY 2013/14 0.007 0.055** 0.026 0.028
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
FY 2014/15 -0.050* 0.097*** 0.135*** 0.073***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant -0.498*** 0.940*** 1.536*** 0.636***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.124) (0.122)
Observations 11,747 11,747 11,747 11,747
R-squared 0.021 0.024 0.057 0.084
Adj. R-squared 0.018 0.021 0.054 0.082
F-test 8.109 9.250 22.800 34.820
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS
Female 0.280*** 0.140*** 0.134*** 0.097***
(0.077) (0.050) (0.048) (0.026)
Age 0.048** -0.026 0.040*** 0.020**
(0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008)
Age2 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant -0.040 0.121** -0.146** -0.005
(0.099) (0.059) (0.068) (0.036)
Hourly wage (log)
Basic usual hours (main job) 0.005* 0.001 0.006*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Overtime hours (main job) 0.013 0.006* 0.021*** 0.007***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Actual hours (2nd job) 0.006 0.001 0.008 -0.002
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married -0.113 0.059 -0.055 -0.021
(0.102) (0.063) (0.054) (0.031)
Divorced 0.003 -0.137 0.006 -0.067
(0.164) (0.125) (0.098) (0.053)
Separated -0.380* -0.007 0.024 0.077
(0.198) (0.151) (0.143) (0.076)
Widowed -0.285 -0.180 0.271 0.221*
(0.306) (0.989) (0.252) (0.125)
Ethnic group
(white reference group)
Black 0.441* -0.325** -0.302* -0.010
(0.263) (0.132) (0.154) (0.089)
Asian 0.044 0.016 0.169* -0.001
(0.113) (0.064) (0.088) (0.052)
Other 0.034 0.027 0.142 0.113













North East 0.105 -0.011 -0.124 -0.162**
(0.178) (0.106) (0.117) (0.071)
North West 0.076 -0.136 -0.064 -0.027
(0.137) (0.093) (0.084) (0.050)
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.325** -0.042 -0.014 -0.129**
(0.157) (0.103) (0.100) (0.057)
East Midlands 0.191 0.130 -0.029 -0.187***
(0.196) (0.134) (0.120) (0.068)
West Midlands 0.270 -0.277** -0.035 -0.127**
(0.181) (0.110) (0.103) (0.056)
Easter 0.213 -0.048 -0.238** -0.119**
(0.193) (0.128) (0.105) (0.058)
London 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South East 0.034 -0.126 0.028 -0.088**
(0.136) (0.101) (0.083) (0.042)
South West 0.275* -0.099 0.107 -0.128**
(0.154) (0.104) (0.095) (0.052)
Wales 0.212 -0.039 -0.171* -0.043
(0.143) (0.099) (0.094) (0.052)
Scotland -0.009 -0.051 0.047 -0.190***
(0.137) (0.095) (0.077) (0.046)
Northen Ireland -0.237 -0.148 -0.534*** -0.158
(0.257) (0.203) (0.188) (0.104)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 -0.147* 0.008 -0.092 0.033
(0.088) (0.061) (0.058) (0.032)
FY 2013/14 0.072 -0.035 0.036 -0.003
(0.089) (0.061) (0.058) (0.032)
FY 2014/15 0.027 -0.036 -0.069 -0.064*
(0.088) (0.062) (0.065) (0.035)
Constant -1.751*** 0.344 -1.051*** -0.406**
(0.476) (0.336) (0.292) (0.170)
Observations 903 1,870 2,157 6,817
R-squared 0.058 0.022 0.053 0.013
Adj. R-squared 0.028 0.008 0.040 0.009
F-test 1.932 1.509 4.241 3.154
Prob>F 0.003 0.043 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS
Female -0.184** 0.004 0.004 0.064**
(0.075) (0.050) (0.047) (0.026)
Age -0.071*** -0.059*** -0.087*** -0.026***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008)
Age2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant 0.176* -0.116** 0.079 0.065*
(0.096) (0.059) (0.067) (0.036)
Hourly wage (log)
Basic usual hours (main job) -0.007*** 0.001 -0.004** -0.002*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Overtime hours (main job) 0.005 -0.004 -0.020*** -0.009***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Actual hours (2nd job) 0.013 0.000 -0.000 0.004
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married 0.222** 0.320*** 0.339*** 0.149***
(0.099) (0.062) (0.054) (0.031)
Divorced 0.209 0.337*** 0.247** 0.028
(0.160) (0.125) (0.097) (0.053)
Separated -0.136 0.180 0.243* -0.170**
(0.193) (0.151) (0.142) (0.076)
Widowed 0.483 1.136 -0.153 -0.150
(0.298) (0.987) (0.251) (0.125)
Ethnic group
(white reference group)
Black -0.119 0.224* 0.279* -0.025
(0.256) (0.132) (0.153) (0.089)
Asian -0.100 0.124* -0.298*** 0.000
(0.110) (0.064) (0.088) (0.052)
Other -0.027 -0.296*** 0.013 0.035












North East 0.005 -0.033 -0.102 -0.061
(0.173) (0.105) (0.116) (0.072)
North West -0.111 0.160* -0.088 0.008
(0.133) (0.093) (0.083) (0.051)
Yorkshire and Humberside -0.360** -0.006 -0.083 -0.003
(0.153) (0.102) (0.099) (0.058)
East Midlands -0.374* -0.180 0.150 -0.029
(0.191) (0.134) (0.120) (0.068)
West Midlands -0.243 0.081 -0.197* -0.030
(0.176) (0.110) (0.102) (0.057)
Easter 0.113 0.082 0.084 -0.054
(0.188) (0.128) (0.104) (0.058)
London 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South East -0.443*** 0.148 -0.034 0.001
(0.132) (0.101) (0.082) (0.042)
South West -0.367** 0.119 -0.058 0.030
(0.150) (0.104) (0.095) (0.052)
Wales -0.169 0.133 -0.003 0.018
(0.139) (0.098) (0.094) (0.052)
Scotland -0.139 0.026 -0.065 0.078*
(0.133) (0.095) (0.076) (0.046)
Northen Ireland 0.366 0.222 0.361* 0.073
(0.250) (0.203) (0.187) (0.105)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 0.096 0.039 0.044 -0.017
(0.086) (0.061) (0.058) (0.032)
FY 2013/14 -0.009 0.068 0.091 0.050
(0.086) (0.061) (0.057) (0.032)
FY 2014/15 0.055 0.042 0.120* 0.111***
(0.086) (0.062) (0.064) (0.035)
Constant 2.231*** 1.132*** 2.031*** 0.464***
(0.463) (0.335) (0.290) (0.170)
Observations 903 1,870 2,157 6,817
R-squared 0.080 0.041 0.069 0.018
Adj. R-squared 0.051 0.026 0.057 0.014
F-test 2.721 2.783 5.651 4.474
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS
Female -0.182** 0.022 0.066 0.065***
(0.079) (0.048) (0.048) (0.025)
Age -0.066*** -0.061*** -0.115*** -0.065***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008)
Age2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant 0.131 -0.072 0.083 0.033
(0.102) (0.057) (0.068) (0.035)
Hourly wage (log)
Basic usual hours (main job) -0.006** 0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Overtime hours (main job) -0.018** -0.005* -0.016*** -0.008***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Actual hours (2nd job) 0.007 0.004 0.011* 0.004
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married 0.224** 0.184*** 0.414*** 0.349***
(0.105) (0.060) (0.054) (0.030)
Divorced 0.259 0.146 0.079 0.064
(0.169) (0.120) (0.098) (0.051)
Separated -0.243 0.192 -0.275* -0.388***
(0.204) (0.145) (0.144) (0.074)
Widowed 0.346 -0.301 -0.659*** -0.374***
(0.315) (0.947) (0.254) (0.121)
Ethnic group
(white reference group)
Black -0.161 0.052 -0.130 -0.208**
(0.271) (0.127) (0.155) (0.086)
Asian -0.233** -0.023 -0.374*** -0.122**
(0.116) (0.061) (0.089) (0.050)
Other -0.062 -0.240*** -0.268 -0.046













North East 0.164 0.073 -0.212* 0.087
(0.183) (0.101) (0.118) (0.069)
North West -0.290** 0.105 -0.219*** 0.085*
(0.141) (0.089) (0.085) (0.049)
Yorkshire and Humberside -0.248 0.017 -0.092 -0.016
(0.162) (0.098) (0.100) (0.056)
East Midlands 0.172 0.011 0.171 0.056
(0.202) (0.129) (0.121) (0.066)
West Midlands -0.101 0.043 -0.247** 0.045
(0.186) (0.105) (0.104) (0.055)
Easter 0.061 -0.048 0.297*** 0.099*
(0.199) (0.123) (0.106) (0.057)
London 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South East -0.355** 0.116 0.077 -0.040
(0.140) (0.097) (0.083) (0.041)
South West -0.176 0.285*** -0.024 0.070
(0.159) (0.099) (0.096) (0.051)
Wales -0.033 0.223** -0.105 0.143***
(0.147) (0.094) (0.095) (0.050)
Scotland -0.116 0.215** -0.008 0.146***
(0.141) (0.091) (0.077) (0.045)
Northen Ireland 0.269 0.157 0.330* 0.119
(0.265) (0.195) (0.189) (0.101)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 -0.025 -0.094 -0.010 0.028
(0.091) (0.058) (0.059) (0.031)
FY 2013/14 -0.062 0.009 0.007 0.050
(0.091) (0.059) (0.058) (0.031)
FY 2014/15 0.047 0.045 0.187*** 0.173***
(0.091) (0.059) (0.065) (0.034)
Constant 2.215*** 1.212*** 2.511*** 1.270***
(0.490) (0.322) (0.295) (0.165)
Observations 903 1,870 2,157 6,817
R-squared 0.071 0.036 0.105 0.059
Adj. R-squared 0.042 0.022 0.093 0.055
F-test 2.399 2.464 8.934 15.090
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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VARIABLES GPs HOSPITAL                        DOCTORS LAWYERS ACCOUNTANTS
Female 0.042 0.114** 0.235*** 0.168***
(0.069) (0.046) (0.050) (0.025)
Age -0.061*** -0.048*** -0.078*** -0.053***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008)
Age2 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant 0.092 0.055 0.053 0.121***
(0.089) (0.055) (0.070) (0.035)
Hourly wage (log)
Basic usual hours (main job) -0.001 0.004* 0.004** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Overtime hours (main job) 0.003 0.003 -0.010*** -0.002
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Actual hours (2nd job) 0.007 0.009* -0.002 0.006**
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Marital status
(single reference group) 
Married 0.133 0.257*** 0.412*** 0.302***
(0.092) (0.058) (0.056) (0.029)
Divorced 0.172 0.229** 0.262*** 0.136***
(0.147) (0.116) (0.101) (0.050)
Separated -0.263 0.596*** 0.252* -0.049
(0.178) (0.140) (0.149) (0.073)
Widowed 0.136 0.446 -0.295 0.012
(0.275) (0.916) (0.262) (0.120)
Ethnic group
(white reference group)
Black -0.271 -0.030 0.214 0.094
(0.237) (0.122) (0.160) (0.085)
Asian -0.163 -0.214*** -0.142 -0.108**
(0.101) (0.059) (0.092) (0.050)
Other -0.024 -0.022 -0.020 0.042







North East -0.095 -0.151 -0.097 0.302***
(0.160) (0.098) (0.121) (0.068)
North West -0.124 0.016 -0.073 0.301***
(0.123) (0.086) (0.087) (0.048)
Yorkshire and Humberside -0.256* 0.039 0.113 0.188***
(0.141) (0.095) (0.104) (0.055)
East Midlands 0.123 -0.103 0.473*** 0.210***
(0.176) (0.124) (0.125) (0.065)
West Midlands -0.258 -0.001 -0.253** 0.239***
(0.162) (0.102) (0.107) (0.054)
Easter 0.323* 0.102 0.372*** 0.213***
(0.173) (0.119) (0.109) (0.056)
London 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South East -0.052 0.076 0.038 0.133***
(0.122) (0.094) (0.086) (0.040)
South West -0.141 0.141 -0.053 0.094*
(0.138) (0.096) (0.099) (0.050)
Wales -0.031 0.144 -0.068 0.311***
(0.128) (0.091) (0.098) (0.050)
Scotland -0.144 -0.016 0.195** 0.321***
(0.123) (0.088) (0.080) (0.044)
Northen Ireland 0.131 -0.178 0.420** 0.194*
(0.231) (0.188) (0.196) (0.100)
Fiscal year dummies
(FY 2011/12 reference group)
FY 2012/13 -0.011 -0.047 -0.061 -0.010
(0.079) (0.056) (0.061) (0.031)
FY 2013/14 -0.091 -0.024 0.034 0.055*
(0.080) (0.057) (0.060) (0.031)
FY 2014/15 -0.081 0.089 0.117* 0.085**
(0.079) (0.057) (0.067) (0.034)
Constant 1.899*** 1.082*** 0.981*** 0.419***
(0.428) (0.311) (0.304) (0.162)
Observations 903 1,870 2,157 6,817
R-squared 0.053 0.042 0.076 0.052
Adj. R-squared 0.023 0.027 0.064 0.048
F-test 1.755 2.866 6.250 13.220
Prob>F 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
